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CONTENTS

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JEWISH COMMUNITIES OF UKRAINE, MOLDOVA AND BELARUS AT THE TURN OF THE 1990s–2000

Jewish Communities of Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus: Description Parameters

The biggest part of the territory made up by present Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, earlier used to be the area of the Jewish settlement of the Russian empire. It is important to remember that the borders of the Jewish settlement at the turn of the 19th-20th centuries included Grodno, Minsk, Koven, Vitebsk, Mogilev, Vilno, Kherson, Volynsk, Bessarabia, Kiev, Podolsk, Poltava, Tauria, Ekaterinoslav, the Chernigov gubernia and ten gubernias of Kingdom of Poland.

According to the data of the population census in 1897, the total number of Jews reached 5215805 people [Statistika evrejskogo naselenija, 1909, s. 35]; within the non-Polish provinces of the settlement the distribution was as follows:

Research

Provinces	**Number**
Bessarabia	228528
Vilno	204686
Grodno	280489
Vitebsk	175629
Koven	212666
Minsk	345015
Mogilev	203946
Chernigov	114452
Kiev	433728
Podolsk	370612
Poltava	110944
Kharkov	13664
Ekaterinoslav	101088
Tauria	60752
Kherson	339910

Source: Obshchij svod, 1905.

Without the Koven and Vilno gubernias it makes up 53, 3 % of the Jewish population of the Russian empire.

In 1989 in the USSR Jews made up 0, 5 % of the whole population (1449 thousand people). The data of the population census in the USSR carried out the same year can be represented as follows[1]:

	Total Population	Jews	Highland Jews	Georgian Jews	Central Asian Jews	Total number of Jews	Percentage
The USSR	285742511	1378344	18513	16054	36152	1449063	0,5
The Ukrainian SSR	51452034	486326	136	56	110	486628	1
The Byelorussian SSR	10151806	111883	73	4	15	111979	1,1
The Moldavian SSR	4335360	65672	89	33	5	65799	1,5

The author of the article will use the data of the population censuses from the end of the 1990s - the beginning of the 2000s.

According to the official data of the population census in Belarus in 1999 (the data are available on the web-site of the Belarusian ministry of statistics http://belstat.gov.by), the Jewish population in the country was 27810 people (0, 3 % of the ten-million population). The all Ukrainian population census in 2001 yielded the following results: of the total population of 48547 thousand people in Ukraine 103, 6 thousand people were Jews (0, 2 %) [http://www.ukrcensus.gov. ua]. The available data on the population census in Moldova in 2004 (without the Transdniester area) show that the total population of the country at that moment was 3383 thousand people with only 3608 people calling themselves Jews (0, 11 %) (the data are available on the site of the National bureau of statistics of the Republic Moldova: http://www.statistica.md).

The population census in the unrecognized Transdniester Moldavian Republic (TMR) took place in the same year of 2004. It is interesting that there is no access to the exact data. According to the available census results, the left bank of the river Dniester was occupied by 555347 people at that time (the message of the information agency "Free Moldova" dated 20.06.2006: http://freemd.info/news/993.html). The precise number of those who called themselves Jews is not known. In 2005 Jewish organizations stated that there are between 3 and 4 thousand Jews living in the TMR [Evrejskaya obshchina v Moldove, 2005, s. 303]. The data of the Jewish organizations are exaggerated. Probably, the real number of Jews remaining on the left bank of the Dniester makes up less than 1, 5 thousand people (0, 3 %).

Researchers challenge the quantitative data of censuses. Special works have been devoted to this issue [see: Zisels, 2003]. Actually, there are several ways of understanding who a Jew is. One of them can be logically called "a declarative principle": a Jew is a person

who considers himself to be a Jew (especially when dealing with authorities). The second principle can be called "a strict principle": a Jew is a person whose mother is a Jew.[2] However, there is no need to study the principles of defining Jewry. One shall mention once again that Jewish organizations provide other quantitative data that differ from the census results. According to the statement of Jewish institutions, at present Ukraine has got from 200 up to 400 thousand Jews (0, 4-0, 8 %) [Evrejskaya obshchina v Ukraine, 2008, s. 418], Moldova has got nearly 15 thousand (0, 38 %) and nearly 2 thousand live on the left bank of the Dniester (data from 2008) [Evrejskaya obshchina v Moldove, 2008, s. 385]; Belarus has got from 50 up to 70 thousand Jews (0, 5-0, 7 %). However, we shall emphasize again that below the author will use the data of the official censuses mainly because they use "the declarative principle" of the nationality and it is considered to be more objective.



Khabad preachers in Ukraine, a small town in Chernovtsy area
(the photo was taken by the author)

In spite of all the differences in the quantitative data cited in sources, Ukraine now is one of those few countries where Jewish life is rather noticeable. It is possible to see a religious Jew striding around Kiev while in a small provincial town one can see Khabad preachers who ride around on bicycles; there one can freely put on sukka.[3]

Jewish life in Ukraine seems to be much more eventful than even in the neighboring Russia, at least to the inhabitants of the country. In Russia the state interferes with the alignment of forces inside the Jewish community while in Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova authorities prefer not to interfere into intracommunal relations. This is a crucial circumstance characterizing the changes that happened to the Jewish communities of three states at the turn of the 1990s-2000.

Thus, the specified demographic factor, an active Jewish life in this region which is most visible in Ukraine, and also the fact that in the specified countries the authorities do

not interfere into the affairs of the community, allow us to speak about the urgency of the chosen research issue.

Question Historiography

There is very little research devoted to the forming of Jewish communities in Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. The majority of the existing works examine the position of the Jewish community in Ukraine. At the same time the post-Soviet Jewry of Moldova is not being studied: the only known work is the review written by V. Bruter [Bruter, 2002]. There is also a very limited number of works devoted to the Jewish community of Belarus [Zajka, 1993; Rubinchik, 2002; Shevelev, 2008]. Besides, when dealing with the situation in Belarus the authors using the tendentiously provided facts, do not always make correct conclusions [Antisemitism, 2005; Antisemitism, 2008].

In general, a set of works available at present can be divided into two groups: first, the research written by "senior generation" authors or former participants of the underground Jewish movement in the USSR (M. A. Chlenov, I.S. Zisels) or Israeli researchers (Z. Khanin), and, secondly, the works of "the younger generation" researchers, i.e. those who have been working in the field of the Jewish research approximately since the middle of the 1990s (V. Likhachov, S. Charny, Y. Korogodsky, D. Shevelev). Thus, it is necessary to note that the conclusions and estimations presented by the authors of the two specified groups are quite reasonable and correct and in many respects supplement each other. Research of one group of authors differs from the other by the attention given to various aspects of the issue.

The works of the first group stating the opinions of "the senior generation" researchers examine demographic problems and the revival of the Jewish life at the end of the 1980s – the beginning of the 1990s [Zajka, 1993; Khanin, 2001; Kupovetsky, 2001; Zisels, 2003]. Here we shall provide the conclusions of either the experts who know the Jewish life from within (I.S. Zisels, M.A. Chlenov) or of those whose subject of the scientific research has long been the Eastern European Jewry (Z. Khanin).

The second group of works offers the conclusions of "the young generation" authors and deals with the period in the second half of the 1990s – the middle of 2000. These authors directly do Jewish research and are either connected with Jewish life or are engaged in science and teaching professionally. It is necessary to mention once again that the presented division is very relative, and the conclusions of the researchers supplement each other.

Let us repeat that there are some moments which make it possible to speak about the necessity of further research of the declared problem. Firstly, there are actually very few works in the specified countries which are devoted to the study of Jewish communities. The research available describes, mainly, the situation in Ukraine. Secondly, the research devoted to the Moldavian or Belarus Jewry during the post-Soviet period is extremely limited. Thirdly, Belarusian material provided by sources is frequently presented somewhat tendentiously.

Characteristic of Research Sources Database

The author has found it reasonable to use the type and kind classification of sources, having divided them conventionally into several groups:

1) legal acts, statistical materials, other documents of authorities;

2) materials of office work of communal establishments, both published and available on the web-sites of communal institutions;

3) periodicals, including the Internet-version of Jewish newspapers in Russian;

4) materials of the Jewish self-publication in Belarus in the 2000s, namely, the newspapers "Anahnu kan" ("*We are here*") and "My jashche tut!" ("*We are still here!*");

5) memoirs and diary records;

6) materials of the Anti-Zionist committee of the Soviet people of the end of the 1980s and analytical materials of the Eurasian Jewish congress (EJC).

Legal acts are available on the websites with the official databases of the given legislations including http://portal. rada.gov. ua/ for Ukraine and http://lex. justice. md/ for Moldova.

Statistical data are reflected both in the collections showing the results of population censuses [Statistika evrejskogo naselenija, 1909; Obshchij svod, 1905] and on the websites (see: the Ukrainian population census in 2001 (http://www.ukrcensus.gov. ua/), the Ministry of statistics and analysis of Belarus (http://belstat.gov.by/), the National Bureau of statistics of the Republic Moldova (http://www.statistica. md/).

Official statements of communal establishments are published in mass media including the printed editions published by the community and on the web-sites of communal establishments.

If we look at Belarusian editions belonging to the Jewish community we shall mention the newspaper of the Union of the Belarusian Jewish associations and communities (UBJAC) *"Aviv ("Spring")* and the newspaper "Berega" ("Coasts") being the body of the Jewish religious association in Belarus. It is necessary to include Belarusian editions published due to the efforts of V. Rubinchik. They are the newspapers which have probably revived the traditions of the Soviet Jewish self-publication "Anahnu kan" ("*We are here*") and "My jashche tut!" ("*We are still here!*"). The information presented in them partially gives a critical opinion of the activity of communal establishments as, clearly, communal editions very rarely express critical responses, and the quality of those editions leaves much to be desired. (For example, such a critical opinion in Ukraine is possible due to a great number of Jewish periodicals belonging to different institutions which often do not only compete between themselves but also are at enmity with each other.)

Ukrainian and Moldavian communal editions are partly accessible on the Internet including the newspaper *"Hadashot" ("News")* available on the site of Vaad of Ukraine (http://www.vaadua.org). The newspaper "Evrejskoe mestechko" ("Jewish place") can be found on the site of the fund "Dor le dor" (http://www.dorledor.info).

After twenty years of the organized Jewish life in the post-Soviet states memoir literature has started to appear. In connection with this it makes sense to mention the extracts from the diary available on the Internet. Their author is R. Sholom Dov-Ber Levin, one of those people who founded the Khabad movement in the former USSR.

In 1989–1990 the collections of the Anti-Zionist committee of the Soviet people (ACSP) "Perestroika i evrejskij vopros" ("Perestroika and the Jewish Question") [Perestroika …, 1990; Perestroika …, 1991] were published. They contained the opinion of the USSR leaders as well as the articles reprinted from the Soviet and Israeli press and some documents. The materials of all collections discussed the condition of the Jewish community in the Soviet Union at the turn of the 1980s – 1990s and the Soviet-Israeli relations.

Materials about the life of communities in the 2000s and reviews about the condition of anti-Semitism are available on the web-site of the Eurasian Jewish congress (http://www.eajc.org) and have been published since 2003 in "The Eurasian Jewish Year-book" (EJY).

The purpose of this work is to provide a comparative analysis of the processes which took place in the Jewish communities of Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus at the turn of the 1990s–2000s. The author has decided to characterize such processes using two parameters, namely, the relations of the community with the authorities and the relations inside the community.

The author of the present article understands quite perfectly that some of his statements provided below can seem disputable. However, it is necessary to note at once that it is only an attempt to explain several aspects of the existence of the post-Soviet Jewish communities.[4]

Jewish Organizations during the Post-Soviet Period

Forming the legal Jewish organizations in the late USSR goes back to 1988–1999. In June 1988 in Ukraine the Chernovtsy fund of preservation of the Jewish cemetery (in August of the same year it was renamed into the Chernovtsy Jewish socially-cultural fund) was created. As the initiative of the creation of such an organization came "from below" the authorities did not trust this institution.

Societies of Jewish culture were set up under the local branches of the Fund of Culture of the USSR in 1988 in Kiev and Minsk.[5] In 1989 a similar organization was created in Kishinev (the order of the government of the Moldavian SSR # 6 dated 05.01.1990). It is also possible that societies of Jewish culture in the Soviet Union republics were created on the basis of local branches of the Anti-Zionist committee of the Soviet people [Perestroika, 1991, s. 10]. In 1989 Jewish organizations became a part of the USSR Vaad.[6]

In the first half of the 1990s those organizations which were members of the all-union Vaad acquired formal independence while communities began to be divided into secular and religious ones. Such structure of Jewish organizations is still in use now.

We shall immediately discuss the use of the term "Jewish community". It is understood as a generality of citizens of the state who identify themselves as Jews; such generality has representation institutions, i.e., associations which represent it to authorities. Such interpretation of the concept "Jewish community" contradicts another understanding of the term stating that the community should have no representation structures but rather self-government institutions. Such communities exist in the West. There a community employs a rabbi paying for his services using its own means. The community also supports other establishments, for example, heder, Yeshiva. If there is a necessity to solve a problem with the authorities which the community cannot solve itself, it addresses the local or national association of communities. Management of such associations is elected. Such associations (or federations) possess not only representative but also administrative, lobbyist, and mediatorial functions. Large private donations are an auxiliary source of existence of a community [see: Likhachov, 2008, s. 115].

In the post-Soviet states the situation is quite the opposite. Representative bodies as well as communal centers, libraries, schools, synagogues exist, mainly, due to donations of foreign organizations, namely, American and Israeli ones. Among them are the American Jewish incorporated distributive committee (AJIDC), better known as "Joint", the organization "Claims Conference", the fund "Or Avner"[7] and several other charitable institutions. The same happens in Belarus. In Ukraine now about half of all means necessary for the existence of the community comes from foreign funds while another half comes from individuals. Since the beginning of the 2000s the financing of the communal projects has been supported by the financing from individuals. Some part of means for the financing of the communal life comes from the state. (In this case it is difficult to speak about the ratio of financing sources.)

Such way of community existence when it depends on foreign money resources allows some authors (for example, V. Likhachov, V. Rubinchik, J. Gutman) to claim that in the post-Soviet states the Jewish community does not exist [Likhachov, 2008, s. 114-115; AK, 2002, # 11; MYAT, 2008, # 38, s. 2].

The role of leaders is very significant in all Jewish associations in the described countries. In many cases associations were developed for specific leaders and without them these associations have got rather doubtful prospects of existence, at least in Belarus and Ukraine.

Only in Ukraine certain communities in Odessa, Dnepropetrovsk, Kharkov, and Donetsk are independent and are free from the unions existing in the center as they possess a sufficient source of financing and support from large businessmen of the Jewish origin [Likhachov, 2008, s. 108, 110]. We shall mention once again that this factor plays a significant role in the functioning of communal institutes only in Ukraine. Experts believe that Moldavian businessmen hardly wished to connect their own interests with the interests of the Jewish community [Bruter, 2002], at least prior to the beginning of the 2000s. The unwillingness of the businessmen to do business with the Jewish community has been characteristic for Belarus partially due to political reasons [MYAT, 2008, # 37, s. 1, # 41, s. 1].

Ukrainian researcher Y. Korogodsky is inclined to think that the structure of the post-Soviet Jewish communities in many respects resembles the political structure of their own states. Moreover, the situation in the community directly depends on the condition of the authorities in these states. In Ukraine the presence of a plenty of Jewish associations and their dissociation are the consequence of the absence of any intervention into the affairs of the community and political anarchy in the country; in Belarus one observes the presence of a small amount of Jewish unions, weakness of communal structures and their full dependence on authorities and foreign assistance. In Moldova there is a national-cultural autonomy, weak inclusiveness of the community in power structures and great dependence on foreign assistance (though it appears to be smaller than in Belarus).

Jewish associations of Ukraine. According to some data, in 2008 in Ukraine there were 288 Jewish organizations and 290 Jewish communities were registered. Observers also name about 100 Jewish charitable organizations.[8] 7 secular communal associations operate in the country. It does not seem important to describe them in detail as experts have just recently described their activity [Likhachov, 2008].

We shall name as the most authoritative the Association of Jewish organizations and communities (the Vaad of Ukraine). According to the experts, it unites 266 [Likhachov, 2008, s. 102] or 265 Jewish organizations [http://www.vaadua.org/]. Vaad of Ukraine is a part of the Eurasian Jewish congress (EJC).[9] It is an association of Jewish unions founded in 2002 that has partly replaced the Vaad of the USSR. In many respects the influence of the Vaad of Ukraine is connected with the activity of its head I.S. Zisels,[10] the former active participant of the Jewish movement in the USSR in the 1970s – 1980s. During "the orange revolution" in 2004-2005 I.S. Zisels and his organization supported V.A. Yushchenko. More will be said about it later. After the "orange" victory the relation between the Vaad leader and the authorities, apparently, became stronger.

The main competitor of the Vaad of Ukraine is probably the all-Ukrainian Jewish congress (AUJC) created in 1997 by businessman V.Z. Rabinovich[11] who was planning to set up a structure that would unite many Jewish organizations. The creation of the AUJC is connected with the attempt of V.Z. Rabinovich to return his original status and image after his imprisonment in 1984-1991 [Korogodsky, 2008]. In 1999 the same businessman became the head of the all-Ukrainian union of Jewish public organizations "United Jewish community of Ukraine" (UJCU) [Likhachov, 2008, s. 104]. In October, 2008 V.Z. Rabinovich stopped managing the UJCU and the association was headed by businessman I.V. Kolomojsky[12] known because of his financial support of the Dnepropetrovsk Jewish community. When analyzing changes in the UJCU management V. Likhachov emphasized that the address of the new association leader at the congress reminded of the speech prepared for its old head V.Z. Rabinovich [Likhachov, 2008, s. 104]. Y. Korogorodsky connected the election of I.V. Kolomojsky with the attempt of the oligarch to preserve his own capital and business in case of possible changes in the ruling clique of Ukraine in 2009-2010.

In 1999 the Jewish confederation of Ukraine (UCU) was created as an alternative to the AUJC. Observers specify that the UCU does not engage in any vigorous activity.

Experts believe that the Jewish fund of Ukraine (JFU) founded by businessman A.B. Feldman has little influence in the country and in the community. In February 2008 A.B.Feldman left the UCU and established the Ukrainian Jewish committee (UJC). Its activities will be described below.

The Jewish council of Ukraine (JCU) transformed from the Republican society of Jewish culture has been functioning since 1992. I.I. Levitas heads the JCU. All observers note that the Council is completely loyal to the authorities, exists because of the means allocated by the state and does not carry out any active work.

Three associations want to control religious communities. These associations include the Union of Jewish religious organizations of Ukraine (UJROU), the all-Ukrainian congress of Jewish religious communities (ACJRC) and the Federation of Jewish communities of Ukraine (FJCU) with all three unions being Chassidic. The specified associations are connected with secular organizations: the UJROU now has close contacts with the Jewish fund of Ukraine (JFU), while the ACJRC deals with the AUJC, and the FJCU cooperates with the UJCU.

Jewish organizations of Moldova. In Moldova there are two secular associations. They are the Association of Jewish communities and organizations of the Republic of Moldova created in 1997 and the Jewish congress of Moldova founded in 2003. The latter will be discussed further in the section devoted to lobbyism.

Very little is known about the activity of religious organizations of Moldova. The Jewish community of Kishinev and Moldova Khabad-Lubavichi [http://www.kishinev.org] is rather active.

The Federation of Jewish communities in the Republic of Moldova has been operating in the country since 1994. Till 1995 it was called the Federation of Jewish religious communities (the order of the Government of the Republic of Moldova # 406 dated 09.06.1994). Researchers do not mention this organization. The organization unites the followers of the Khabad movement.

Moreover, the activity of the Union of messianic Jewish communities in the Republic of Moldova keeps developing. However, very little is known (the order of the Government of the Republic of Moldova # 822 dated 01.09.1997).

Jewish organizations of Belarus. At present Belarusian Jewish communities are consolidated into four unions. A lot has been written about it. [Evrejskaya obshchina Belarusi, 2008], including the article of the author of this paper [Shevelev, 2008]. We shall remind once again that secular communities and organizations are a part of the Union of Belarusian Jewish associations and communities (UBJAC) founded in 1991. There are three religious unions. The first one is the Jewish religious association in the Republic of Belarus (JRA) founded in 1993 and consisting of Litvaks[14] communities. Another one is the Association of Jewish religious communities in Belarus (AJRC) that includes the followers of the Khabad movement. The third union is the Religious association of communities of progressive Judaism in Belarus. The World Association of Belarusian Jews (WABJ) registered in the USA in 1993 was quite active.

Relations between Authorities and Jewish Community

"Orange Revolution" in Ukraine and Jewish Community

"The triumphal procession" of the velvet ("color") revolutions on the post-Soviet territories began with "the revolution of roses" in Georgia in 2003, then it reached Ukraine in 2004-2005 and Kyrgyzstan in 2005. Similar coup d'états were soon expected in Moldova, Belarus, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan.

Of all the states described in this article "the color revolution" won only in Ukraine. What is more interesting is the fact that the victory of the opposition, obviously, was partially due to the support of some leaders of the Jewish community.

Without concentrating on the historiographic debate around "the orange revolution" in Ukraine,[15] the author of the given work considers it necessary to present his own point of view generated both by analytical works and his observing the Ukrainian events.

When describing "the color revolution" in Ukraine some authors have even applied the term "Fronda" ("Opposition")[16] as one can find certain features of similarity between two historical phenomena. Firstly, both the French Opposition and the color revolution in Ukraine were to a great extent a struggle between various groupings of the political elite. Everyone who fought for power in Ukraine in 2004 had earlier worked with president L.D.Kuchma. V.A. Yushchenko was the prime-minister in 1999-2001; V.F. Yanukovich held the same post in 2002-2005 while J. Timoshenko was the vice-premier in the government of V.A. Yushchenko in 1999-2000. Their struggle partially had a character of personal enmity while partially it was a fight for the interests of financial-oligarchic groups represented by politicians. For instance, as sources specify, V.F. Yanukovich represented the interests of R.L. Ahmetov and, partially, the interests of V.M. Pinchuk.[17] V.A. Gajduk and S.A. Taruta were said "to be behind" V.A. Yushchenko.[18] Secondly, it is interesting to note that in both cases one could observe a sharp transition from one camp to the other. Experts underlined



the fact that many large businessmen supported simultaneously both parties. For example, the founder and the head of the Jewish fund of Ukraine A.B. Feldman before the second round of presidential elections of Ukraine on November 22, 2004 supported V.F. Yanukovich (see: zajava Kongressu natsionalnyh gromad, 15.09.2004). Then when "the Opposition" won he switched over to the side of "the orange". Thirdly, both during "the Opposition" and during "the orange revolution" the fight between the political elites was conducted with the attraction of broad masses. Both the "white-blue" and "orange" managed to organize demonstrations in their support, though, certainly, the "orange" were supported by the most politically active part of the population in the capital.

Fourthly, in both cases there was a high degree of participation of foreign forces. While "frondeurs" provided themselves with the support of Spain the "orange" forces were managed by the USA.

Fifthly, historians describing the events in the 17th century showed that people experienced a great disappointment after the events of the Opposition. Ordinary Ukrainians who supported the "orange" forces were not so much for V.A. Yushchenko but rather wanted to see many changes in the "depressive"[19] government of Ukraine. As a result, now there is an obvious disappointment with the anarchy in Ukraine that took place in the country after the victory of "revolutionaries".

During the "Ukrainian" Opposition" in 2004-2005 a great number of Jews who were citizens of Ukraine was inclined to support V.F. Yanukovich [Pletinsky, 2004]. However, it is impossible to deny that sometimes the community took into consideration the halakic principle "Dina demalkhuta dina" ("the law of the state is the law") calling upon Jews to follow the laws of that state they live in. Heads of the Jewish community of Ukraine referred to this principle during the events of 2004-2005.

The community of Jewish businessmen and public figures split with I.M. Levitas and G. M. Surkis[20] supporting V.F. Yanukovich and I.S. Zisels, A. Fishbein,[21] E.I. Gurvits,[22] E.A. Chervonenko[23] supporting V.A. Yushchenko [see: zajava Kongressu natsionalnyh gromad Ukrainy 15.09.2004, Fishbein]. As it has already been mentioned A.B. Feldman at least before the second round of voting adhered to the ruling power but then joined "the orange". In general, the patrons of the community preferred not to disclose their connections with this or that party.

One of those who unconditionally supported V.A. Yushchenko was the chairman of the Vaad of Ukraine I.S. Zisels. Such position can't but make one respect him as at that moment the chances of the "orange" forces to win were too high. Already during the period of the active confrontation since November 22, 2004 other leaders of the Jewish community began to take the side of V.A. Yushchenko.

Kiev synagogue of Brodsky that belongs to the all-Ukrainian congress of Jewish religious communities with the rabbi from the Khabad movement announced the free-of-charge delivery of food, hot drinks and clothes to those in pickets on Independence Square (Maidan nezalezhnosti). Even though they declared in the synagogue that they were giving out clothes to everyone who needed them "irrespective of political predilections" it was

clear that it mainly concerned the "orange" forces because "maidan" was occupied exclusively by them [See: Kievskaya synagoga kormit i odevaet mitingujushchih, 2004].

On December 5 the supporters of V.A. Yushchenko gathered on Maidan were addressed by the representatives of churches and religious associations. Though the speeches of some of them did not contain any direct expression of support of V.A. Yushchenko their appearing in the camp on the square meant the transition of the clergy to the side of "the orange". The head rabbi of the Progressive Judaism communities addressed the people on "Maidan" with a rather interesting speech. The author of this work will dare to cite the full version of the address keeping the style and language of the document, "Shalom Aleichem, Ukraine! God, the Creator of everything, created man as his helper to build a society where no war would exist but peace and justice would reign. To build such a society and improve this world, we have to perfect ourselves first. Kind David explained how to do this in Psalm 15."

1. My Lord, who shall abide in thy tabernacle? Who shall dwell on thy holly hill? 2. He that waketh uprightly and worketh righteousness and speaketh the truth in his heart. 3. He that backbiteth not with the tongue, nor doeth evil to his neighbor, nor taketh up a reproach against his neighbor. 4. In whose eyes a vile person is contemned; but he honoureth them that fear the Lord. He who sweareth to his own hurt and changeth not. 5. He that putteth not out his money to usury nor taketh reward against the innocent.

He that doeth these things shall never be moved. Each of us possesses some of these qualities. But we have a lot to improve ourselves and make Ukraine and the whole world a better place.

Adonai, adonai, El rahum ve hanoun! Lord, merciful and gracious, I turn to You with a prayer through the people of Ukraine, my Mother Land. I will now say the prayer in Russian.

Lord, You are the creator of all things in existence, the Creator of peace, good and justice! Protect Ukraine with Your great mercy and hold the shroud of Your peace over her and protect the integrity of our country. Lord, shine the light of Your truth upon all people of Ukraine, her president and presidential candidates, members of her government, judges and elected representatives of people; endow them with wisdom so that they follow the path of justice, freedom and truth.

Lord, save us from hatred, hostility, envy and anger. Teach us to respect the positions and views of others. Lord, strengthen love, brotherhood, humaneness and peace in our hearts. Let the words of Your prophet soon come true, "Henceforth, nation shall not lift up a sword again nation, neither shall they learn war any more".

And let us say "Amen!"

We shall pay attention to the interpretation of the psalm given by A. Duhovny to emphasize his own support of rally supporters, "Lord! Who can stay in Your shelter? Who can live on Your sacred mountain?" The same verse from the psalm sounds in its Russian translation as "Lord! Who can stay in Your tabernacle? Who can live on Your sacred mountain?" (Ps. 14 (15): 1).[24]

Clear support of V.A Yushchenko was shown by Rabbi Jacob Dov Blajh, the head rabbi of the Association of Jewish religious organizations of Ukraine and by Rabbi Azriel Khaikin, the head rabbi of the Federation of Jewish communities of Ukraine.[25]

Thus, after the first round of presidential elections in Ukraine on November 21st, 2004 and with the strengthening of the opposition at the end of November - the beginning of December, 2004 which demonstrated only the weakness of the ruling power the leaders of the Jewish community, both secular and religious, started taking the side of V.A. Yushchenko who began showing the strengthening of his own positions. They were joined by the community patrons and large businessmen.

The position of I.S. Zisels, the head of the Vaad of Ukraine, played a certain role in the Jewish community support rendered to "the orange". After all, the victory of "the orange" had to mean the creation of the most comfortable conditions for the existence of the Jewish community by the new power. At that time it was possible to foresee the lobbying of interests of the Jewish community and Israel inside the Ukrainian power structures. However, even though the relations between the authorities, namely, V.A. Yushchenko and the representatives of the Jewish community, namely, I.S. Zisels and the Vaad of Ukraine, E.A. Chervonenko and the Jewish confederation of Ukraine in 2005-2008, most likely, became stronger, the fight inside the once uniform "orange" coalition neutralized all the efforts undertaken by the Jewish leaders during "the Opposition". V. Likhachov states that each wing of the coalition preferred to work with its own Jewish leaders, for example, V.A. Yushchenko and "Nasha Ukraina" ("Our Ukraine")[26] cooperated with I.S. Zisels while Julia Timoshenko's block[27] worked with A.B. Feldman [Likhachov, 2008, s. 112] which is quite logical for the political elite.

"The color revolution" was also predicted in Belarus in March, 2006.[28] Without providing a detailed account of the events connected with the presidential elections in March, 2006 as this is not the goal of the given work we would like to mention that the absence of "a revolutionary situation" in the country, extreme dissociation and weakness of the opposition, readiness of the authorities to deal with the possible action of the opposition, the interest of the main players in the region such as the EU, Poland, the USA and Russia in the preservation of the political status quo in Belarus, and, hence, limited financing of the coup attempt led to the defeat of the opposition.

Jewish community remained loyal to the authorities though some actions of the latter such as the destruction of a former synagogue in Minsk in Dimitrov street, house # 3, in 2001 [see: Rubinchik, 2002, s. 76-80], the attempt to preserve neutrality in litigation between the communal leaders and the enterprise "Pravoslavnaja kniga" ("Orthodox book") regarding its anti-Semitic editions the most known of which is "War under Laws of Meanness" (Minsk, 1999), etc. could sour the relations between the authorities and the community.

The small number of the Jewish community in Belarus, the absence of strong independent leaders including those from the world of business as well as the present leaders of the

community lacking any political predilections made the community absolutely insignificant in the arrangement of political forces in the country.

The script of the development of events following the example of the Ukrainian "Opposition" was predicted by some experts before parliamentary elections in Moldova in 2005. "Color" symbolics were used by both movements oppositional to the communist regime. The Christian Democratic National Party[29] of Y. Roshka used "orange" while the supporters of the Block "Democratic Moldova" used "yellow". Chances of the latter led by the former mayor of Kishinev S. Urekyan[30] were believed to be rather high. According to the results of the elections on March 6, 2005 the Party of communists of the Republic of Moldova received 45, 98 % of voters' voices and 56 mandates in parliament with "Democratic Moldova" receiving 28, 53 % and 34 mandates, and the Christian Democratic People's Party getting 9, 07 % and 11 mandates.[31]

The velvet revolution did not happen in Moldova due to several reasons. First of all, the election results were recognized by international observers, secondly, the quantitative data did not allow the opposition to insist on the possibility of the juggling of voting results, and, thirdly, all external players including the USA, the EU, Russia, and Romania for many different reasons important at that time were interested in preserving *status quo* in Moldova (analysis of the reasons of those countries is not the goal of this paper). One shall also take into account that just before the election, March 6, 2005, President V. Voronin and S. Urekyan managed to agree on a number of controversial issues.

All that time the Jewish community preferred to remain loyal to the authorities, even during the short period when "the frontists" were in the government (1990-1991) as, first of all, the community was small and was hardly capable of any active political representation; secondly, it did not support the ideas of the unionists, and, thirdly, the authorities except for a short period at the beginning of the 1990s tried to observe the rights of national minorities including the Jewish population. It was stipulated in the legislation (see: the Decree of the President of the Republic of Moldova # 161 of 12.08.1991; the order of the government of the Republic of Moldova # 682 of 09.12.1991).

Academic Judaica between the State and the Jewish Community

"Academic Judaica" is research in history, languages and culture of the Jewish people conducted within the frames of special research establishments both state ones within the academies of sciences or universities and non-state ones. Further we will use the term "Jewish studies" in the same meaning. The author of this paper has already written about the condition of Judaica in Belarus and separate branches of Oriental research in the post-Soviet states within the limits of the general discussion devoted to the experience of the Jewish research at the turn of the 20^{th}-21^{st} centuries [Shavyaleu, 2003; Shevelev, 2007; MYAT, 2008, 38, s. 2; see also: Likhachov, Fedorchuk, 2004; Charny, 2004; Korogorodsky, 2004; Epstein, 2007]. At the same time it seems meaningful to specify certain aspects as

research in Judaica is quite a specific area of contact of interests of the state and the Jewish community.

Presence of the research division in the Academy of sciences presupposes the presence of the order from the state to study Jewish history and culture. Thus, the state is interested in financing such research which simultaneously concerns both theoretical and practical areas of humanitarian knowledge as they supplement and correct the understanding of the past by society. At the same time the recommendations of such bodies can be used for the carrying out of competent and well-grounded national policy by the state.

We shall remind that the Jewish population in Ukraine makes 0, 2 %, in Belarus it is 0, 3 %, and in Moldova it is 0, 11 %. With such quantity indicators the Jewish community has little demand for the services of the academic institutions engaged in Jewish research. However, both in Ukraine and in Moldova the state support of Jewish studies, namely, the presence of special divisions within academies of sciences, is connected with the problems in the field of interethnic relations. Besides, the presence of such research centers becomes a proof of the preservation of respectful attitude to national minorities in Ukraine and Moldova. In part, it is one more argument protecting the position of these countries when dealing with European institutions.

Jewish research can be also conducted by non-state institutions existing, clearly, due to sponsors' money. Usually such bodies carry out the tactical order (most frequently it is the study of the Holocaust). Both kinds of the specified establishments including state and non-state do not always work effectively.

If one is to look at the state academic establishments in Ukraine connected with Jewish studies one shall mention the Center of Jewish history and culture and the Center for the study of the history of the Holocaust with both of them being a part of the Institute of political and ethnonational research named after I.F. Kuras of the National academy of sciences of Ukraine (NASU). The first was created in January, 1992 (before 2002 it was a department, in 2002 it was turned into the Center). The Center for the study of the history of the Holocaust included into the structure of the institute was founded in March 2002. The center is headed by A.E. Podolsky.

The Kiev Institute of Judaica (KIJ) is among the non-state institutions and was created in 1994 under the aegis of the Vaad of Ukraine.[32] Like any non-state establishment the institute of Judaica in Kiev was more mobile and aspired to correspond to the condition of Jewish research and the inquiries of researchers. From the very beginning of its activity the KIJ management tried to create the image of an elite establishment and, apparently, sometimes succeeded in this. It is thought that the KIJ as a non-state structure in comparison with state establishments has achieved certain results in the development of Jewish research in Ukraine.

We can identify several obvious KIJ achievements. Firstly, it was an attempt to create a summary review of the history of the Ukrainian Jewry "Narisi z istorii ta kultury evreev Ukrainy" *(*"Sketches of history and culture of Jews of Ukraine"*)* [Narisi, 2005]. Secondly, it was the gathering of archives and collections. The KIJ created the archives of the Ukrainian

Jewish writers, artists, scientists, and workers of culture. The collection of personal papers of Jewish writers totals more than 1 thousand units and it is one of the most valuable collections of the KIJ.[33] The collection of old post cards, photos, phonograph records, posters, and leaflets of the Jewish political parties of the beginning of the 20th century is also of interest. It started with the collection presented to the Institute of Judaica by Rabbi Yakov Dov Blajh [institute iudaiki …, 2003]. Thirdly, it is important to mention the publishing activities of the KIJ. Together with the publishing house "Dukh i litera" ("Spirit and letter") the KIJ published many valuable scientific works and collections of documents. Fourthly, one more KIJ achievement is regularly organized international scientific conferences unequivocally positioned by organizers as a certain elite assembly of adherents.

It is clear that rather free possession and disposal of means enabled the management of the Institute of Judaica to correspond to the image of a solid research center not dependent on the state, to develop and finally to receive certain results of research work in the form of already listed achievements but not in the form of a pile of papers consisting of appropriately combined phrases and titles.

Slowness of state scientific structures has been connected with the insufficient financing of science in Ukraine as well as with a general crisis of humanities in the post-Soviet states and Ukrainian academic science responsible for the coordination of scientific research in the country. Ukrainian and foreign scientists believe that the biggest part of the problems of humanitarian branch of knowledge in Ukraine and the National academy of sciences is connected with the absence of young scholars in the academic management elite, a weak inflow of young generation into science, corruption of the faculty and old academic elite as well as "the brain drain".[34]

However, the humanitarian branch of scientific research in the post-Soviet states finds itself in a certain postmodernist situation when upon the confluence of the listed factors the system basically cannot function but still operates contrary to everything.[35]

From 1992 till present (2009) Jewish studies in Belarus have not been presented by any research center either state or private and developed exclusively due to the efforts of few researchers. All attempts to establish scientific-coordination institutions have been unsuccessful. The scientific-educational center named after S. Dubnov existed exclusively on paper[36] while the organizations created under the patronage of the Union of Belarusian Jewish organizations and communities operated as amateur societies and initially did not set as their purpose the unification of researchers working in the field of Jewish studies.[37]

In the 1920s-1930s the Jewish department operated first in the Institute of the Belarusian culture and then within the structure of the Belarusian Academy of sciences. The department was engaged in the research on history of the Belarusian-Lithuanian Jewry and Yiddish literature and language. A lot is known about the research conducted in the Byelorussian SSR while the received results are highly evaluated by the specialists [For more details see: Greenbaum, 1994; Gerasimov, 1996]. Then the Jewish research in the BSSR stopped till the beginning of the 1990s. Only the works of G.M. Livshits published in 1957-1981 supporting the Soviet academic tradition are well-known.[38]

The present reconstruction at the Academy of sciences of the structure similar to the Jewish sector of the Academy of sciences of the BSSR 1929-1930 seems hardly expedient owing to the lack of demand for such research by the community with the absence of specialists being another factor. Today it seems actual to create a scientific department within the National academy of sciences of Belarus which could be engaged in history and culture of national minorities in Belarus. Such a department could develop competent national policy the way it should be done. However, such an offer presented by the author of this paper earlier [Shavyaleu, Charnavitskaja kanferentsia, 2008] was left without any notice.

Nevertheless, the absence of the structure capable of coordinating Jewish research in Belarus seems to be the factor that could only promote the achievements of Belarusians in the given area [for more details see: Shavyaleu, 2003]. The Belarusian state does not at all interfere into the area of Jewish research as the latter does not touch upon any ideological bases of the authorities. Therefore, the researchers are not limited either in the choice of topics or in the selection of hypotheses, definitions or methodological bases of their own research.[39]

It seems that Moldova has quite a harmonious design of Jewish studies where the structure of the Academy of sciences included the department of history and culture of Jews of Moldova that changed scientific institutes in which subordination it was as a result of the reforms in the organization of science in the republic. Until 1999 the Jewish department was a part of the Institute of national minorities and until 2006 it was at the Institute of interethnic researches. Now it is a group of ethnology of Jews at the Institute of cultural heritage of the Academy of sciences of Moldova.[40]

However, this has not changed the essence of research which is to study Bessarabia Jewries that together with other peoples occupied the province and now lives in the Republic of Moldova. Accordingly, related academic departments study history, culture and language of other ethnoses. All this coincides with the state policy in relation to national minorities. It was necessary for the state to formulate competent national policy. The state did not neglect the advice of the academic divisions to finally create an atmosphere of tolerance in the country that had gone through the civil war in 1990-1992.

The mobility of the management of the academic division and its being present in the authority and communal structures in the country gave the Jewish department the necessary freedom of actions. Scientists could work independently with foreign partners, advised employees of the state bodies, etc. Under such circumstances it was not necessary to create a separate non-state structure connected with Jewish studies in Moldova. It is the support and interest from the state and the lack of duplicating scientific structures that allow the author of this article to speak about the harmonious design of Jewish studies in Moldova. The president of the Republic of Moldova P. Luchinsky issued decree # 400 (16.12.1997) that set up the Commission for interethnic relations under the auspices of the president "to render assistance in realization of policy in the field of interethnic relations and provision of the right of all citizens to preservation and expression of ethnic, cultural, language and religious originality" [cit. from the text given on the website of the Bureau

of interethnic relations of the Republic of Moldova: http://www.bri.gov.md]. One of the members of the Commission was Y.M. Kopansky[41] who then headed the Jewish department at the Academy of sciences of Moldova. Y.M. Kopansky belonged to the senior generation of researchers who formed the Moldavian post-Soviet Judaica just as K.L.Zhignya[42] and R.J. Kleiman[43]. The interest of the state in the study of history and culture of peoples occupying Moldova seems to have played a significant role in the successes of academic Judaica. Thus, the support from the state and the absence of scientific structures duplicating each other make it possible for the author to speak about the harmonious design of Jewish research in Moldova.

Obvious achievements of the Moldavian post-Soviet Jewish research comprise, first of all, the inclusion of the scientific institution into the system of relations between the authorities and society in such a manner that the authority needs the conclusions formulated by scientists; secondly, it is the emergence of significant research and publications of sources [Kopansky, 1994; Kishinevsky pogrom, 2000; Kopansky, 2002; Oklik, 2003].

The Moldavian state is not inclined to limit researchers in their choice of topics, partners, and sources of project financing. The only factor that obviously does not facilitate the development of research including the Jewish one in Moldova is the unwillingness of the young people to engage in science. However, the last circumstance is a common feature in all post-Soviet states.[44]

Studying of the Holocaust as an Indicator of Relations between the Jewish Community and the State

The relation to the Holocaust can be called the indicator of relations between the authority and the Jewish community. Both parties use mentions of the catastrophe of the European Jewry as a trump in the game which they play or the game that the state plays in its relations with neighbors.

It seems reasonable to remind that historical literature identifies the Holocaust as the destruction by Nazis and their helpers of the European Jewry in 1933-1945. It is very likely that under the influence of political correctness publicist publications and quazi-scientific essays have started to apply the expanded interpretation of the term “Holocaust” including the destruction of the gipsy, other peoples and sometimes sexual minorities. The author of this article does not accept postmodernist tendencies to provide additional interpretation to the identified concept and adheres exclusively to the first definition which he finds the only possible one.[45]

Initially, historians of Ukraine quite favorably treated the research on history of the Holocaust. However, if at the turn of the 1980s-1990s it also was perceived as the restoration of memory of the victims of the Great Patriotic war and was one of the ways to renew the Jewish life in the USSR then by the middle of the 1990s many professional historians and officials including those working in the sphere of education began to see it as a way of getting an addition to one’s salary.

Quantitative data about Jewish population that died on the territory of Ukraine are provided by researchers but the information differs greatly from 900 thousand up to 2 million people. The data provided by A.I. Kruglov with the number of the death toll of 1, 5 million people is probably the most accurate.[46]

It is clear that there are two main problems in the calculation of data. First of all, it is the problem of borders in 1939-1946 as this or that researcher can include or not include some territory into the zone of study; secondly, there is a political problem as this or that author may find it fruitful either to exaggerate or to underestimate the number of victims of the catastrophe due to the author's political favors.



Kishinev. The monument in Ierusalimskaja street to the people who died in the Kishinev ghetto. The sculptor is N.M. Epelbaum. The monument was created in 1990-1991 (the photo was taken by the author of the article)

In Ukraine there is the Ukrainian Center for Holocaust studies which formally operates within the structure of the Institute of political and ethnonational research of the National Academy of sciences of Ukraine (NACU) that has already been mentioned. Actually, the Center functions as an independent body enjoying certain authority in research circles.

In 2002-2003 the Center published the bulletin "Golokost i suchasnist" ("The Holocaust and the present"). In 2005 it started publishing the magazine "Golokost i suchasnist. Studii v Ukraini i sviti" ("The Holocaust and the Present. Research in Ukraine and the World") and in 2007 the bulletin "Uroki golokostu" ("Lessons of the Holocaust") began to be published.[47]

With the coming to power of "the orange" in Ukraine after 2005 it became possible to observe a trend that is not so visible in other states of the described region, more specifi-

cally, it is an attempt to transform the Holocaust into a component of the state ideology of Ukraine comparing it with the Holodomor (famine).[48]

When speaking in 2005 at the international forum "Let My People Live" ("Zhizn narodu moemu"),[49] the president of Ukraine V.A. Yushchenko declared, "I am the son of the Ukrainian land where the most terrible tragedies of the 20th century took place. They are the Holodomor and the Holocaust and they have taken away the lives of 15 million people. Ukraine remembers what threat intolerance, violence, and aggression carry."[50]

On April 16-17, 2008 commemorative actions in memory of the victims of the Holodomor took place in the Israeli cities of Bat-Yam and Jerusalem. The information service Newsru.co.il. wrote about it the following day. The portal quoted the minister of culture of Ukraine, "The Holocaust and the Holodomor are closely related topics. The state of Israel was created for the tragedy of the Jewish people not to be repeated. The Jewish people remembers its history. Ukrainians learn from Jews recollecting the events of 1932-1933." A.B. Feldman was to finance the erection of a monument to the victims of the Holodomor in Jerusalem (the message *of Newsru. co. il*, 4.05.2007).

The comparison of the Holodomor and the Holocaust that the Ukrainian "orange" political elite tried to impose was taken rather seriously by the Israeli establishment and on January 16, 2007 *Newsru. co. il* informed about the meeting of the chairman of the party "Likud" B. Netanjahu[51] with J. Timoshenko who was then on a visit in Israel. If we are to trust the messages of the news agency then the Israeli politician had studied the literature connected with the Holodomor for some time and during the conversation he declared, "The Genocide of Ukrainian people was none other than the display of internal extremism of the dictator while the threat of the president of Iran Mahmud Ahmadinejad to wipe out Israel from the face of the earth is also extremism of the dictator but this time it is external."

The thesis about the acknowledgement of the Holodomor as the genocide of the Ukrainian people was registered in the legislation. It is article 1 of the law "O Golodomore 1932-1933 v Ukraine" ("About the Holodomor in 1932-1933 in Ukraine") of November 28, 2006. Article 2 of the law says, "Public denying of the Holodomor in 1932-1933 in Ukraine is recognized as the violation of memory of millions of victims of the Holodomor belittling the dignity of the Ukrainian people and is illegal."

In 2006 the Institute of national memory was founded in Ukraine as the central enforcement authority with the responsibility to provide ideological support of internal and foreign policy of Ukraine. Tasks of the institute included:

1) "attraction of attention of societies to their own history, dissemination of objective information about it in Ukraine and in the world;

2) realization of state policy and coordination of activity in the sphere of restoration and preservation of the national memory of the Ukrainian people;

3) provision of the comprehensive studying of stages of struggle for the restoration of the statehood of Ukraine in the 20th century and the historical past of the Ukrainian people including all forms of repression;

4) realization of a set of measures to immortalize the memory of victims of famines and political repression and participants of the national-liberation struggle" (the regulation of the Council of Ministers of Ukraine # 764 of 31.05.2006).

Ideally, the institute of national memory should resemble a similar Polish institute.[52] Both were given the functions of executive authority; both organized collection and storage of documents and information, and also research work on the declared topics.

However, unlike the Polish analogue the Ukrainian institute has not yet managed to organize its own archival work and its structure seems to be less thought out (see: the regulation of the Council of Ministers of Ukraine # 927 of 05.07. 2006). The only visible display of the work of the Ukrainian institute of national memory is the publications in the Ukrainian mass media.

It is interesting to note that the history of the Holocaust keeps well within the field of action of the specified establishment. So, when identifying the tasks of the institute the regulation states that the institute "shall provide the studying of habitation history of other indigenous peoples and national minorities on the territory of Ukraine and their integration into the Ukrainian society" (point 3 of the Provision on the Ukrainian institute). Besides, the institute is assigned the task of developing the state policy concerning "the evaluation of famines and all forms of political repression, other crimes against the Ukrainian nation and national minorities in the 20th century, and resistance to totalitarian regimes" (point 4. 1 of the Provision).

The above said allows to draw a conclusion that the present authorities of Ukraine give an example when the Holocaust becomes a component of the state ideology fully supported and assisted with by scientific circles and Jewish community.[53]

In Moldova the history of the Holocaust served as an additional topic among the actual problems of the political and ideological antagonism between the centrist and pro-Romanian forces.

The author of this article knows about two works devoted to the history of the Holocaust on the territory of Bessarabia including "Holokost v Bessarabii" ("The Holocaust in Bessarabia") (1999) by I.E. Levit[54] and "Holokost: Stranitsy istorii (na territorii Moldovy i prilegajushchih oblastyah Ukrainy, 1941-1944)" ("The Holocaust: Pages of history (on the territory of Moldova and adjoining areas of Ukraine, 1941-1944)") (2005) by S.M. Nazariya [Nazariya, 2005]. It seems that now only one expert is engaged in the research of the Holocaust in Moldova. It is D. Dumitru. However, the communists encourage such research and its inclusion into the educational process. D. Dumitru describes the situation connected with the attempts to teach history of the Holocaust in Moldova in her work "V labirinte politizatsii: prepodavanie Holokosta v shkolah Respubliki Moldova" ("In the labyrinth of politization: teaching of the Holocaust at schools of the Republic of Moldova"). The researcher singles out a group of "pro-Romanian" specialists from the whole community of Moldavian historians. They are those who "are oriented towards" "the Romanian" version of the Moldavian history and culture. In her opinion, they make up the majority. D.

Dumitru mentions that they are not "supporters of the annexation of Moldova to Romania" [Dumitru, 2008, p. 28].

On the contrary, the author of this paper is inclined to see the "pro-Romanian" historians as supporters of the annexation of Moldova to Romania. It is necessary to identify another part of humanitarians who are "pro-Russian". They do not support the annexation of Moldova to Russia. Such an idea can hardly be considered seriously by rational and sensible politicians and experts. When dealing with "pro-Russian" experts we can speak about the construction of such a concept of history which would not identify Moldavians with Romanians. Moreover, the author of the article is inclined to believe that the number of "pro-Russian" people is not so much a minority but rather they are less active in politics.

Immediately after coming to power in 2001 the communists undertook an attempt to advance the "state" (i.e., Moldavian) line in teaching history. However, it failed. We shall remind that the order of the Government of the Republic of Moldova # 180 on February 15, 2002 assumed the replacement of the course "History of Romanians" with the course "History of Moldova" starting September 1, 2002. It was also decided to make the Russian language a compulsory subject at schools but under the pressure of the Unionists led by the Christian Democratic People's Party and its leader Y. Roshka who in February - March, 2002 gathered some tens of thousands of supporters at the protest meetings the decision of the government was cancelled [Nezavisimaja Moldova, 01.03.2002]. Russian was introduced at schools upon the will of the parents while the course "History of Romanians" remained one of the school subjects. It was this concession to the Unionists that communists were later blamed for including the period before the parliamentary elections of 2009.

Prior to the beginning of the 2000s authors of Moldavian textbooks preferred to withhold the information about the Holocaust. Approximately till the end of the 1990s it depended, first of all, on a similar position of historians of Romania [Dumitru, 2008, s. 28-29] but the change of the attitude of the latter both towards research and teaching history of the Holocaust, connected with the country's joining the European Union (Romania entered the EU January 1, 2007), did not at all affect the opinion of the "pro-Romanian" historians from Moldova. Just like their colleagues from ultranationalist circles on the other side of the Prut they treated the detailed studying of the period of the regime of marshal Antonesku as a threat "to the unification of Romanians".

In their turn, after 2001 the authorities of Moldova encouraged the inclusion into the curriculum of the Holocaust topic for two reasons. Firstly, they aspired to eliminate the ideological orientation towards "Romanian identification" which was generated during the "before communists" period in 1990-2001 and to replace it with the idea of "Moldavian identity". Secondly, promotion, studying and research of the specified theme met the requirements of the European institutions and, as consequence, the interests of the foreign policy of the Republic of Moldova.

The Council of Europe (CE) pays great attention to teaching history. Special meetings of Ministers of Education and sessions of the Parliamentary Assembly and the Commit-

tee of Ministers are all devoted to this issue. There are also separate regional educational projects for the states which joined the Council of Europe in the 1990s.

The recommendations of the CE Committee of Ministers concerning history teaching "Recommendations of the Committee of Ministers for states-participants concerning teaching history in Europe in the 21st century" (*Rec (2001) 15*) are well known.

One of the purposes of teaching history is "the strengthening of trust and tolerance inside the states and in relations between them". The Holocaust takes a special place in these recommendations. According to them, all possible measures should be taken in education "to avoid recurrence or denying of horrifying events... [of the 20th century], namely, the Holocaust, genocide and other crimes against humanity … " Such measures include the allocation in the educational process at schools of one day devoted to the commemoration of victims of the Holocaust and to the prevention of crimes against humanity, namely, to develop actions of the Council of Europe in the field of education and provide them to its Special group on the international cooperation in the sphere of education, memory and studying of the Holocaust (point 6 of the Appendix to Recommendations).

Here is how the extermination of the Jewish population of Bessarabia is described in the currently used didactic materials on "history of Romanians" (2005 edition):

> "The Jewish population accused of cooperation with the bolshevist regime was isolated in a number of ghettos (mainly, in a certain area of cities), and then in great numbers it was deported to the camps behind the Dniester. A part of the gipsy was also deported. Separate representatives of other nationalities accused of cooperation with the Soviet authorities were also sent to the camps. It was an act of genocide which later received in the countries seized by Nazis, the name "Holocaust" that marked the extermination of thousands of Jews" [Shishkanu, 2005, p. 316].[55]

There are no exact quantitative data about the Jews who died in Bessarabia in 1941-1944. The death toll has been estimated to be between 270 thousand and 600 thousand people. Apparently, the data corresponding to the reality should be 300-350 thousand people.

It is interesting to note that the narrations about many episodes of the Jewish catastrophe were within the ideological frames of Israel of the end of the 1940s-1950s. Jews obediently went to die like "rams to the slaughterhouse". Below please find a fragment from the memoirs of R.Y. Udler[56]:

> "[Odessa, October 23, 1941]. In the morning of October 23 we, boys, gathered at the entrance, some went outside to find out what was happening in the city. … We slightly opened the gate and looked at the street. At the corner of the street, literally just two houses away from us, a pillar with a crossbeam on which four ropes were attached had been dug in. We guessed that it was something terrible but we could not

> imagine exactly what it was. A Romanian sentry was standing near it. Along K. Marx street a chain of about 20-25 person guarded by soldiers was slowly moving from the direction of the railway station.
>
> It was clear that they had been exposed to severe tortures. Their clothes were torn up to pieces, faces were covered in bruises and blood. Some people were barefooted or in socks and without headdresses. When they reached our gate we saw their empty thoughtless eyes. They were neither looking forward nor to the side. They probably knew what was coming. At the corner of the street from where they were coming four people had already been hung, among them there were friends or people close to them. Having learned about human cruelty, they accepted their destiny …
>
> At the gallows the chain stopped. Officers, the sentry and the escort [Typing error. It shall be read escorts. - D. Sh.] were speaking about something, started smoking. Then something was ordered to the first doomed. He came closer to the gallows, put down the stool which he had been carrying, got on it, put the loop on the neck and waited quietly and silently. The Romanian officer ordered something to the man standing next in line … The man obediently approached and beat out the stool with his foot. Some sharp convulsions and the hanged man stopped moving. Murderers said something to each other, waited for a few minutes and ordered the second doomed to do the same. He did so without any emotion as though it was not a question of his life, pushed his head into the loop. He said nothing, asked nothing, only stood and waited. On hearing the command the third in line beat out the stool from under the legs and in some instants the hanged man was immovable" [cit.: Stati, 2003, s. 368-369].

The numbers of the Jewish population that died on the territory of Belarus in 1941-1944 differ and make up between 377 thousand and 811 thousand people. Apparently, the number of 500 thousand victims seems to be more expedient.[57]

It is important to remind that the interest of the authorities of Belarus in Jewish affairs was very limited. They rightly treated the Holocaust as a part of genocide committed by fascist invaders. At the same time the uniqueness of the catastrophe of the European Jewry was never officially denied. Studying the history of the Holocaust during the analyzed period was conducted within the context of the general policy of the representation of events of the Great Patriotic war which since the beginning of the 2000s has been considered an ideological component of the Belarusian state.

However, there has been no Belarusian research on the history of the Holocaust since the beginning of the 2000s which could be identified as actual, new, and significant.[58] It is probably connected with the general decline of the historical science that started in the middle of the 1980s as well as with the strengthening of the currently dominating in Belarusian historiography official direction which has chosen as the main theme the development of questions connected with the Great Patriotic war having coordinated them with the state ideology. Attempts of researchers sometimes to bypass the plots connected with the Jewish catastrophe leads to the unfair reproaching of Belarusian authorities accused by

the international Jewish organizations of "suppressing the history of Jews of Belarus and the tragedy of the Holocaust" [for example, Antisemitism, 2008, s. 294].

At the beginning of the 2000s the Republican fund "Holocaust"[59] began to operate on the base of the UBJAC. The fund was established with the assistance of the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the State committee on affairs of religions and nationalities of Belarus. The tasks of the organization include the perpetuating of the memory of victims of genocide against the Jewish people, the studying of the Holocaust history, the Jewish resistance and the contribution of Jews to the victory along with the publication, gathering and storage of documents, the creation and support of scientific research and teaching in the specified area, and the assistance in the awarding of the title "The Righteous Person of the Nations of the World" [http://www.meod.by]. At first, the authorities tried to assist the fund but later they simply did not interfere into its affairs. It is possible that Minsk partly considered the support of the establishment of the fund "Holocaust" at the beginning of the 2000s as a proof for the European organizations of Belarus being a civilized country and Belarus's aspiration to follow the direction of the all-European policy of tolerance and political correctness. At the same time Belarusian authorities were believed to sincerely help the community in all its actions especially after the forum in Auschwitz in 2005[60] as the Holocaust was treated as a part of fascist genocide; the latter was a part of the history of the Great Patriotic war and, accordingly, a part of the state ideology.

The Belarusian fund "Holocaust" worked together with the Museum of history and culture of Jews of Belarus formed under the auspices of the community. Both the fund and the museum were headed by I.P. Gerasimova. In reality, the search, study and partly educational work both in the fund and in the museum were concentrated in the hands of a few individuals including the head, the employee of the museum V. Rusakova and a group of about ten volunteers. The fund acted as the organizer of exhibitions and seminars "Lessons of the Holocaust" for community leaders from rural areas and teachers of history from secondary and Sunday Jewish schools.

Summing everything up it is necessary to emphasize once again that Belarus was the only of the three analyzed countries where the Holocaust was not used as a means of putting pressure of the state on the community or, on the contrary, of the pressure of the Jewish community on power holding structures.

Thereby, in the studied region of the three states of Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus the authorities use the Holocaust as the confirmation of their adherence to the European ideals and values. Only in Moldova the public discussion of the events connected with the extermination of Jewry during the disaster years causes the aversion of an influential and politically active part of historians who due to political, career or personal reasons are in the opposition to the communist regime. Both the research on the Holocaust history and the submission of this question for public discussion in Moldova in the 2000s were coordinated with the construction of national identity by intellectuals and communist authorities. Only in Ukraine "the orange" who came to power in 2005 tried to make the Holocaust

a part of national ideology comparing it with the Holodomor. Belarusian authorities do not connect the period of the Jewish catastrophe with state ideology allowing the experts to solve the problems of research and education themselves.

Anti-Semitism and Charges of Anti-Semitism in the Games of Authority with Community

When analyzing the relations between the Jewish community and the authority in all post-Soviet states it is possible to notice one essential detail, namely, the authority does not incite anti-Semitic actions. Such actions can be carried out by extremist movements either by the extremely left or by the extremely right in the post-Soviet political spectrum as well as by the marginal layers of the population or teenagers; however, the authority always leaves anti-Semitism "for emergency cases only" as a way to distract attention from internal problems. At the same time Jewish organizations safely use the charges of anti-Semitism against the authority as powerful means of pressure on the authority. Sometimes certain representatives of some communal institutions label this or that event as "an anti-Semitic action" using it as a means of self-promotion.

It does not seem relevant to examine anti-Semitic actions in detail as they are annually recorded by the experts of the Eurasian Jewish Congress.[61] It seems useful to consider the distinctive characteristics of this question from the point of view of relations between the authorities and the community.

It is important to remember that the border between anti-Semitism and Judophobia is indistinct. The concepts can be treated differently. Sometimes the emergence of anti-Semitism is dated back to the second half of the 19th century when traditional Christian Judophobia began to be supplemented with racial theory; sometimes they speak about anti-Semitism since the most ancient times. It seems that one of the best works on history of anti-Semitic views was written by French researcher L. Polyakov and was translated into Russian [Polyakov, 1997-1998]. We shall also emphasize that analysts of the EAJC do not often use the concept "Judophobia".

The experts observing Judophobia and anti-Semitic tendencies in the post-Soviet states identify some features typical of this phenomenon during the researched period.

Firstly, Judophobia and anti-Semitism do not occupy the first place on the list of xenophobia moods in the post-Soviet states.

Secondly, the tendency observed is quite inconsistent as on the one hand, anti-Semitism according to the Soviet political practice turns into anti-Zionism[62] and is accepted by many parties as an element of political tricks; on the other hand, being associated with the Soviet past, accusations of anti-Semitism are used to compromise the opponents from the left wing political forces (communists, socialists), whose views are connected with the idealization of the Soviet heritage.

Thirdly, the rights of national minorities and freedom of religion are recorded in the legislation of the corresponding states while the stirring up of interethnic enmity belongs

to the category of criminal offences. However, some of the existing legal norms are not complied with while others are rather inconsistent. It is not so clear, for example, how to combine the right to freedom of religion with the ban on the propagation of religious exclusiveness.

Fourthly, Western orientation of the majority of the ruling elites of the post-Soviet states imposes obligations on the fight against anti-Semitism. Absence of Judophobic policy acts as an original "test" for democracy and observance of human rights.

Fifthly, in the post-Soviet states the society following the Near-Eastern conflict is inclined to support Israel. In the opinion of the EAJC analysts it is one of the factors determining the situation with anti-Semitism on the post-Soviet territory [Anti-Semitism, 2003, s. 223-225].

The author of this paper will try to add some points to the ones already stated above which were offered by the EAJC experts.

It is possible to speak about two specific methods allowing to present the level and character of Judophobia moods in society. It is the scale of social distance of **Bogardus** and the monitoring of mass media. Both lines of research have been carried out in Ukraine since the beginning of the 1990s. Similar work has not been conducted in Belarus, and the author does not know much about the application of such methods in Moldova.

Ukrainian sociologists N.V. Panina headed the research using Bogardus scale. The research conclusions have already been presented [Golovakha, Panin, 2006; Kirichenko, 2005].

The index of the distance in relation to Jews from the maximal number 7, according to the data of the experts has made up:

Year	1992	1994	1996	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2004	2005	2007
Index of distance	4,2	3,8	3,8	3,9	3,8	3,9	3,9	5,1	5,1	5,0	4,6

Sources: Golovakha, Panin, 2006; data for 2007 are provided by V. Likhachov [Antisemitism, 2008, s. 311].

When analyzing the level of Judophobic moods in Ukraine, sociologists have come to the following conclusions:

First, in 2002 one can observe a greater distancing towards Jews remaining till 2005. Experts believe that it has to do with the existence in the society of uncertain "national-civil identification" in general, and with the crisis of power and a low standard of living of the majority of the population in particular [Golovakha, Panin, 2006].

Secondly, one can see the dependence of "phobias" on each other as hostility in the society to any group of the population increases the feeling of hatred towards another [Kirichenko, 2005].

Thirdly, the level of anti-Semitism is considerably higher in the Western areas of Ukraine (with 60 % of adult population subjected to it), in the central areas only 50% is inclined to anti-Semitism while in the east the percentage is 39% and in southern regions

the number reaches 43 %. A high level of Judophobia moods is characteristic of the countryside inhabitants.

Fourthly, the level of xenophobia in general and Judophobia in particular is quite high among youth (from 18 till 29 years old) [Golovakha, Panin, 2006].

It has already been specified that anti-Semitic moods in society do not occupy the first place on the list of xenophobia tendencies in the post-Soviet states. The same concerns the region under analysis where the situation did not change during the whole researched period of the 1990s-2000s. The highest level of hatred in all three countries is towards Negros and inhabitants from the Caucuses; the degree of "Romania phobia"[63] and "Poland phobia"[64] is high; there is also Russia phobia though its level is low (in Ukraine it ranges from 1, 9 up to 3, 1 points on Bogardus scale. Since the middle of the 1990s the stated list of "fears" has been expanded with Islamophobia.

The second technique is the fixing of anti-Semitic publications in the press. In Ukraine it is V. Mindlin who uses it. Below please find the following quantitative data compiled in accordance with anti-Semitic publications in the central Ukrainian editions:

Year	**Number of publicationsй**
1992–1993	Nearby 300
1994–1996	Nearby 200
1997	150
1998	260
1999	More than 200
2000	150
2001	More than 100
2002	179
2003	258
2004	379
2005	661
2006	676
2007	542

Monitoring data provided by V. Mindlin: Antisemitism, 2003, s. 247; Antisemitism, 2005, s. 259; Antisemitism, 2008, s. 309-310.

During the researched period Judophobia and anti-Semitism were an original element of the political games between the authorities, its political opponents and the community. It was convenient for the authorities to keep anti-Semitism as "a lightning rod"[65] as it was possible to use it in small dozes to extinguish the discontent of the common people. The community in turn used anti-Semitic "tricks" of extremists to activize its own activity. The fight against anti-Semitism became one of the main directions of activity of Jewish organizations. At the same time we can see that at the turn of the 1990s-2000s Jewish associations

began to use anti-Semitism accusations as a way of putting pressure upon the authority. Anyway, such situation is characteristic of Ukraine and Belarus.

Anti-Semitic actions and Judophobia moods in the described region are based on "the traditions" of the Russian empire, namely, "Reports of the Zion white men" and Black-Hundred slogans which became supplemented with Nazi and Pan-Slavic ideas. (The situation was different in Central Asian countries by it is not the purpose of the present research.)

All anti-Semitic actions usually keep within several categories:

1) Nazi and neo-Nazi graffiti (identified as hooliganism under the criminal code);

2) vandalism or violation of tombs (for example, clause 297, Criminal Code of Ukraine, clause 222, Criminal Code of the Republic of Moldova) or the damage of the monuments of culture (clause 298, Criminal Code of Ukraine, clause 221, Criminal Code of the Republic of Moldova);

3) ideologically motivated violence against Jews (the term offered by V. Likhachov) [Antisemitism, 2003, s. 235] or inflicting physical injuries;

4) propagation of racial intolerance or a category of crimes called "genocide" in the criminal code of Ukraine and Moldova (for example, clause 442, Criminal Code of Ukraine, clause 135, Criminal Code of the Republic of Moldova).

Anti-Semitic actions are most frequently organized by neo-Nazi or ultranationalist groups, sometimes with the participation of marginalized layers of the population. As it has been specified above, all such actions are certain types of criminal offences. Jewish and rights protection organizations often accuse bodies of law of inactivity and reproach them with the impossibility to find the suspects who have committed the most frequent crimes such as vandalism and the damage of monuments. However, it is quite difficult to investigate these categories of crimes. In such cases charging the authorities with the inactivity and connivance to the anti-Semites by activists of Jewish organizations is hardly justified. Moreover, similar charges can also be used by some activists of Jewish organizations to put pressure upon the authority and emphasize their own importance or that of the structure.[66]

The closing of the International Humanitarian Institute in Belarus in 2004 could serve as an example of putting pressure upon the authority undertaken by the Jewish community. The IHI was "a unique higher educational institution where there was a department of Judaica and students studied the history of the Jewish people and the Jewish civilization, the bible and modern Jewish languages, bases of Judaism, problems of interethnic and interconfession relations in the context of world history (sic!- D. Sh.*)*" [Anti-Semitism, 2005, s. 242].

The IHI opened in 1999 was presented as a higher educational institution teaching Jewish disciplines. After its closing leaders of various Jewish institutions involving international organizations demonstrated their strong protest having accused the Belarusian authorities of anti-Semitism. It is not known what the reasons for its closing were. However, shortcomings in the educational process were not mentioned among the reasons though the educational process in that educational institution was organized dubiously: some lec-

tures were taught by people without a degree and sometimes without proper preparation, the set of disciplines was chosen just by chance; "Cultural studies" became the basis for preparing specialists. Besides, according to some data, representatives of Jerusalem University refused to work with the IHI management a few years later. It was decided to turn the IHI into a part of the department of international relations of the Belarusian state university. Student enrollment continued. However, the author of this paper has already expressed his opinion regarding the IHI closing [see: Shavyaleu, 2008; MYAT, 2008, # 38, s. 2].

There were cases of violence with anti-Semitic motivation in Ukraine and Moldova. Now such crimes are registered in Ukraine annually. There was also one case of violence in Tiraspol in 2000 (?) and that happens extremely rarely in the studied region.[67]

Anti-Semitic propagation is characteristic of the whole post-Soviet period. Authorities as it has already been specified find the presence of Judophobia moods expedient as it allows them to occupy at least a part of the population.

Besides, anti-Semitic propagation and publication of Judophobia literature are well paid by the customer and are in demand, in particular, in the conditions of economic and political shocks and the instability of the authority. All this explains the impossibility to liquidate the structures carrying out anti-Semitic propagation and "jamming" of such types of crimes in judicial bodies.

In Ukraine one of the most known customers of anti-Semitic propagation is the Interregional academy of personnel management (IAPM). It is a non-state higher educational establishment. It began participating in Judophobia hysteria at the beginning of 2002 [Antisemitism, 2003, s. 247]. Observers connect it with the establishment of contacts between the management of the academy with the Near-Eastern states [Antisemitism, 2003, s. 248-249]. It is important to remember that exactly in 2002 experts started noticing a certain growth in the number of anti-Semitic publications. The IAPM case is described in literature and is widely discussed at the international conferences on Jewish research, therefore, the author would not stop here for a more detailed description of the academy's activity. (To read more about anti-Semitic propagation in Ukraine in the first half of the 1990s see: Nyman, 1998.)

In Ukraine experts also treat as anti-Semitic some Russia oriented parties, for example, the Party of Slavic Unity of Ukraine or ultranationalist parties like the association "Derzhavna samostijnist Ukrainy" ("State Independence of Ukraine"), the organizations of the Ukrainian nationalists in Ukraine which were rather active in the 1990s though the author of this work does not know much about it [for more details see: Antisemitism, 2003, s. 250; Nyman, 1998].

During the described period in Belarus the customers of anti-Semitic materials include some circles of Black Hundred orientation connected with the exarchate of the Russian orthodox church including people close to president A. Lukashenko such as E.M. Skobelev[68] and S.I. Kostyan[69] [Antisemitism, 2008, s. 295].

In this connection it is imperative to study the case with the publishing house "Pravoslavnaja initsiativa" ("Orthodox initiative") established in 1996 with Minsk diocese of the

Belarusian orthodox church being one of the founders. Some editions of "Pravoslavnaja initsiativa" led to the claims of Jewish organizations filed in courts.[70] Constant scandals, including the claims filed against the specified publishing house displeased the hierarchs of the Belarusian orthodox church which is believed to have left the body of founders in December 2005.[71] In 2006 the publishing house was registered under the new name of "Hristianskaja initsiativa" ("Christian initiative").

It is possible to speak about the preservation of anti-Semitic moods among the conservative Catholic circles in Belarus. However, the author's knowledge about this is very limited.

In Moldova Romanian nationalists are more likely to be interested in anti-Semitic propagation. We have already mentioned the confrontation of the "pro-Romanian" historians with the authorities connected with the attempts of the communist country leaders in 2001-2008 to introduce into the educational system the teaching of certain parts of the Holocaust history in Bessarabia. Experts also mention the book distributed in 2007 in Kishinev. The book "Krasnaja nedelya: 28 ijunya – 3 ijulya, 1940, ili Bessarabia i evrei" ("Red week: June 28 - July 3rd, 1940, or Bessarabia and Jews") whose author is Romanian writer P. Gomy[72] [Antisemitism, 2008, s. 298-299] was anti-Semitic in nature.

It seems that out of the three described states only in Moldova the authorities are not interested in preserving anti-Semitic moods in society due to the above mentioned factors such as the European orientation of internal and foreign policy as well as the desire to prevent the scenario of the civil war of 1990-1992.

Ukraine is the only country in the region where Judophobia and anti-Semitism have become elements of the political game (a similar situation is observed in the Russian Federation). Parties and movements use anti-Semitic slogans and ideas. Experts register constant splashes of anti-Semitic propagation before parliamentary and presidential elections. A vivid example of the political game with the use of Judophobic propagation was the presidential elections in Ukraine in 2004. Nationalist leaders supported V.A. Yushchenko. Addresses of O. Tiahnybok, the deputy of the Supreme Rada of Ukraine from the fraction "Nasha Ukraina" ("Our Ukraine"), became very popular.[73] In April 2004, when speaking at the meeting organized at the grave of Klim Savur, the commander of the Ukrainian insurgent army in Ivano-Frankovsk O.Tiahnybok declared,

> "They were not afraid as well as we now should not be afraid, they hang automatic guns on the necks and went to those woods, they prepared and fought with Moskali, fought with Germans, fought with Jews, with other evil spirits which wished to take away from us our Ukrainian state … It is necessary to give Ukraine back to Ukrainians at last. And these young men, and you, gray-haired, - here it is that mix which "moskal-Jewish mafia" is most of all afraid of. This mafia rules in Ukraine today" [cit. from "Ukrainska Pravda" ("Ukrainian truth", 22.07.2004].

The speech led to the exclusion of O. Tiahnybok from the deputy fraction "Nasha Ukraina" but the decision of the Ivano-Frankovsk Public Prosecutor Office on filing a criminal case against the politician was dismissed by the judicial order [Antisemitism, 2005, s. 255, 257]. It is necessary to add that on March 16, 2003 "Ukrainska Pravda" informed that at the elections to the Ternopol regional Rada O. Tiahnybok's party "Svoboda" ("Freedom") received more than 33 % of voices and took about half of all seats in the regional government body.

Consequently, the opinion of experts including that of the Ukrainian observers from the EAJC about the marginality of extremist leaders like O. Tiahnybok turned out to be wrong. In conditions of the economic crisis and constant struggle for the authority inside "the orange" and between "the orange" and the Party of regions of V.F. Yanukovich the coming to power of extremists is very likely.[74]

Thus, we can observe a number of anti-Semitism tendencies in the studied region.

First of all, the authority accurately uses anti-Semitic moods of some parts of the population to eliminate the discontent with the authorities. A part of society having Judophobic prejudices is subject to influence of different groups acting as customers of anti-Semitic propagation. In Ukraine and Belarus they include a part of the Orthodox population with Black Hundred orientation and conservative Catholics. In Ukraine such people include a part of nationalist political groups. We can also add government, education and science officials connected with Arabian countries. In Moldova Romanian nationalist circles are among such groups.

Secondly, Judophobia is a part of internal political processes. Similar processes can also be observed in the Russian Federation.

Thirdly, there are cases when leaders of the Jewish community skillfully use miscalculations and mistakes of authorities accusing the latter of anti-Semitism using it as an excuse to put pressure on them.

Lobbyism in System of Relations between Authorities and Jewish Community (Attempt to Evaluate Lobbyist Opportunities)

We understand lobbyism as the interaction of non-state structures and pressure groups with state bodies with the purpose of promoting interests of a certain part of the population. Such organizations include business associations, non-state research organizations, and public associations; sometimes a lobbyist body may also include deputy groups and political parties.[75] We shall also agree that "lobbyist opportunities" are understood as a set of relations between lobbying bodies and power structures.

In many post-Soviet states the role of an oligarchic top echelon is very significant. Big business has been connected with power structures throughout the described period after the disintegration of the USSR. In the 1990s-2000s businessmen took upon themselves the functions of representing interests of the Jewish community when dealing with authorities by creating Jewish community representative structures and lobbyist organizations for the

promotion, first of all, of their own interests and then the interests of the Jewish community. It was done in Russia and Ukraine.

When evaluating the opportunities for lobbyist activities by analyzing the available materials and using personal observations the author can identify a number of subjects of the lobbyist activity of Ukraine's Jewish community before "the orange Opposition" in 2004-2005. They are the Vaad of Ukraine headed by I.S. Zisels and the all-Ukrainian Jewish congress (AUJC) founded by V.Z. Rabinovich.

After the revolution of 2004-2005, apparently, the positions of the AUJC weakened and the lobbyism subjects were supplemented by the Ukrainian Jewish committee founded by A.B. Feldman.

Political analysts divide the power structures carrying out lobbying functions into four categories: the president and his administration, government, parliament, and judicial bodies [Tolstyh, 2007, s. 30-31]. In Ukraine, thus, we shall single out the State committee on nationalities and religions as well as the Institute of national memory from government agencies where lobbying can be carried out.

Only the Vaad of Ukraine is thought to have lobbyist opportunities for all objects; the influence of other listed organizations probably affects only the activity of parliament and government.

Businessmen prefer to represent interests of the Jewish community before the authorities for two reasons. Usually the expenditure on charitable purposes such as community assistance allows to reduce the amount of taxes to be paid; at the same time it is possible to claim safely that a part of the businessmen of Jewish origin help the community due to their "call of blood".

However, the connections between the lobbying structures and the objects of lobbying in Ukraine after "Opposition" in 2004-2005 have become stronger due to several reasons. Firstly, the crisis of the authority caused by the personal rivalry of the "orange" leaders V.A. Yushchenko and. J. Timoshenko naturally affected the work of all branches of authority in Ukraine; in such cases it is difficult to use legal methods (and illegal methods are not used in sociopolitical lobbying[76]).

Secondly, each leader of the group fighting for authority inside "the orange" prefers to support his "own" Jewish leaders and the structures connected with them. V.A. Yushchenko and "Nasha Ukraina" support the Vaad of Ukraine and I.S. Zisels. J. Timoshenko and BYUT support A.B. Feldman and the Jewish fund of Ukraine (prior to the beginning of 2008) and since 2008 it has been the Ukrainian Jewish committee [Likhachov, 2008, s. 112].

Thirdly, the rivalry between representative Jewish associations leads to the indistinct formulation and differing interpretation of community interests. Accordingly, it becomes inconvenient for the authorities to work with numerous associations. As a result, state leaders select "suitable" structures which, probably, are not well aware of the interests of the community. The example of the latter is the Jewish council of Ukraine headed by I.I. Levitas.

One of the most influential Jewish leaders in Ukraine is I.S. Zisels. In many respects the organization of the Jewish community presentation to the authorities at the beginning of the 1990s is the merit of the Vaad of Ukraine created by I.S. Zisels.

One of the latest examples of the lobbyist activity and coordination of actions of the authorities and the Vaad of Ukraine is the international conference in August, 2008 in Ukraine devoted to the 100 anniversary of the Chernovtsy Yiddish conference in 1908.[77] The author of this work was honored to be a participant of the conference in 2008. The scientific aspect of the conference has already been written about [Shavyaleu, 2008]. Such anniversary conferences were organized in Chernovtsy in 1928, 1993 and 1998. The author will dare to express his opinion about the apolitical component of the forum.

The conference tried to demonstrate that the present Ukrainian political establishment provides support to the Jewish community. Moreover, the Vaad of Ukraine representing the most politically active part of the Jewish community as one of the conference organizers is completely solidary with the political elite of Ukraine. It is quite symbolic that at the grand opening of the conference on August 18, 2008 the participants were offered to honor the memory of those who died in the Caucasus with the minute of honor (it is interesting that there was no mentioning of the recent flood in Ukraine and Moldova).

It shall be mentioned that in August, 2008 the Eurasian Jewish Congress organized the provision of assistance to the refugees from the conflict zone in the Southern Caucasus. The commission on humanitarian aid of the EAJC was headed by I.S. Zisels. The association itself claims that more than 250 people received help from the EAJC [Evrejskaja obshchina Gruzii, 2008, s. 373].

However, such claims at the opening of the international scientific forum were regarded as the solidarity of the Vaad management with the "orange" political elite which opposed Russia in "five-day" Russian-Georgian war in 2008.[78] The document of the press-service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine in connection with the statement widely spread by the Party of regions in the Supreme Rada says, "Russian administration … has actually carried out violent actions against Georgia that is a sovereign state and a member of the United Nations". Thus, Kiev made Moscow responsible for the infringement of international law and aggravation of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict.

We shall mention some other details describing close cooperation of the milieu of V.A. Yushchenko and the Vaad of Ukraine. Conference participants received greetings from the mayor of Chernovtsy N. Fedoruk, the head of the Chernovtsy regional administration V. Kulish, and the deputy of the Supreme Rada from BYUT P. Gasyuk. The first day was organized in "the Ukrainian house" serving as the headquarters of the local branches of the National Movement of Ukraine[79] and the movement "Nasha Ukraina".

So, it is possible to make a conclusion that the Vaad of Ukraine possesses certain lobbyist opportunities.

The Ukrainian Jewish committee (UJC) founded in 2008 can become one more lobbying body. At the moment it is difficult to speak about its opportunities. It manifested its presence when it protested against the statement spread by the Security service of Ukraine

(SSU) "List of the individuals involved in the organizing and carrying out of the Holodomor in 1932-1933 in Ukraine" (it is accessible on the SSU web-site http://www.sbu.gov.ua/). The UJC insisted that the publication of this list places blame for the Holodomor on Jews and Latvians. The committee also noted that the list contains some discrepancies while, at the same time, in the opinion of the organization, the document does not name "real people responsible for the Holodomor" (the message on *Regnum. ru* of 28.07.2008: http://www.regnum. ru/news/1032978.html).

Sometime later the UJC representatives declared that "the lists published … by the SSU of the persons guilty of the Holodomor were compiled without the knowledge about it of the head of the special service Valentin Nalivajchenko" apparently, having decided not to quarrel with the heads of the SSU. A.B. Feldman claimed that promulgation of such a document shows "deep non-professionalism reigning today in this department" (the message from the information agency "Novy region" ("New region") of 29.07.2008: http://www.nr2.ru/kiev/188644.html). Nothing is known about other activities of the UJC.

The Jewish community of Moldova has two bodies with lobbyist functions. They are the Jewish congress of the Republic of Moldova and the Welfare fund "Dor le dor" ("From generation to generation").

The Jewish congress of Moldova (JCM) was created in June, 2003 by the Moldavian Jewish businessmen [Evrejskaja obshchina Moldovy, 2008, s. 385]. This structure is a member of the EAJC. This testifies to certain lobbyist influence of the JCM both inside and outside of the country.

Businessmen A. Bilinkis and A. Pinchevsky[80] are among the current leaders of the Jewish community of Moldova. A. Bilinkis has been the head of the UJC since June, 2006 and since June, 2007 together with A. Pinchevsky he has been the head of the association of Jewish communities and organizations of Moldova (AJCOM). Apparently, the creation in 2007 of the uniform management of the AJCOM and the UJC has strengthened lobbyist opportunities of the Moldavian community [Evrejskaja obshchina Moldovy, 2008, s. 385].

One more body which could carry out lobbyist functions is the Welfare fund "Dor le dor". The fund was established in 2003 by "some Jewish businessmen" as it is written on its site. The fund, possibly, is very close to the Israeli politician of the Moldavian origin A. Lieberman who has been the Minister of Foreign Affairs in B. Netanjahu's government since 2009.[81] However, the fund persistently positions itself as a "charitable" but "not political" organization [http://www.dorledor.info/].

It is known that till 2006 the fund invested 200 thousand US dollars into the Kishinev Jewish cemetery. In the autumn of 2006, conceding to the pressure of the Kishinev mayoralty (Vasile Ursu acted as mayor then) "Dor le dor" ceased to examine this cemetery. However, it has not been reported what the reasons for it were [Evrejskaja obshchina Moldovy, 2008, s. 385-386].

Unlike lobbyist bodies in Ukraine formed by oligarchs, there is nothing similar in Moldova first of all, because of the absence of big business of the Moldavian origin. This feature has been specified by sociologist V. Bruter [Bruter, 2002?].

However, there is an oligarch of the Jewish origin who was well received by the Moldavian authorities both before 2001 and after. It is B.I. Birnstein, the citizen of Switzerland.[82] President M. Snegur remembers Birnstein as a person who got him in touch with A. Rutskoj[83] and V. Barannikov[84] who in March - July, 1999 acted as intermediaries at signing the Agreement on principles of peace settlement of the armed conflict in the Transdniester region of the Republic of Moldova (21.07.1992) [Snegur - Volkov, 2007, s. 165 166]. However, there is no information about the official relations between B.I. Birnstein and Moldavian Jewish community.

V. Bruter also emphasizes the role of parties in the Moldavian politics using the Democratic party of Romania as an example of the Jewish community lobbyist body. Its heads were led to power not by the politically weak Jewish community of Romania but by the Jewish business circles outside of the country [Bruter, 2002?].

However, the creation of a similar political party in Moldova at present is hardly possible, first of all, because of huge expenses necessary for the financing of such a project. Besides, the interests of any business circles outside of Moldova are not restrained by the leaders of the state and are resolved without any intervention into the functioning of parliamentary mechanisms.

Political and business interests of Israel in Moldova allow to deal with the issues of friendship groups and communal institutions working in the Moldavian parliament and the Knesseth.

Hence, we can say that at present Jewish organizations have very few lobbyist opportunities. However, the factors specified above such as the expansion of the activity of the JCM and the creation of the united administration of the Association of Jewish organizations of Moldova and the JCM are most likely to further affect the strengthening of the lobbyist activity of Moldova Jewish community.

Jewish organizations of Belarus are not sponsored by any large private business. It prevents them from conducting lobbyist activities and forming communal institutions. For this reason the Jewish structures of Belarus are personified like in no other country of those analyzed. Thus, the activity of the organization is concentrated on one-two persons. We could say quite confidently that in Belarus Jewish lobbyist powers are invested in people but not in organizations.

The most influential person in the community is, undoubtedly, the head of the UBJAC L.M. Levin[85] who has access to power structures. L.M. Levin has been the head of the association since it was founded in 1991.

It is possible to say that the UBJAC head rarely uses his contacts with authorities. Such position leads to criticism coming from some representatives of the community. Apparently, this criticism is not always fair.

Other leaders of the community, especially from the competing associations such as the JRA and the JARC have a very limited access to the authorities.

However, we shall say that at the end of 2007 the prospects of the JARC rapprochement with the authorities became more promising. Many mass media quoted an extract from

the speech of President A.G. Lukashenko at the press conference for Russian journalists on October 12, 2007. These statements were regarded anti-Semitist[86] but the reaction of the UBJAC was quite mild,

> "This fact [the statements of the president of the country] caused bewilderment and anxiety among the representatives of the Jewish community of Belarus. Never before any of the heads of a high rank allowed to doubt that the Belarusian population of our republic is tolerant towards to the fellow citizens representing different nationalities of the republic. It fully concerns the Jewish community." (The Press release of the Union of Belarusian Jewish associations and communities [October, 2007]).

On October 25-27, 2007 the international conference "Dialogue of Christianity and Islam in the conditions of globalization" was held in Minsk. Representatives of the Jewish community were among the guests. On October 26th, 2007 the President of Belarus met with the conference delegates. The reports about the event said nothing about the presence of the UBJAC and JRA representatives. Only the JARC leaders were mentioned. Thus, we shall make a conclusion that, probably, the authorities were planning to support the competing association connected with the Khabad movement. It is also possible to speak about a partial loss of some connections of the UBJAC with power structures, namely, with the people surrounding the president of Belarus in 2007-2008.

Subsequent events such as a series of publications and statements in the Belarusian mass media about the fair national policy in the country and the history of interethnic contacts in Belarus, as well as the state support of the carrying out of the memorial days devoted to the destruction of the Minsk ghetto on October 20-23, 2008, and favorable coverage of some events of the Jewish and Israeli history on the Belarusian TV have shown the restoration of the UBJAC lost contacts with the authorities.

Conflicts inside Jewish Communities

There were quite a few conflicts inside the communities in the 1990s-2000s. Probably, the whole post-Soviet history of Jewish communities consists of internal conflicts. The time has not come yet to describe everything. Due to the lack of sources it seems impossible to describe certain facts. Actually, in spite of all differences in the nature of conflicts, whether it was in the secular part of the community or inside of its religious part or between the religious and secular parts, the purposes of them all were most trivial with their leaders fighting for power, influence in the community, and sources of income.

We will describe just one story, namely, the fight for the title of the main rabbi and the rivalry between the representatives of the traditionally Lithuanian rabbi Judaism and Khabad Chassids for influence in the communities.[87]

Fight for Position of Main Rabbi and Struggle between Mitnagdim and Chassidim

The enmity between *Mitnagdim* and *Chassidim* has a long history as it began at the end of the 18th - the beginning of the 19th century; it slowed down exclusively under the influence of the common threat which the Orthodox people saw in Khaskal. The rivals spread pamphlets against each other, *Mitnagdim* cursed Chassids with herem,[88] and both parties wrote denunciations to the authorities.

Actually, except for herem, other ways of struggle between the rivals have been preserved till now as rivals still exchange caustic remarks in mass media and try to win power structures over to their party's side.

Many observers, when analyzing the situation in the post-Soviet communities, are inclined not to place too much importance on this conflict and for this reason the author of this work found it necessary to consider it in more detail. Though, naturally it would be incorrect to reduce the conflict in the community to only one religious struggle between Mitnagdim and Chassids Khabad[89].

The Khabad web-site in Russian [http://www.chassidus.ru] provides memoirs "Objedinenie hasidov Habada (Agudas Hasidei Habad) v stranah SNG: Sozdanie, istorija, dejatelnost, trudnosti" ("Association of Chassids Khabad (Agudas Chassidaj Khabad) in the CIS countries: Creation, history, activity, difficulties") the author of which is Rabbi Sholom Dov-Ber Levin, one of the participants of Khabad organizations forming in the post-Soviet states. The text on the site is dated 2000.

Vigorous activity of Khabad in Russia begins in 1991 [r. Levin, 2000]. While in Russia and Belarus the situation around the post of the main rabbi was unequivocal with two main rabbis, one of them representing Mitnagdim and the other representing Chassids it was different in Ukraine with three main rabbis from Chassidic associations.

Today the main rabbi should represent the interests of some group of the community religious part before the authorities. According to some data, a similar rank was given in Babylonia in the 6th - 11th centuries B.C. Till the New time the receipt of this rank served as the recognition of authority in the field of law teaching. The position of the main rabbi as a representative position develops during the period of Napoleon reforms in the 1800s. Actually, its existence in such a form is the imperial tradition. In 1836-1837 in the Ottoman empire the post *of Khakhambashi* was established (the main or supreme rabbi)[90]. Since 1845 the main rabbi of the Big London synagogue has been called the highest rabbi of the British Empire. There is no such position in many Western European countries.

In 1987 the congress of the Jewish communities of the USSR elected A.S. Shaevich as the main rabbi of the country. He was the rabbi of the Moscow choral synagogue (in those times the rabbi of the Moscow choral synagogue in the USSR had the recognized authority on religious issues).

The position of the main rabbi of Russia was introduced in 1993 at the convention of the Congress of Jewish religious organizations and associations in Russia (CJROA). The

same person A.S. Shaevich was elected. In 2000 with the support of Putin's milieu the second main rabbi B. Lazar from the Federation of the Jewish communities of Russia (FJCR) which included Khabad followers was elected. The FJCR was created in 1999. The Federation of Jewish communities of the CIS (the FJC of the CIS) was founded in 1998. L. Levaev administered the activities connected with all these associations.

In essence, the election of the second main rabbi meant the recognition of Khabad activities and efforts. Apparently, the emergence of the position of the second main rabbi in Russia in 2000 discredited the representative functions of this post not only in Russia but also in other post-Soviet states.

The Association of Jewish religious organizations of Ukraine is headed by Yakov Dov Blajh, the follower of Carlinston Chassidism.[91] Rabbi Blajh received the title of the main rabbi of Kiev and Ukraine in 1990 [http://ru.wikipedia.org], according to other sources it happened in 1991 [Likhachov, 2008, s. 106] or 1992 [Popper, 2006]. He arrived in Ukraine in January, 1990 and became the head of the only Kiev synagogue in Podol area.

Since 2000 after B. Lazar's election as the main rabbi of Russia the FJC of the CIS has joined in an active struggle for influence in the post-Soviet communities. Likhachov claims that in 2003 the Federation of Jewish communities of Ukraine became the initiator of the election of Azriel Khaikin as the main rabbi of Ukraine at the congress of rabbis. V. Likhachov calls rabbi Khaikin "the most legitimate candidate" for such a position as his election took place specifically at the rabbi congress [Likhachov, 2008, s. 107].

According to the sources of the FJCR Lazar was supported by the Party of regions of V.F. Yanukovich. Therefore, the election of r. Khaikin supported by both the FJCR and the FCJU as the main rabbi was received by the political elite of Ukraine with reserve [Levitina, 28.12.2004].

In 2005 under the initiative of the all-Ukrainian Jewish congress there was one more rabbi elected. Moshe-Reyven Asman, the rabbi of the Kiev "synagogue of Brodsky", became the third main rabbi of Ukraine. Sources say that it displeased other Khabad followers. Khabad rabbis were outraged as r. Asman has a hostile relationship with the leadership of the FJC of the CIS. Following different sources we can make a conclusion that the reasons for the conflict between r. Asman and L. Levaev and r. Lazar lie in the fact that r. Asman ceased to depend on the financing from the FJC of the CIS and found a new source for the realization of his own initiatives. Apparently, the source was the AJC of V.Z. Rabinovich. Unlike most Khabad supporters r. Asman did not study in the USA but in Israel having started with the underground Yeshiva in Leningrad [Popper, 2006]. It is also important to know that r. Asman rendered president Yushchenko invaluable services by promoting American-Ukrainian trade negotiations.

Experts estimate that the ACJRC includes 15 communities (in comparison, the rivaling FJCU has got 17 while the AJROU consists of 62 communities) [Likhachov, 2008, s. 106]. But Asman has managed to resist the pressure of the FJC so far.

Observers name some more influential Ukrainian rabbis in the provinces who could apply for a post of the main rabbi, but it is hardly probable that they will agree as they pos-

sess both the authority in the province and the power to influence the decision-making in the capital. Observers name Dnepropetrovsk rabbi Shmuel Kaminetsky as one of such individuals.

It is quite possible that the election of I.V. Kolomojsky as the leader of the UJCU as it has already been mentioned along with the presidential elections in Ukraine in 2009 will change the alignment of forces in Ukraine's Jewish community.

The situation with the main rabbis in Belarus in comparison with Ukraine appears to be much more simple and similar to that in Russia. There are two main rabbis in Belarus. One of them is from the JRA which includes the communities of Litvaks and the other is from the AJRC which includes Khabad followers. If there was no special struggle between *Mitnagdim* and Khabad there was a struggle inside the Khabad association.

On January 9, 2005 at the AJRC congress the replacement of previous leaders of the association E.F. Parizh and the main rabbi Iosif Gluzman was announced. V.N. Malinkin became the new chairman [http://www.religare.ru/print14454.htm 10.02.2005]. The valid reason to replace the old management AJRC team was its negotiations with the EAJC leaders to include the association member communities into the EAJC structure [Levitina, 2004] in reply to the reduction by the FJC of the CIS of the financing of important communal programs. The AJRC actions looked like a revolt. There was supposed to be some punishment for the open transition to the rivals, namely, a secular association connected with *Mitnagdim* and reformists after the failures to appoint Khabad representatives the main rabbis in Lithuania and Georgia in 2004.[92] As a result the resignation of E.F. Parizh and r. Gruzman followed the meeting of the AJRC and EAJC leaders.

Belarusian authorities had a very peculiar stand. Neither E.F. Parizh, nor r. Gruzman agreed with the decision of the AJRC congress. The committee on affairs of religions and nationalities of Belarus unequivocally supported the new leaders of the association.

News agencies quoted a phrase from the letter passed by the chairman of the State committee on affairs of religions S. Buko to the former head of the AJRC, "In case of failure to fulfill the requirements of the current legislation connected with the addition of powers of the head of the legal entity by you, the Association of Jewish religious communities in the Republic of Belarus has the right to resolve the developed situation in the established manner" [cit. from: the message *Religare.ru* dated 10.02.2005].

The most interesting fact is that after that the authorities began to delay the approval of the nominee of the main rabbi from the AJRC. The association elected r. Tsvi Kaplan. On May 5, 2006 the AJRC addressed the Committee on affairs of religions and nationalities with the request for the approval of r. Kaplan as the main rabbi of Belarus and Minsk. The official excuse for the delay in the approval of a new nominee was the liquidation of the state committee itself (the Decree of the President of Belarus # 289 of 05.05.2006). Probably, it was one of the reasons as the Regulation about the Representative on affairs of religions and nationalities appeared only in July, 2006 (the Decision of the Council of Ministers of Belarus # 891 from July 15, 2006 "On approving the regulation about the representative on affairs of religions and nationalities and his machinery").

However, in reaction to the application of V.N. Malinkin the bodies of the Public Prosecutor office sent the AJRC a notice stating that they had had a complaint from certain persons about committing by r. Kaplan of "illegal actions" on the territory of Belarus [message *Afn.by* of 09.06.2006: http://www.afn.by/news/i/78520]. On July 17 the same year the Public Prosecutor Office allegedly advised V.N. Malinkin that "there was no corpus delicti" in Kaplan's actions. On August 3 the AJRC again addressed the corresponding bodies of Belarus and as the leader of the Khabad association claimed the department on affairs of religions and nationalities of the Minsk regional executive committee sent a new notice about the complaint of citizens about the activity of r. Kaplan.

As a result, though sources do not provide the exact date, sometime between September and December, 2006 r. Kaplan was approved to become the main rabbi of Belarus.

It is known, that r. Kaplan was born in Mozyr, studied in Israel, in 1998 or 1999 he returned as a rabbi to Belarus and then left for Kiev as the organizer of Yeshiva connected with "Brodsky's synagogue". The story about the attack on this synagogue on April 13, 2002 is well-known. R. Kaplan was beaten then. (the message of "CN-Stolichnye novosti" ("Capital news"). 2002. # 14).

We do not know exactly what "citizen address" about "the illegal activity" of the rabbi was investigated by the Public Prosecutor office and whether it existed at all. It is difficult to specify the reasons which led to the delay in the approval of the main rabbi of Belarus from the AJRC in 2006. It can only be said clearly that in 2008-2009 the authorities were obviously drawn to Khabad movement followers, though, probably, they did not really know the differences between Khabad and other movements in Chassidim or could not distinguish between Jedaism and Mitnagdim as the political elite of Belarus was rather interested in relations with L. Levaev. However, they say that the construction of Minsk synagogue in Kropotkin Street is stalled again. Thus, we can assume that for some reason Belarusian authorities did not manage to have consensus with L. Levaev.

We shall not exaggerate the present confrontation between *Mitnagdim* and Khabad as well as inside Khabad in the post-Soviet states. At the same time we shall not underestimate it. Khabad preachers have acquired over the last few decades skills of American Protestant priests and have been applying them successfully. This is noticed not only by the opponents of the movement but also by outside observers. Finally, in the modern world theological discussions sometimes are hidden behind financial interests. As the above mentioned Blajh has precisely said, "Khabad comes with such big money that there are only very few who can resist it" [cit. from: Popper, 04.12.2006].

Jewish Cultural Revival or Illusion of it? (Instead of Conclusion)

We shall remind that according to the official data of the census in 2001 the Jewish population made up 103, 6 thousand people in Ukraine (0, 2 %), in Moldova there were

3, 6 thousand people (0, 11 %), while in Belarus the number reached 27, 8 thousand Jews (0, 3 %). If we look at the quantitative data provided by Jewish organizations in Ukraine the Jewish population makes now from 200 up to 400 thousand people (0, 4-0, 8 %), in Moldova it is 13 thousand (0,38 %), there are about 2 thousand people in the not recognized Transdniester Moldavian Republic (0, 36 % of the population of the republic) and in Belarus it varies between 50 and 70 thousand people (0, 5-0, 7 %).

In order to evaluate the results and perspectives of Jewish cultural revival in the specified region we shall use several parameters: Jewish religious life, Jewish primary and secondary education and publications in the Jewish language spoken on this territory, namely, Yiddish.

The sources do not provide the exact quantitative data about the number of synagogues functioning today in the outlined region. The most exact remain the data provided by Dr. M. Beizer in the publication "Nashe nasledstvo: Sinagogi SNG v proshlom i nastojashchem?" ("Our Heritage: CIS Synagogues in the past and present") (M., 2002).

M. Beizer provides the number of synagogues which worked in the USSR in 1952. The total number of synagogues is 133 with 40 in the USSR, 11 in the Moldavian SSR and 2 in Belarus [Beizer, 2002, p. 42]. He also identifies the number of operating synagogues and the buildings of former synagogues returned to Jewish communities. There were 49 of them in Ukraine, 10 in Moldova (with three of them in the Transdniester Moldavian Republic, two are located in Tiraspol and one is in Bendery), and there were 9 synagogues in Belarus [Beizer, 2002, p. 170-173]. (However, not all of the buildings of former synagogues being at the disposal of communities are now used for religious services; many have been adapted to serve as communal centers).[93]

On December 23, 2007 Belarusian "National TV" informed about the completion of the construction of Minsk synagogue in Kropotkin Street, 22, carried out with the support of the fund "Or Avner" [http://www.ont.by/news/our_news/0022922]. We shall emphasize Khabad followers' significant contribution to the revival in the 1990s-2000s of Jewish life in general and religion in particular.

Though the author of this article does not have exact quantitative data, it is possible to say with confidence that the majority of operating synagogues are now under the authority of Khabad movement. It is clear that if synagogues exist it means that they collect minyan.[94] It seems that to the majority of "parishioners" it does not make any difference whether to go to a synagogue where rabbi is Chassid or *Mitnagid* if, of course, they did not attend the synagogue in the 1970s-1980s. It also seems that it is Khabad followers' persistence and their personal example that attracted people to the synagogue in the second half of the 1990-2000s.

It is not possible to give the exact number of Jews-believers. The available results of censuses in Ukraine in 2001 and in Belarus in 1999 do not contain data on denomination. The census data in Moldova in 2004 contain information about denomination but do not provide the number of people practicing Judaism. The author decided that it is possible to show the real number of people regularly attending the synagogue with the help of the

following data: in Ukraine and Belarus it is those who "identified as the native language the language of their nationality" (Yiddish). In Ukraine it is about 3 thousand people, in Belarus it is about 1,5 thousand people. The synagogues in Moldova are believed to be attended by approximately 1 thousand people.

Observers provide the following data on the Jewish educational institutions in Ukraine: there are 37 secondary and 60 Sunday schools, 11 kindergartens, 8 Yeshivas; there are also gymnasia of the fund "Orakh Khaim"[95] and ORT lycea[96] but there are no figures given. Till the fall of 2000 the majority of Jewish secondary schools of Ukraine were financed by the fund "Or Avner" [Evrejskaja obshchina Ukrainy, 2008, s. 424-425].

The author intentionally omits the list of higher educational institutions which are believed to provide Jewish education as the sphere of use of services of experts and graduates of these institutions is quite narrow and the level of knowledge does not always meet the requirements even of state standards.[97] Though we shall mention that Ukraine has the biggest amount of higher educational institutions connected with Judaica in the post-Soviet countries.

In Moldova there are two licea, one Khabad kindergarten, and a pedagogical college for females [Evrejskaja obshchina Moldovy, 2008, s. 304].

In Belarus there are 19 Jewish Sunday schools, 5 kindergartens, 3 schools "Or Avner", Lauder-shneor-college, one gymnasium, Jewish classes in a secondary school in Minsk, one boarding school, and Mitnagdim Yeshiva.

In all examined states there are communal periodicals in Russian: there are about 30 in Ukraine, 5 in Belarus and 3 in Moldova.

Very few people speak Yiddish today. It makes sense to emphasize that according to the census data, in Belarus 5, 4 % of Jews named as their native language "the language of the nationality" (i.e., Yiddish), in Ukraine Jews make up 3, 1 % of the population so it is 1, 5 thousand and about 3 thousand people respectively. The author does not have such data for Moldova. It is probably about 1 thousand people. Thus, a few thousand people in all three countries understand Yiddish. It seems that this number of Yiddish speakers allows the forecast to be quite optimistic.

At present creative work in Yiddish continues to be carried out in Moldova where the radio program "Yiddish lebn" ("Jewish life") has been broadcasted with host S.M. Bengelsdorf since 1990.[98] In 2000, 2003 and 2007 collections of works of I.I. Shraibman[99] were published in Kishinev.

The broadcast in Yiddish has also been monthly coming out in Chernovtsy since 1991. It is 30 minutes long. However, nobody writes in Yiddish in Ukraine now. The last of the Ukrainian elders of literature in Yiddish was Grigory Isaakovich Polyanker (1911-1997).

Until recently it was possible to assume that the culture in Yiddish was destined to disappear in Belarus. However, in 2004 just before his death G.L. Reles[100] who was one of the last classics of Jewish literature published memoirs in Yiddish "Jewish Soviet writers of Belarus". The Yiddish-Belarusian dictionary compiled by A. Astrauh [Astravuh, 2008] was

published in Minsk in 2008. Publication of books in Yiddish in Moldova and Belarus provide some degree of assurance that Jewish culture has certain prospects of development.

Thus, in all three countries the amount of synagogues is gradually increasing though the number of their visitors will hardly grow in the foreseeable future. Moreover, it will probably decrease. In Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus there are Jewish periodicals in Russian, i.e., the language used by Jews in their daily life and understood by the rest of the population. So the Jewish periodical press solves the educational problem. At the same time the number of people who know and understand Yiddish as the Jewish language of these territories is sharply decreasing. These territories are former provinces of the Jewish settlement. Yiddish is learned by a very limited number of people (mainly, these are amateur courses) and it is not really propagandized by communities of Belarus and Ukraine. As a result a part of Jewish culture is completely disappearing though the publication of books in Yiddish already in the 2000s in Belarus and Moldova reflects some modest attempts to change the situation. So chances of Jews in Belarus and Moldova are greater than those of Jews in Ukraine.

V. Likhachov in the article often quoted in this work about the Jewish community of Ukraine wrote that the Jewish revival took place in Ukraine [Likhachov, 2008, s. 99]. Following his views we can declare without any reservation that the Jewish revival took place in all post-Soviet states, including the three examined countries. Now we can more or less confidently forecast certain tendencies in the development of the Jewish life in the specified states.

In Ukraine the Jewish life will have prospects as long as big businessmen support it (we shall remind that about half of all means going to the Ukrainian Jewish community is allocated by oligarchs). In Belarus the Jewish community exists exclusively due to the donations of foreign sponsors. Such way of existence has very few chances in future. Moldova now seems to be that country where there is a certain balance of the functioning of Jewish life. Moldavian businessmen are interested in the activity of communal institutions and have started their partial financing. The state created the conditions for the existence of the community within the frameworks of the national-cultural autonomy.

At the same time Jewish life will really be Jewish only when the community preserves the disappearing culture in the described region and it is the culture preserved in Yiddish. It is still possible in Moldova and Belarus but it is probably too late for this in Ukraine.

Notes

1 The indicator of "the whole Jewish population" is made up by summing up the quantitative data on the Ashkhenazim, Highland, Georgian and Central Asian Jews; the calculation does not include the data on Karaite. This technique is mainly used by experts [see also: Kupovetsky, 2001].

2 For various interpretation of Jewry see: Evrej – kto on, 2007.

3 Sukka is a shelter, ritual dwelling constructed on the Sukkos holiday.

4 The present research is executed within the framework of the project *Center for Advanced Studies and Education (CASE)*. The author expresses his special gratitude to his colleagues and friends for their help, namely, Y. Korogodsky for his useful advice and remarks concerning the Ukrainian situation, Mrs. Y. Oleneva for the copies of some materials brought from Beer-sheva made by her in December, 2008 under the Hamas rocket fire. The author is also grateful to his Moldavian colleagues Dr. Hab.V.P. Stepanov and Mrs. O. Sivak from the Jewish library named after I. Manger for the assistance rendered during his business trip to Kishinev in November, 2008

5 The establishment of Minsk society of Jewish culture is sometimes wrongly dated 1989 [see, for example: Evrejskaja obshchina Belorussii, 2008, s. 360].

6 Vaad means "committee", "commission" in Hebrew.

7 The fund "Or Avner" is a charitable fund in support of the KHABAD movement created by businessman L. Levaev in 1992-1993 in memory of his father r. Avner Levaev. Khabad is an abbreviation of three Hebrew words such as "wisdom" *("khokhma")*, "understanding" *("bina")*, "knowledge" *("da'at"). It is a trend within Chassidim* founded by r. Shneur Zalman from Lyad. It was formed at the end of the 18th - the beginning of the 19th. Before the First World War Byelorussia was the center of Khabad followers activity. Gradually Khabad activities moved to the USA.

8 The Eurasian Jewish congress was created in 2001 as a representative body of the Jewish communities of the former USSR states for the relations with other international Jewish organizations [see: Chlenov, 2003; http://www.eajc.org/].

9 Zisels, Iosif Solomonovich was born in 1946 in Tashkent. He is one of the most influential and authoritative Jewish leaders on the territory of the former Soviet Union. He was a member of the dissident movement in the USSR in the 1970s – 1980s and a participant of the creation in 1988 of the Chernovtsy fund of preservation of the Jewish cemetery. In 1989 he became one of the organizers of the Vaad of the USSR. Nowadays he is the chairman of the Vaad of Ukraine, the executive vice-president of the Jewish confederation of Ukraine, and the chairman of the General Council of the EJC.

10 Rabinovich, Vadim Zinovievich born in 1953 in Kharkov is a Ukrainian businessman considered to be a confidant of President M. Kravchuk. He is the founder of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry "Ukraine – Israel" and the founder of the holding *R. C. Group*. In 2000 he opened the media-company *Media International Group*. V. Rabinovich was accused of deliveries of arms to the "Taliban" movement and Chechen guerrillas [see: http://www.compromat.ru/].

11 Kolomojsky, Igor Valerievich is a large-scale businessman and the citizen of Israel permanently living in Switzerland. He is the founder of the financial and industrial organization "Privat". According to the rating of the magazine "Correspondent" of the wealthiest Ukrainians in 2006 he was in the third place (his capital is 2, 8 billion dollars). Some data claim that he supported "the orange" [see: http://file. liga. net/].

12 Feldman, Alexander Borisovich born in 1960 in Kharkov is a Ukrainian businessman and the founder of the joint-stock company "Concern AVEK and Co". He began his political activity at the beginning of 2002. Before "the orange revolution" A. Feldman supported the Party of regions. Since June, 2005 he has joined the fraction "Julia Timoshenko's Block" (BYUT). In 1997 he founded the "AVEK" charitable fund. Nowadays it is called the International charitable fund of Alexander Feldman [see: http://file. liga. net/http://www.feldman.org. ua/].

13 Litvaks are Lithuanian Jewry, Belarusian-Lithuanian Jewry. They are the Jews who lived on the territory of the Great Duchy of Lithuania. In the religious sense they were the followers of rabbinitic Judaism.

14 It is, clearly, a subject for separate research. It is important to pay attention to the collected articles compiled by Ukrainian political scientist M. Pogrebinsky and devoted to "the orange revolution" of 2004-2005 in Ukraine. The book provides opposite points of view on the problem as well as some documents [see: Oranzhevaja revolutsija. 2005].

15 Fronda (Opposition) is the movement against absolutism in France in 1648-1653. The idea about "the Ukrainian Fronda" was provided to the author of this article by Ukrainian historian and journalist Y. Korogodsky who had probably used this concept following his colleagues.

16 Ahmetov, Rinat Leonidovich is one of the major Ukrainian businessmen. He is the native of Donetsk and controls the financial and industrial group *System Capital Management*. Pinchuk, Victor Mihajlovich is the founder of the investment-consulting group *EastOne* and the son-in-law of President L.D. Kuchma. He is a member of the Board of trustees of the Dnepropetrovsk Jewish community and the vice-president of the Jewish congress of Ukraine. They both are named as people supporting V Yanukovich and the Party of regions of Ukraine.

17 Gajduk, Vitaly Anatolievich and Taruta, Sergey Alekseevich are the biggest Ukrainian businessmen and the founders of the corporation "Industrial Union of Donbass".

18 The author borrows the epithet "depressive" from the article of V.A. Nikonov in the already mentioned collected articles "Oranzhevaja revolutsija: versii, hronika, dokumenty" though the latter applies the epithet to Western Ukraine.

19 Surkis, Grigory Mikhajlovich was born in 1949 in Odessa. He is a businessman and a politician. In 1993-1998 he was the president of the industrial-financial concern "Slavutich". In 1998-2006 he was the People's Deputy of Ukraine. Since 2000 he has been the president of the Football Federation of Ukraine.

20 Fishbein, Moisei Abramovich born in1946 in Chernovtsy is a Ukrainian Jewish poet and translator. He lived in Israel and Germany and since the beginning of the 2000s he has been living in Ukraine and is a member of the Ukrainian Union of writers.

21 Gurvits, Edward Iosifovich was born in 1948 in Mogilyov-Podolsk. In 1994-1998 and then since 2006 he has been the mayor of Odessa. In 1998 he became the deputy of parliament from the movement "Nasha Ukraina" ("Our Ukraine").

22 Chervonenko, Evgeni Alfredovich born in 1959 in Dnepropetrovsk is a businessman. In 2000-2001 he was the chairman of the State agency on management of the state material reserve and the founder and the head of the concern "Orlan" ("Sea-eagle"). In 2004-2005 E. Chervonenko was the head of V.A. Yushchenko's escort. In 1999 he became one of the founders of the Jewish confederation of Ukraine.

23 In both cases the use of italics is ours – D. Sh.

24 Addresses of the Jewish community spiritual leaders were placed on the site of the Vaad of Ukraine: http://www.vaadua.org/

25 "Nasha Ukraina" ("Our Ukraine") is the political movement which has united supporters of V.A. Yushchenko. It was created in January - February, 2002; in March, 2005 the National Union "Nasha Ukraina" ("Our Ukraine") (NUNU) was founded; in 2007 the NUNU was used as the basis for the setting up of the political block "Nasha Ukraina – narodnaja samooborona" ("Our Ukraine is national self-defense"). The Web-site of the movement can be found at: http://www.razom.org. ua/

26 Julia Timoshenko's Block (BYUT) is the association of supporters of J. Timoshenko created in 2002. The Web-site of the movement can be found at: http://www.byut.com.ua/

27 The only successful attempt to provide the chronicle of the failed "revolution" is presented in the collected articles "Zastaemsya! Sakavik 2006: Pryvatnae i agulnae" ("We shall stay! March 2006: Individual and Common") (Vilnius, 2007) [zastaemsya! 2007].

28 The Christian Democratic People's Party (CDPP) is the Moldavian right political party of Unionist orientation (i.e., supporting the unification with Romania). It was created in 1999; earlier it was called the Christian Democratic Popular Front of Moldova (up to 1999) and the Popular Front of Moldova (1989-1992/1993).

29 Urekyan, Serafim Alexandrovich born in 1950 is a Moldavian politician. In 1994-2005 he was the mayor (primar) of Kishinev. Since 2003 he has been the co-chairman of the Alliance "Nasha Moldova" ("Our Moldova"). Since 2004 S. Urekyan has been the leader of the election block "Demokraticheskaja Moldova" ("Democratic Moldova"). He positions himself as the opponent of the ruling communist regime.

30 Data can be found at: http://www.alegeri2005.md

31 In his interview "The institute of Judaica: 2003 portrait sketches" to the newspaper "Khadashot" L.K. Finberg, the director of the Kiev Institute of Judaica, erroneously identified 1990 as the date of the foundation of the Kiev Institute of Judaica (http://www.vaadua.org/Hada-sot/Had12/07. htm) [institut iudaiki, 2003].

32 For example, Kii archives contain papers of I.S. Falikmyan, L.M. Kvitko, N.I. Zabara, N.Kon, etc. Ihil Shmulevich Falikmyan (1911-1977) is a Jewish Soviet writer, the author of stories, sketches, novels, and the participant of the Great Patriotic war. He was the associate editor of the magazine "Sovetish Geimland" ("Soviet Motherland"). The following books were published in Russian: a collection of stories "Gorkoe semya" ("The Bitter Seed") (1964), the novel "Obrechyonnye berut oruzhie" ("The Doomed Take Arms") (1959), the novel "Ogon i pepel" ("Fire and Ashes") (1977), the collection of stories and short stories "Semja chelovecheskaja" ("Human Family") (Kiev, 1975), and the novel "Chorny veter" ("Black Wind") (1974), etc. Kvitko, Lion Moiseevich (1890-1952) was a Jewish poet who wrote in Yiddish. He was a member of the Jewish anti-fascist committee and participated in the edition of the newspaper "Ainikait" ("Unity"). He was subjected to repression and was shot. Collections of translations of poems were published in 1948, 1956, 1964, 1978, and 1990. Zabara, Natan Ilyich (1908-1975) was a Ukrainian Jewish writer who wrote in Yiddish. In 1951-1956 he was imprisoned. He was believed to be one of the first illegal teachers of Hebrew in Kiev. There are translations into Russian of his story "Dva syna" ("Two sons") (Kiev, 1939), the novel "Otets" ("Father") (1961), and the collection of novels (1968). Gerts-Kon Naftali (Yakub Serf) is a Jewish poet born in 1910 near Chernovtsy. Very little has been written about N. Kon until recently. One of the latest articles about him was published by K. Auerbach in the magazine "Polin" [Auerbach, 2008].

33 Foreign scientists spoke about the crisis of the academic branch in Ukraine in two articles in the magazine "Nature" March 9, 2006 [Nature, 2006, p. 128, 132-133]. The author of this work has been told about the state of affairs in Ukrainian science by his Ukrainian colleagues. The author of this article has already expressed his opinion regarding the general crisis of humanitarian science in the late Soviet and post-Soviet period [see, for example: Shevelev, 2007].

34 The author owes Y. Korogodsky the definition "a postmodernist situation". The story of the organization of the Ottoman seminar in the institute of oriental studies named after A.E. Krymsky of the NUNU seems quite interesting and indicative in the described context. [Galenko, Driga, 1997].

35 Though the name "Scientific-educational center of Semen Dubnov" also appeared in several editions [see, for example: Dubnovskie chtenija (Dubnov readings), 2001].

36 To read more about it see the article of the author of this paper "Razvagi ab stane iudaiki v Belarusi" ("Reflections about the condition of Judaica in Belarus") in Jewish self-publication "My jashche tut!" ("We are still here!"), 2008, # 38.

37 For more details about G.M. Livshits see: Botvinnik, 1994.

38 The underside of such freedom is probably the emergence of quasi-scientific works which only imitate scientific research.

39 Some facts from the history of the Jewish department in the Academy of sciences of Moldova were provided to the author of this article by the Academy's present head Dr. I. Shikhova. To read more about the ethnic component of Moldavian science: Stepanov, 2006; Stepanov, 2007.

40 Kopansky, Yakov Mikhajlovich (1930-2006) is a Moldavian historian and the author of works on history of Moldova and international relations. He is considered to be one of the founders of Jewish research in Moldova. In 1978 Y. Kopansky became Doctor of historical sciences. In 2005 for his country work achievements he received the Award *Gloria Muncii* (the Decree of the President of the Republic Moldova # 2285 of 28.03.2005). For more details see: Shpitalnik, 2000, s. 158-159.

41 Zhignya, Klara Leonidovna (was born in 1945) is a historian, philologist, translator, doctor of historical sciences (1978). She writes about history of international relations, the Kishinev pogrom in 1903, and history of Zionism. See: Shpitalnik, 2000, s. 158.

42 Kleiman, Rita Yakovlevna (1947-2008) was a philologist, literary critic, and one of the recognized researchers of F.M. Dostoevsky's creative work. For a certain period of time she was the head of the Jewish department in the Academy of sciences of Moldova as well as the Union of the Jewish organizations of Kishinev. See: Shpitalnik, 2000, s. 45-46.

43 On the basis of his personal observations the author could say that the situation in Moldova has started changing but several years should pass before the young generation of researchers occupies a certain niche in science.

44 There is a great amount of research devoted to the Holocaust. To learn more about various aspects of the problem read the works of Israeli researchers such as I. Gutman, I. Arad, Sh. Kholyavsky, D.Romanovsky, D. Mikhman, I. Bauer, etc. More about works of Belarusian, Ukrainian and Moldavian authors will be said below.

45 These quantitative data have been graciously provided by Y. Korogodsky. To learn more about Ukrainian aspects of the problem read the works of A.I. Kruglov, A.E. Podolsky, S.Y. Elisavetsky, F.L. Levitas, and M. Tyagly.

46 See the web-site of the Ukrainian Center for Holocaust Studies: http://www.holocaust.kiev.ua

47 The Holodomor (famine) is the term which appeared in the late Soviet Ukrainian and post-Soviet historiography and was later accepted in Western literature. It identifies famine in Ukraine 1932-1933 which, in the opinion of modern Ukrainian historians, was the result of the planned actions of the Soviet authority against the Ukrainian people. Official historians consider the Holodomor to be genocide or even ethnocide. The present version of Ukrainian history also contains a thesis about Holodomors or famines in Ukraine being the results of the planned actions in 1921-1922, 1932-1933 and 1946-1947. It is clear that the qualitative research of the famine which took place in the main USSR agricultural areas such as Ukraine, Belarus, Russia, and Kazakhstan at the beginning of the 1930s due to the illiterate agrarian policy of bolsheviks including the dispossession of kulaks, is impossible in the conditions of a different version that contradicts the historical truth but is officially recognized. Some time should pass for this

question to stop having some specific meaning for state ideology. Attempts to argue with the theses of "official historiographers" can be regarded as the intrusion of Russian "great empire chauvinism".

48 On January 26-27, 2005 the Polish museum "Auschwitz-Birkenau" held a memorial event devoted to the 60 anniversary of liberating the prisoners of the Auschwitz concentration camp. One of the actions was the international forum "Let my people live" ("Life to my people").

49 The citation of V.A. Yushchenko has been taken from the article of Sh. Briman "Ukraina ii Holokost: oranzhevyj vzglyad na chornoe proshloe" ("Ukraine and the Holocaust: the orange look at the black past") (http://www.jew. spb. ru/ami/A354/A354-031.html). The same fragment from the speech of president Yushchenko at the international forum given in "Eurasian Jewish year-book" for 5765 year (2004-2005) sounds differently, "I am the son of the Ukrainian land where the most terrible tragedies of the 20th century took place, namely, the Holodomor and the Holocaust. Ukrainians remember what threat intolerance, violence, and aggression carry" [the text of the speech of the President of Ukraine, 2005, s. 32].

50 Netanyahu, Benjamin was born in 1949 in Jerusalem. He is one of leading right politicians of Israel. In 1984-1988 he was the ambassador of Israel in the USA. He became actively involved in politics at the end of the 1980s; in 2009 B. Netanyahu again headed the government after elections in the Knesseth [see: Karmel, 2001, p. 809-813].

51 The Polish analogue, the Institute of National Remembrance, is the Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation. It was created December 18, 1998 by the decision of the parliament and started to work July 1, 2000. See: http://ipn.gov. pl

52 Actually, A.E. Podolsky mentioned in the article expressed his views in the publication in the latest EJY edition trying to prove the opposite. In his opinion, the Holocaust is not recognized by some historians as a part of national Ukrainian history [see: Podolsky, 2008]. It is clear that such a tendency exists as well as the opposite one described above. Apparently, the latter dominates.

53 Letit, Izyaslav Elikovich born in 1922 is a historian and Doctor of historical sciences (1983). I. Letit writes about history of Moldova, Romania, and history of Jews of Bessarabia. He is said to have left for the USA in 1994. See: Shpitalnik, 2000, s. 159-160.

54 Original style and punctuation have been preserved.

55 Udler, Rubin (Ruvim?) Yakovlevich born in 1925 is a Moldavian linguist, Doctor of Philology. In 1956 he started working for the Moldavian branch of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. In 1992 he left for the USA. For more details see: Shpitalnik, 2000. s. 177-178.

56 The data are provided by E.S. Rozenblatt.

57 We shall pay attention to the works of Belarusian researchers M.B. Botvinnik, I.E. Elenskaja, E.S. Rozenblatt, R.A. Chernoglazova [see, for example, Tradedija evreev Belorussii (Tragedy of Jews of Byelorrussia), 1995; Rosenblatt, Elenskaja, 1997; Judenfrei! 1999; Botvinnik, 2000; Istorija Holokosta (History of the Holocaust), 2001]. At the turn of the 1990s-2000s Belarusian researchers began to be published abroad a lot. Now in Belarus there are a lot of pseudoscientific opuses on history of the Holocaust.

58 Jewish community names 1999 as the date of the establishment of the Republican fund "Holocaust". However, this date is incorrect. The already mentioned edition of the bibliographic index "Istorija Holokosta na territorrii Belarusi" ("History of the Holocaust on the territory of Belarus") 2001 [istorija Holokosta, 2001] which was compiled by the head of the Belarusian Fund "Holocaust" I.P. Gerasimova identified "Scientific-educational center of history of Jews of Belarus and the Holocaust named after S. Dubnov" as the publishing body.

59 Belarus was presented by the delegation headed by the Chairman of the Council of the Republic of the National Assembly of Belarus N. Novitsky.

60 The review of anti-Semitic actions in the post-Soviet states has been published in "Eurasian Jewish Year-book" since 2003.

61 We believe that it is important to distinguish the concepts "anti-Semitism" and "anti-Zionism" as what has been named above "the Soviet political practice" was not always so simple and unequivocal as it is described in modern research. It is, apparently, a subject of separate research but the time for that has not come yet.

62 Romaphobia is the hatred of gypsies. The term "gypsyphobia" is also used.

63 Polishphobia is the prejudiced attitude to Poles and Poland. The term "anti-Polonism" is also used.

64 The epithet of I.V. Stalin. See: Stalin, 1951.

65 We could use the example of the activity of Jewish communal structures in Belarus. The report about the condition of anti-Semitism in the post-Soviet states in 2007-2008 published in "Eurasian Jewish Year-book" in 2008 has a separate section "Belarus". Its author is one of the UBJAC heads and an active member of the Association of Councils for the Protection of Jews of the former USSR. The report says, "The positions of law-enforcement bodies and the Public Prosecutor Office shock because during the last 20 years they neither filed suits nor took to courts the cases of vandalism at Jewish cemeteries, desecration of monuments in memory of the victims of Nazism and Stalinism, publication and dissemination of anti-Semitic literature" [Antisemitism, 2008, s. 296]. However, criminal suits were filed. A part of the same publication devoted to the analytical review of the communal life for the year of 5767 specifies that November 15, 2006 a criminal suit was filed in accordance with clause 341 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Belarus due to the fact of desecration of the memorial "Yama" in Minsk (11-12.11.2006) [Shevelev, 2008, s. 124]. We shall emphasize again that such crimes are rarely investigated and the carrying out of the investigation is complicated. In general, desecration of monuments at Jewish cemeteries takes place every year in each of the countries of the described region.

66 The report of the Eurasian Jewish Congress about the condition of anti-Semitism in 2003 says that unknown individuals attacked the worker of the Jewish cemetery and cut out "David's star" on his back [Antisemitism, 2003, s. 233].

67 Skobelev, Eduard Martinovich born in 1935 is a politician and a writer who writes in Russian. E. Skobelev is an active supporter of A.G. Lukashenko, and openly expresses his Judophobic position.

68 Kostyan, Sergey Ivanovich born in 1941 is a politician, writer, and a member of Pan-Slavic movement of the 1990s-2000s. S. Kostyan is the deputy of the Supreme body of Belarus of the 13th convocation and the deputy of the House of Representatives of the National Assembly of Belarus of three convocations (1996-2008).

69 One of the well-known cases is the litigation connected with the ban of the book "Vojna po zakonam podlosti" ("War under Laws of Meanness") (Minsk, 1999). It is impossible to deny, however, that litigations and bans on sales of publications only arouse the interest of public in such literature.

70 The newspaper "Natsionalnaja volya" ("The National Will"), July 12, 2006 (# 112-113), published fragments from "Pastyrskoe uveshchevanie" ("Preacher Admonition") addressed to the general director of the joint-stock company "Hristianskaja initsiativa" ("Christian initiative"). The author dares to provide the text of the document the way it was published in the newspa-

per, "At the end of the 90s the Minsk diocese of Belarusian orthodox church and mister Chertovich formed the joint-stock company "Pravoslavnaja initsiativa" ("Orthodox Initiative"). One of its main problems was the satisfying of the needs of orthodox communities in divine and educational literature, church utensils and many other objects of religious nature. The hopes associated with the newly founded organization gradually began to be justified as the shop "Pravoslavnaja kniga" ("Orthodox Book") was becoming well-known not only in the religious but also in the secular environment… However, the first successes were not free from indicators which showed the danger of emergence of negative processes in society activities. Gradually, the counters began to be filled with publications of some doubtful content which reflected the views of dissenting groupings and tendentious periodical press with an obvious nationalist orientation. To a certain degree it could be explained by insufficient awareness of the head of the joint-stock company of the subtleties of intrachurch and political processes or enthusiasm which did not always distinguish "the spoon of tar" and always hurried to add it to "the general meal". We know that Orthodox church declares and aspires to strictly adhere to the principle of non-participation in politics which in its essence is the defining of forms, tasks and contents of the activity of the state. The church finds it even more unacceptable to be involved in ideological oppositions with internal or external forces. You began to place not only the information about the shop "Pravoslavnaja kniga" in your religious publications but also the advertisement of yourself, your political views and ideological predilections. So, in 1999, without any consultations with the Minsk eparchial management and without the blessing of the church authority you published the book "Vojna po zakonam podlosti" ("War under Laws of Meanness") in which in the most vulgar form you tried to combine neo-bolshevist views on political processes in modern society, rude anti-Semitism and Christian phraseology. Alongside the well-known but distorted historical facts, the collection also contained rather odious materials frequently taken from the sources alien to the Church. The book was published under the signature stamp of "Pravoslavnaja initsiativa" ("Orthodox Initiative") and this created the impression that it was the position of the whole Belarusian orthodox church. Today there are no doubts that you intentionally and quite consciously made this provocative step while the semblance of your subsequent regret about the negative consequences of this enterprise was only a distracting maneuver … The platform of the shop "Pravoslavnaja kniga" ("Orthodox Book") began to turn into the territory of secret maneuvers of the General director of the joint-stock company with a loud name that did not really correspond to its essence. The shop became a place of dissemination of the odious information of dissenting, nationalist and anti-Semitic character. The shop under the signboard "Pravoslavnaja kniga" ("Orthodox Book") still wanted to preserve its status of "the cultural-educational center" whereas education was more and more replaced with banal recruitment of anti-Semitic supporters while the contents of the published materials of the joint-stock company could be less and less connected with Orthodoxy … your last actions testify that you have forgotten about the repeated repentances which you sometimes brought to the Patriarchal exarch on your knees for the harm caused to the Belarusian orthodox church as a result of your constant provocative activity. You finally decided not to fulfill the repeated promises to improve the state of affairs in the joint-stock company which constantly infringed its charter in the last few years. At last, you forgot about the responsibility for the blood spilled by you when you were intoxicated and when the Minsk diocese at which you throw stones today tried to help you.

Such full-scale oblivion proves that your ecclesiasticism has not surpassed your personal ambition and the repentant destruction was only a mask for you necessary to satisfy your further

whims. Your shocking publication activity in 2004-2005 reached its apogee when you decided to publish a volumetric book "Prigovor ubivajushchim Rossiju" ("The Verdict to Those who are Killing Russia"). It turned out that after almost ten years in the fold of the Church you preferred to return to the condition of religious ignorance and deafness towards the voice of conscience. By having published this book you showed the basic misunderstanding the nature, tasks and mission of the Christian Church and took the nocuous position of pseudo-Christian hysterics. Such are the impressions left by this book. Such is the spiritual diagnosis of your present views and your actions. However, the bifurcation of your views has already been causing bewilderment for a long time as it is not a secret for anybody that your closest relatives live in Israel. It is the state which you so zealously criticize. Having left the joint-stock company "Pravoslavnaja Initsiativa" the Minsk diocese of the Belarusian Orthodox church shows its non-participation in your personal initiatives and their consequences. Vladimir Vladimirovich, listen to the words of the Christian Gospel and to our admonition which we direct to you grieving over the delusions of your soul and the temptation created by you in church and secular environment." The answer of V.V. Chistovich was shocking, " … I do not know what racial hatred we rouse and against whom? If it is against Jews then some people came to me and thanked … How can I act against Jews when there are three Jewish women among my staff members and my elder daughter is married to a Jew! How shall I be against Jews? Against yids - yes, quite probably, that there are yids, Jews, Zionists… they, in short, are intertwined …" [cit. from ""Natsionalnaja volya" ("National Will", 12.07.2006 (# 112-113), s. 2].

71 Goma Paul was born in 1935 in Bessarabia, in 1944 he was in Transylvania. He is a dissident and has been living in France since 1977 [http://www.cartier. md/].

72 Tiahnybok, Oleg Yaroslavovich was born in 1968 in Lvov. He is a Ukrainian politician of nationalist orientation. He has been the head of the all-Ukrainian association "Svoboda" ("Freedom") since 2004. His personal site is: http://www.tiahnybok. info/ the Site of the all-Ukrainian association "Svoboda" is: http://www.svoboda.org. ua/

73 I do not know whether someone speaks about "the Weimar Ukraine" but parallels sometimes arise.- D. Sh.

74 For more details about the definition of "lobbyism" and lobbyist activity in Russia see: Tolstyh, 2007. The classification of lobbyism offered by P.A. Tolstyh is further used in the article.

75 See the classification of lobbying by methods: Tolstyh, 2007, s. 32-33.

76 The Chernovtsy conference on the Yiddish language took place August 30 - 3, 1908 in Chernovtsy (Austria-Hungary). The conference was attended by more than 70 delegates. They were prominent Jewish public figures, writers, and poets. The conference proclaimed Yiddish to be "one of the national languages" of the Jewish people. The Chernovtsy conference in 1908 is believed to have influenced the creation and development of Jewish science in Yiddish.

77 The position of the leaders of Ukraine is reflected in the statements of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine in August, 2008. They are available on the web-site of the ministry: http://www.mfa.gov.ua. It is extremely difficult to identify the dates of these documents as they do not contain the date of their appearing.

78 Natsionalny rukh Ukrainy ("National Movement of Ukraine") is the political movement created in September, 1989. It was called "Natsionalny rukh Ukrainy za perestroiku" ("National Movement of Ukraine for perestroika") till 1990. The Web-site of the movement is: http://www.nru.org. ua/

79 There is very little information about A. Bilinkis. Pinchevsky, Alexander Aleksandrovich was born in 1956. He is a Moldavian diplomat, businessman, and the owner of the holding *Elita 5*. In September, 2007 he was presented the Award *Gloria Muncii*.

80 Liberman, Avigdor born in 1958 in Kishinev is an Israeli politician, one of the founders of the "Russian" party "Nash dom – Izrail" ("Our House Is Israel") [for more details see: Karmel, 2001, p. 587].

81 Birnshtein, Boris Iosifovich is considered to be a colleague of the Russian businessmen and financiers B.A. Berezovsky and V.A. Gusinsky. At the beginning of the 1990s he was the founder and the head of the firm "Seabeko". He was under the protection of L.D. Kuchma whose assistance helped him to create the "AGUkraina" enterprise. B. Birnstein is a Ukrainian and Moldavian investor. Now he is the citizen of Switzerland. He is believed to be the owner of the Moldavian newspapers "Kishinevskie novosti" ("Kishinev News") and "Delovaja gazeta" ("The Business Newspaper").

82 Rutskoj, Alexander Vladimirovich born in 1947 is a Russian military man and politician. In 1991-1993 he was the vice-president of the Russian Federation and a close colleague of B.N. Yeltsin.

83 Barannikov, Victor Pavlovich (1940-1995) was an employee and later the head of the militsia bodies of the USSR and Russia. In 1992-1993 he was the minister of security of the Russian Federation.

84 Levin, Leonid Mendeleevich born in 1936 was a Soviet and Belarusian architect awarded the title "the honored architect of the BSSR" (1988). He was one of the authors of many architectural projects in the BSSR and the USSR, including memorial complexes "Khatyn", "Soldier's field" in Volgograd (1976-1980), etc.

85 The author intentionally omits these repeatedly quoted words from the speech of President A. Lukashenko.

86 Chassidim is a trend within Judaism of mystical nature that developed in Eastern Europe in the 1730s and that belongs to the orthodox direction. Chassidim is the plural form of the Hebrew word "Chassid". Mitnagdim means "opponents, "rivals" (Hebrew). They are followers of the traditional Lithuanian direction in Judaism opposing Chassidim. The conflict between *Mitnagdim* and *Chassidim* was most acute at the end of the 18th - the beginning of the 19th century. Orthodox Judaism is the name applied to identify those trends in Judaism the adherents of which consider themselves to be unique keepers of the Jewish tradition. Orthodox Judaism as a set of views it was formed in the first half of the 19th century as a reaction to reformism and secularization; the context described in the article unites *Mitnagdim* and *Chassidim*.

87 Herem is an exclusive form of punishment used in Jewish communities. It is excommunication from the community.

88 Chasidei khabad (Hebrew) is Khabad Chassids.

89 It is only one of the dates, there are also others.

90 Carlinstolin Chassidim is a direction in Chassidim named after the place of residing of founders of the tsadik dynasty that was the leader of Chassidic community in Karlin near Pinsk and in Stolin; it developed in the second quarter of the 18th century.

91 It is known that in 2004 the FJA of the CIS tried to make r. S.B. Krinsky the main rabbi in Lithuania and r. A. Mihelashvili the main rabbi in Georgia. Both of them were loyal Khabad followers. In July, 2004 the EAJC leaders held negotiations with the governing body of Lithuania and in October of the same year with President M. Saakashvili. As a result the attempts undertaken by L. Levaev and R. Lazar were unsuccessful.

92 On December 23, 2007 Belarusian "National TV" announced the ending of the construction of Minsk synagogue in Kropotkin Street, 22, carried out with the support of the Fund "Or Avner" [http://www.ont.by/news/our_news/0022922].

93 Web-sites and Internet-pages name between 4 and 6 synagogues working in Belarus now.

94 The minimum number of 10 people has been fixed for the joint saying of the prayer.

95 The "Orah Khaim" fund is a welfare fund created in 1990. It is headed by r. Yakov Dov Blajh and it works under the auspices of Kiev synagogue in Podol.

96 SCW is the Society of crafts work, later it was called the Society of distribution of work. It is a world Jewish philanthropic organization that was originally founded in 1880 in St.-Petersburg.

97 The author has already spoken about higher educational establishments teaching Judaica. See: Shevelev, 2007.

98 Bengelsdorf, Sergo (Sergey) Moiseevich born in 1937 in Birobidzhan is a musician, critic, and the honored worker of arts of Moldova (1996). He is an expert of Yiddish and Jewish folklore [see: Shpitalnik, 2000, s. 96-97].

99 Shraibman, Ihil Itsikovich (1913-2005) is a Jewish writer, became a member of the Union of writers of the USSR in 1940. He was a member of the editorial boards of the Soviet magazine "Sovetish geimland" (The Soviet Motherland") and of the Russian magazine "Di yiddishe gas" ("Jewish Street"). Russian Wikipedia describes I.I. Shraibman as "the last Yiddish writer of Moldova". A collection of his works "Etsire un libe" ("Creation and Love") was published in Kishinev in 2000. The book "Zibn ior mit zibn hadoshim" ("Seven Years with Seven Months") was published in 2003 and "Klein un grois" ("Small and Big") was published in 2007 [http://ru.wikipedia.org Evrejskaya obshchina Moldovy, 2008, s. 387].

100 Reles Girsh (Grigory Lvovich, 1913-2004) was a Jewish poet who wrote in Yiddish and Russian and published his works in newspapers "Einikait" (Moscow), "Folksshtime" (Warsaw), and the magazine "Sovetish Geimland" during different periods. Collections of his poems in Yiddish were published in Minsk in 1939 and 1941.

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The regulation of the government of the Republic of Moldova # 180 of 15.02.2002 "About the introduction of the course "history of Moldova" as a subject in educational institutions" from September 1, 2002".

Documents available on the web-site of the Bureau of interethnic relations of the Republic of Moldova (http://www.bri.gov. md/)

The decree of the President of the Republic of Moldova # 400 of 25.12.1997 "About the forming of the Commission on interethnic relations".

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The list of used abbreviations

AK – "Anakhnu Kan" (" We are here"). ACSP is the Anti-Zionist committee of the Soviet people. EJC is the Eurasian Jewish congress. EJY is "Eurasian Jewish Year-book": the publication of the Eurasian Jewish Congress. IA is the information agency. MYAT is "My yashche tut" ("We are still here"). r. – rab. - rabbi.

Grigory Minenkov

POLICY OF IDENTITY FOR THE POST-SOVIET SPACE: INTRODUCTION TO PROBLEMATICS

Policy of identity together with new social movements moved to the foreground of both the theoretical analysis and various social practices in the last third of the 20th century. In its development policy of identity in the West passed through different stages starting with it being an agiotage hobby and up to it being sharply criticized in 1990, in particular, by post-feminism for essential and reificated tendencies. Policy of identity especially in its national and gender dimension began to be addressed together with the fall of communism and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in the post-Soviet space. Different groups tried to actively use practices characteristic for Western countries together with their conceptual designs and languages. At the same time there were a number of difficulties and problems which somehow repeated the peculiarities of the early stages of policy of identity but mostly they were connected with the non-critical adoption of Western models without the consideration of local social and cultural contexts. Thereby, it seems necessary to further conduct the theoretical analysis of policy of identity in view of the post-Soviet realities.

In the given article the defined problem is considered in three aspects: the opinion of modern social theory about the sources and essence of policy of identity; the analysis of some applications of policy of identity in the post-Soviet space including Belarus; preliminary clearing of gender measurements of policy of identity actual for the post-Soviet contexts.[1] It is obvious that the subject considered in the article is extremely extensive and multidimensional and requires a series of research including that of empirical character with the use of various qualitative and quantitative methods. Accordingly, the offered text acts more like a means of theoretical introduction into the problematics including its gender measurement.

From the very beginning policy of identity was aimed at such an organization of the political action which would allow to identify and legitimize earlier suppressed voices of different social groups. In connection with this we shall say that in many respects the sources of policy of identity are connected with the feminist movement; moreover, its evolution coincided greatly with the evolution of feminism. The narrative of difference is explicitly or implicitly in the center of policy of identity. Policy of identity as it was originally formed in the multicultural space concentrating, first of all, on the problematics of race, class and gender, explicitly or implicitly strove towards internal homogenization of concrete communities but this process relied on the assertion of differences from other communities. As T. Gitlin says, at the same time it is necessary to see that policy of identity is something greater than the expression of a set of special ideas and feelings experienced and expressed by concrete individuals and groups. It is a pattern of belonging, search for comfort, aspiration to such a community in which the feeling of belonging is simultaneously both protection and attack, and a method of overcoming exclusion and non-disclosure. It is not a coincidence that here we often face naturalization and reification of identities with the idea that social groups have intrinsic identity. Anatomy can turn into destiny. As a result, "dissemination of policy of identity leads to the turn inside, gloomy and tight bravado which acquires the ideological form of paranoid and covered by slang post-modernist group thinking, delirium of persecution and stylized marginality".[2] It shows that identities are not formed in laboratories or classrooms but are designed in specific social practices. This makes both these practices and the knowledge about them political as they always are the interaction of senses which we put into social actions. Certainly, the autonomy and stability of any special identity laying claim for the definition and interpretation of the existence of the subject[3] are doubted.

For this reason policy of identity identifies an essentially new measurement of the problem field of social theory. M. Somers and G. Gibson note that, first of all, we speak about the possibility of constructing viable sociological concepts of the activity which would not need to resort to the external compulsion for the explanation of the action "deviating" from the "universal" preconditions and concepts which have generated traditional theoretical discourses. The search for such explanations inevitably leads to doubts in the universalism of modernist social ontology as the latter is possible only in the case of ignoring the fact that, for example, women and other "others" have voices. It turns out that the ostensibly universal social actor of classical sociology is actually extremely particular, namely, it is a Western white educated male speaking on behalf of the general. Accordingly, the theoretical answer should not only reveal the socially concrete character of the "general" modern social actor but also offer an alternative which would be able to transform the denied "otherness" into a newly developed ideal of self-identity and normative social action.[4]

Thus, it becomes clear why we speak about policy. The matter is that the aspirations covered by "policy of identity" are collective and public and not just individual and private. It is a struggle, both theoretical and sociopolitical instead of just joining into interest

groups; it is the struggle connected with the destruction of former legitimating and search for the recognition and legitimacy and sometimes power and not just opportunities for self-expression and autonomy. Policy of identity is also policy because it includes the denial or replacement of those identities which others, often in the form of various labels, would like to impose on behalf of "the general" on the individuals struggling for recognition. Theoretical and projective reconsideration in the last decades of racial, gender and sexual identities could serve as a bright example of this. It means that the conversation about policy of identity is the conversation about the directions and prospects of the development of democracy. Though in itself policy of identity has democratic sources and intentions insisting on granting voices to the subordinates it can lead (and leads) to non democratic social opinions and practices as, for example, it often happens to policy of national identity. The example of 30 % of deputies-women in the House of Representatives of the National Assembly of Belarus could be quite demonstrative. It would seem to be absolutely democratic policy of identity. Actually, we know that in reality it has no relation to democracy. Moreover, in this case women are given an opportunity to play exclusive man's roles and follow the norms of patriarchal consciousnesses. Consequently, the problem is clear. It is the question whether the democratic policy of identity is possible in general and if yes, then in what sense? How can its obvious non democratic tendencies be cut off?

If one is to identify the sense of modern policy of identity then one shall address the understanding of policy and political as well as how the subject of political identity is constructed in the situation of the "death" of the classical rational subject. In this case I shall rely on the concept of political and radical democracy in late modern society developed by Chantal Mouffe; in particular, Mouffe's thesis that "the social agent is constituted by a set of "subjective positions" which can be never recorded in the closed system of differences. It is constructed by a variety of discourses within the limits of which continuous movement of redefinition and replacement take place instead of certain necessary relations".[5] It means that we enter the sphere of the collision of principles of constructivism and essentialism in the problem field of policy of identity.

We believe that the distinction which, using the language of M. Heidegger, Mouffe makes between policy as an "ontic" level and political as an "ontological" level is essential. Mouffe believes that "it means that ontic belongs to the multitude of practices of conventional policy and ontological concerns the method itself with which the symbolical forming of society occurs".[6] In other words, constructivist activity to form and realize various forms of policy of identity takes place on the first level while on the second level they are attributed some symbolic universals.

When we speak about policy of identity, especially about the early stages of its development (this is what we have got in Belarus) we often see the mixing of these levels. Then the conventional practices connected with the solving of situational problems start to acquire the ontological status. Identity becomes a way of solving problems though not one's own but of other groups and communities which ostensibly have "wrong" identity, for example, national or sexual one. So, policy of identity is ideologized. At the same time it is

impossible to deny the presence of the ontological bases of policy of identity. Certainly, we mean post-metaphysical ontologies and discourse ontologies but they, nevertheless, play an important role in the substantiation of specific policy. We shall say that policy of identity in its gender measurement is determined by how the ontology of gender is seen. For example, when we have "care for women" actually it can mean elementary social equality when in reality the function of the woman includes exclusively motherhood. This is what we have got in Belarus. Such discourse ontology of gender acquiring the appearance of traditional ontology becomes, thereby, a basis for the sexist oriented colonization of the vital world of the woman without leaving her any other choice.

In other words, we shall speak about the ability to think really politically when talking about identity. What does it mean? Mouffe believes that frequently we are not capable of thinking politically due to the domination of the liberal type of thinking. Mouffe probably has in mind Western realities. But in a certain sense it concerns the post-Soviet space when the ideological market widely offers an especially liberal discourse that accepts extremely abstract forms not connected with the local features while we have got a situation of real struggle in various measurements.

Therefore, the problem is how to analyze and represent policy of identity. We shall agree with Mouffe that liberalism cannot deal with it as it is based on the presumption exclusively of a rational individual and the possibility of consensus. It is possible to say that the liberal approach is important as a principle in the form of the recognition of the possibility and inevitability of various solutions, especially in the present situation of social uncertainty but it does not act as a working mechanism with reference to policy of identity as the latter necessarily includes not so much consensus but rather antagonism. It is clear that exclusive instrument rationality does not work here as from the instrumental point of view the claims of different groups can look absolutely strange, especially if the group is a minority. Certainly, the principle of communicative rationality could be a more adequate mechanism. It could also be a deliberative approach in which moral principles play the main role. However, the reality is such that if there is a conflict of interests then the principles of morals do not always work or, at least, various moral principles collide. Mouffe correctly says that in both cases one ignores what she calls "passion", i.e. an affective measurement being "the central model of collective identification without which it is impossible to understand the constructing of political identities. Political identity is always collective identities, and it is one more reason why liberalism with its methodological individualism is not capable of understanding the originality of the political. In policy we always deal "with us" contrasted with "them" and … for this reason elimination of antagonism is impossible".[7]

Such an emphasis on collective identities is extremely important as the interaction between them sets the peculiar features of concrete policy of identity. At the same time the concept of collective identity should be used with extreme caution. We shall avoid any sort of organization analogies, so characteristic of the classical social theory starting with the ideas of K. Marx and G. Spenser. We shall not forget that collective subjects repre-

sent largely unstable sets, the empirical reality and identity of which in the end depend on *the identifications* coming from the persons forming this collective. Individuals can be "elements" of various collectives; basically, they can enter into them and leave them at any time. We shall refer to the definition offered by the researcher of collective identity Y. Asman, "We consider *a collective* or *we-identity* as the image of oneself constructed by the collective; it is the image with which members of the collective identify themselves. Collective identity is the question about the identity of the individuals participating in the collective. It exists not "by itself" but only to that degree in which it is recognized by the individuals. It can be strong or weak depending on how it lives in consciousness and actions of group members and can motivate their thoughts and actions".[8]

Thus, collective identities are constructs defining nothing else but the generality that should reveal itself in the practical attitude towards itself and the world. They express the achieving of certain consensus between individuals. We shall not presuppose an exclusively conscious or rational character of such agreements. In this case we are more likely to speak about silent knowledge which structures and directs thoughts, feelings and actions of the collective members. Collective identities are communicative constructs and discourse facts. It is extremely important to interpret them correctly from an empirical point of view. If the interpretation is incorrect then the danger of manipulating the collective emerges when the differences between individuals are ignored and their forcible homogenizing takes place.

If one is to move away from the possibilities of essential interpretations of policy of identity realizing the aspirations of supposedly homogenous collectives or cultural communities then it is important to use the understanding of collective identity offered by A. Melucci who sees collective identity as a set of practices of realization of specific social actions. At the same time a collective action is not a product of some natural forces or strict laws of history or beliefs and representations of actors. According to Melucci, a collective action should be treated like a construct created in the context of complex processes of interaction and cultural changes and, more specifically, as "a set of social practices which (a) simultaneously cover a certain amount of individuals or groups, (b) display similar morphological characteristics in certain time and space, (c) presuppose a social field of relations and, (d) the ability of the included into this action people put sense into what they do."[9]

In other words, we are asked for a very specific analysis of collective actions in all their sequence taking into account that each such action is a system of various acts. These or those senses of collective identities are set and constantly tuned within such acts. They are united in the movement of individuals and corresponding political practices. Thus, Melucci calls "collective identity" the process of "constructing" of the system of actions. Collective identity is an interactive and joint process of defining carried out by a certain number of individuals (or groups on a more advanced level) connected with the orientation of their action and the field of possibilities and limitations where such an action takes place."[10] We shall also keep in mind that collective identity as a process includes *cognitive*

definitions connected with the purposes and means and the field of actions thus referring to the network *of active relations* between actors who interact, start communicating, influence each other, agree and make decisions; collective identity never represents a completed calculation following the principle "expenses – benefits", and it always mobilizes emotions. Accordingly, collective identity especially precisely reveals the relational character of any identity, its rooting in real social practices, as well as the fact that it is not "a thing" but always a relation. The above allows us to evaluate the significance of Melucci's following conclusion, "Collective identity is the process of training which leads to the forming and maintaining of the uniform empirical actor which we could name "social movement". As this process passes through different stages the collective actor develops an ability to solve the problems set by the environment and becomes more and more independent and autonomous in the ability to act within the limits of that structure of relations in which it is included. The process of collective identity is, thus, the ability to create new definitions integrating past and arising elements of the present into the uniformity and continuity of the collective actor."[11] We believe that *it is exactly within this process of social training of various particular identities that constantly moving horizons of policy of identity are set* allowing to solve the soluble paradox of democracy. This specific process of training is extremely essential for policy of identity on the post-Soviet space.

Thus, it becomes clear that policy of identity does not exclude antagonism; on the contrary, it even assumes it. Any situation of the relations "we" and "they", i.e. the relations of identity, can become the locus of antagonism. The main problem is how to connect multidirectional interests within the limits of democratic pluralism stopping the non democratic orientation of policy of identity. We shall say that in Belarus we have got two extreme forms of policy of identity: on the one hand, it is the so-called "ideology of the Belarusian statehood" while on the other hand, it is a purely nationalist project reducing the national dimension exclusively to the language dimension and the following of certain primary national traditions. The non democratic character of both projects is evident as in both cases it is the exclusion rather than the inclusion of these or those social groups that is presupposed. But it is also obvious that both projects have certain objective reasons and the uniform purpose of constructing independent Belarus. How shall such antagonism be solved?

We should consider what American philosopher G. Stayton calls "the constituting inside". He used this concept to identify a number of subjects developed by J. Derrida (addition, trace, differentiating). The essence of the concept is that identity always assumes the establishment of distinction. Moreover, this distinction is often constructed on the basis of hierarchy, for example, between black and white, man and woman, etc. Distinction is the basis of identification practices and as Mouffe claims, it actually transforms identity into policy for policy is distinguishing "us" from "them" and is not always friendly. Certainly, this distinction can be covered with elements of respect, recognition, etc. This is when the discourse of liberalism is important. It can be organized with the help of "the rough language of the poster" with rigid defining of "friends" and "enemies", "correct" and "incorrect",

etc. This is how policy of identity of Belarusian authorities is being constructed though the oppositional policy of identity is also constructed the same way. In other words, any policy of identity is fraught with antagonism, especially when "they" are perceived as a threat to "our" identity. According to Mouffe, "antagonism is the constantly existing opportunity where the political belongs to our ontological condition and when we reflect on the problem of democratic policy we shall not forget about it".[12]

Now we shall refer to E. Laclau. The absence of any universals which could be accepted by everyone as "true" as a result of the rational discussion is evident. However, E. Laclau emphasizes that this sets the possibility for democracy which is possible due to the absence of the common meaning that will always be a subject of discussion, struggle and choice.[13] If there is certain "truth" for everything then why would one need democracy? We shall remind that this is the logic of communism and any other totalitarian ideology and practice.

What is policy of identity focused on? It shall be said that any social system represents itself as a certain order and/or orderliness originating from ontological foundations of that order that are discursively established but often presented as unconditional. Enthusiasm for "order" and its hegemonic establishing is especially characteristic of authoritative social systems. Accordingly, any attempts to destroy the established order are considered to be an infringement of the life bases of the existence of the given society. But what does the order actually express? Mouffe asserts that "the social represents an area of sedimentated practices, i.e. those practices which hide the initial acts of their accidental political establishment and which are considered to be self-evident containing their own basis. Sedimentated social practices represent the constituting part of any possible society as it is impossible to doubt all social connections simultaneously."[14] So, the social is the affirmed political, i.e. it is the result of some set of former actions. It means that such social can always be doubted in spite of its attempts to declare its ontological unconditionality. Its extreme display is gender relations where the hierarchy of man and woman is traditionally represented as natural, logical, etc. Then gender policy appears to be especially man's policy of "presenting" something to women as this takes place in Belarus with its typically sexist discourse of the political authority. It is enough to recollect the bill boards in the streets of Belarusian cities with their essentially sexist and patriarchal representations of gender roles. The saddest thing is that such game rules are also accepted by women, i.e. they are not subjects but rather objects of certain policy of identity.

It seems that policy of identity appears when the established social practices are doubted and their conditionality and ambiguity are discovered. In reality, any social order is temporary and fragile. The border between the social and the political is unstable and requires constant displacement and revision by social agents. Struggle for recognition undermines the social order but at the same time the group fighting for such recognition itself aspires to establish a hegemonic project. Therefore, early policy of identity is criticized for its propensity to essentialism and hegemonism. Identity is never ready. Proceeding from "the constituting inside", constituting of "us" depends on how we represent "them".

Accordingly, the problem of democratic policy of identity is to stop potential antagonism built in policy of identity but not to strengthen it.

Mouffe interprets this practice of stopping as the transfer of antagonism into agonism. If in the first case we have the situation of enemies which do not have common rational space for the conflict resolution then in the second case the conflict remains but the parties recognize propriety and legitimacy of the positions of each other. They are on the different sides of the barricades but they are not enemies in the literal sense of the word for they perceive themselves as belonging to the same political space. Various hegemonic projects collide but the confrontation is regulated by democratic procedures. In Mouffe's opinion, "agonistic concept of democracy recognizes the accidental character of hegemonic political-economical articulations which determine the specific configuration of society at present. These are fragile and pragmatic constructions which can be rearticulated and transformed as a result of agonist struggle between parties."[15] The analysis of policy of identity is the analysis of specific forms of life of individuals making understanding of the problem concrete and situational. It simultaneously detects various projects aspiring to hegemony and laying claims on the domination of various denotatives. We shall not forget that policy is always biased.

It is obvious that practices of realization of policy of identity being the most actual question for the post-Soviet space deserve our special attention. We shall say that gender policy of identity in Belarus is acquiring an especially violent character. On the one hand, within the patriarchal traditions men and women are imposed former social roles when, say, the woman turns exclusively into "a lofty biological object", namely, the machine for the birth and raising of children. But, on the other hand, the woman is affirmed by the authority exclusively as a sexual object and is symbolically raped (we shall recollect "filthy French women" and so forth). Such policy of identity is based on the logic of exclusion. A great number of women as well as men are excluded from the constructed "women". "New patriarchal societies" are not ready to perceive the structure of the uncontrollable female self-sufficiency as the self-sufficiency of "the other".[16]

The problem is that policy of identity on the post-Soviet space including women's organizations and movements is carried out in the spirit of classical rationalism, i.e. ideas about the transparency of social relations which only need to be built correctly. Thus, we see constant appeals to the authority which should help, solve, etc. The contingent character of social and political establishments described by Mouffe is not taken into account. This requires the realization *of one's own* policy instead of the traditional aspiration to take place in the authority and solve "women's problems" from there. Until this happens policy of identity will be the place or field of manipulations of the authority to serve its own interests while women will always remain mothers and loyal girlfriends.

The above makes us address again the theoretical measurement of policy of identity and corresponding discussions around it. It is important to remember that a significant part of researchers treat the very concept of identity and policy of identity with suspicion that shall be taken seriously especially in the post-Soviet contexts which do not possess

democratic political culture. A typical example of the mentioned suspicion is S. Hekman's article "Beyond Identity: Feminism, Identity and Identity Policy".[17] The article is devoted to the criticism of the theory of identity offered by J. Butler and a number of other feministic theorists of policy of identity as well as to the critical analysis of policy of identity as such. In particular, Hekman believes that Butler's denying the modernist subject is not reasonable. Using the theory of the so-called object or subject relations as the basis Hekman opposes Butler's idea applying the concept of the subject as "an unsupported reason" (ungrounded ground) occupying an intermediate position between the postmodern and modern subjects. In regard to policy of identity the author believes that instead of settling the political sphere with numerous identities identity shall be removed from this sphere. We shall say that the latter is interesting and theoretically attractive. Can such removal be done practically? Will it not become just another policy of identity?

Let's remind that policy of identity has been put forward as an instrument for solving those problems which women faced in the political sphere. At the same time, the feminism of the first wave when emphasizing the equality of men and women aspired to include women into the universal category of "citizens". However, the discovery of the second wave feminism of the fact that in essence this category was masculine destroyed the given strategy though the solution of the problem offered by the second wave was incorrect. It emphasized the distinctions between men and women, and feministic policy was defined in the language of the universal category of "women". This category hid hegemony of white heterosexual women of the middle class placing other women on the roadside of feminist policy.

We shall say that the same logic is characteristic of the development of any policy of identity. If we consider the national policy of identity then we shall find out that when the equality of nations is proclaimed then a certain essential attribute such as language is fixed and, accordingly, everyone who does not have the command of this language even if they are the citizens of the given state turn out to be people of the second sort and are denied subjectness. So the principle of hegemony is realized in a non-democratic way when contingent factors are declared to be essential and ontological. In case of policy of identity connected with sexual minorities equality and other things can be proclaimed but machismo and homophobia will be set on the level of the political establishment as it happens in Belarus.

If we return to feminism then the detection of similar tendencies leads to the revision of the early policy of identity by offering other discourse strategies of identities construction, namely those which could overcome the homogenizing trends such as feminism and other social movements. We shall say that the need for such strategies became especially important in the situation of explosion of nationalist moods in the 1990s.

The concept of identity developed by J. Butler in "Gender Trouble" and later works plays a special role in the solving of the designated problem. Butler suggested to replace the idea of stable essential identity with the understanding of identity as a phenomenon constituted by unsteady and fluid discourse forces. In other words, Butler believes that "there is

no gender identity outside gender displays". The gender organized body has "no ontological status outside of various acts which constitute its reality".[18] Butler tries to construct "the genealogy of the gender" detecting contingent acts which constitute the idea about natural necessity. The essential subject of the modernist discourse and psychoanalytic theory is replaced with "a non-essential woman" whose identity is performatively constituted by the very "expressions" determined as its results. We believe such identity eliminates all the problems created by the modernist identity of "woman" which the feminism of the first and second waves did not move away. So, we can see the bases of criticism by Butler of policy of identity which hides the mechanisms approving the submission of women. It is important to understand, that the category "woman" is formed by the structures of authority and the corresponding policy of identity hides political discourse sources of the invented nucleus of gender identity. When deconstructing policy of identity we can discover the political sense of the language which is used to articulate identity by contrasting it with the strategy of the collage that forms gender trouble and undermines essential constructions of gender.[19]

How can feminism resist this? Or, if we use the language of the book, how shall we form gender trouble? Butler's answer is not "to make" the gender the way it is supposed to be made. The initial formulation of this strategy is expressed in Butler's idea that if the gender is affirmed in diverse forms then it can be destroyed in the same diverse forms. Butler hopes that such destructions detect the contingency of the gender arranged identity and, hence, its vulnerability. This somewhat unclear idea is revealed at the end of "Gender Trouble" as the collage strategy. In later works Butler shows that the so-called "queer-policy" is the means to realize the given strategy.

Did such an approach promote the solution of the problems generated by policy of identity? Many believe that it is not so as Butler went too far in the efforts to destabilize the essentially represented identity and feminism did not manage to refuse traditional policy of identity. Let us return to the article of Hekman. The author believes that the present policy of identity has reached the deadlock and this is the result of two fundamental problems. Firstly, the theory of identity developed by Butler that forms the base of the feminist criticism of policy of identity lost the middle part between the modernist and postmodernist subjects having reduced the subject to fiction, imagination, and game. However, Hekman states that the stable basis which the author calls "ungrounded ground" can be and must be found in identity. Secondly, enthusiasm for policy of identity only emphasizes the distinctions aggravating the confrontation of groups. That is why it is necessary to reject such policy, namely, not to move the problematics of identity to the political level.[20]

Actually, Butler's concept became the basis for the criticism of policy of identity in the 1990s though the idea of such policy remained rather strong. Hekman believes that the reason is not policy of identity but the problematics of the concept of identity that forms its basis. The most criticized part of policy of identity is the fact that it inevitably assumes stable identity and by that it preserves all the dangers connected with the modernist essentialist subject. This criticism has an ironic side. Policy of identity reflects how iden-

tities change and are reconstructed in various social conditions. Early policy of identity considered itself as the problematization of the connection between identity and policy. Nevertheless, practical policy of identity denies the construction of identities. As soon as political movement starts to rely on identity it becomes a basis for a new "political truth" expressed by the movement. Policy of identity does not take into account individual distinctions and the fluid and constructivist character of identities. Rather, it fixes identities in new dimensions.[21]

We shall say that simultaneously with Butler W. Connolly also sharply criticized the tendency of policy of identity to fix identities in the book "Identity/Difference" (1991). Connolly's main argument is the following: "Identity needs difference for its existence and it transfers difference into otherness to protect its own definiteness". As a result we have a paradox as we cannot either protect identity or leave it. We cannot give up the idea that "my identity is more likely to be what I am and how I am accepted rather than what I change, what I want or what I agree with. It is the compressed self-identity which results in choice, desire and consensus. Without this compression these actions are impossible; upon its availability they are recognized as mine." At the same time this idea cannot be protected as both individual and collective identity inevitably define themselves as correct and transform difference into otherness and the latter is turned into the scapegoat.[22]

So, as a result of policy of identity we have both internal and external fixing of identities. Internally it means that members of a certain group create a certain ideal of identity which should be accepted by all representatives of the group. Externally, it is the propensity to the strengthening of dominating political groups formally and informally (female voting, voting of ethnic groups or groups of sexual minorities, etc.). The identity designed as the point of resistance is reitified and fixed being freed from duality, fluctuation, and individuality. It turns into a means with the help of which the authority is extended rather than limited. In other words, we have a contradiction as on the one hand, policy of identity is carried out under the slogan of flexible and fluid identities while on the other hand, its result is fixed identities.

Hekman believes that the way out from the dilemma of the modernist//postmodernist subject is the subject with different bases. It is the subject with a nucleus constituted by relational experience rather than by absolute universal essence. Like in postmodernism self-identity is the product of social, discourse and relational forces. However, unlike in postmodernism it is emphasized that such self-identity arising in the early years of the life of an individual is necessary for healthy subjectivity forming its coordination. Then the aspiration of policy of identity to fixed identities becomes clear.

Policy of identity was useful as it highlighted the falsity of the idea of universal citizenship characteristic for liberal ideology having shown that there is no such universal subject. Another concept of the subject moves to the foreground. It is a relational subject constituted by social/cultural influences of its special situation. Hekman believes that it requires a different strategy, namely, policy outside of identity, i.e. complete removal of identity from the limits of policy. Experience of policy of identity proves that there is no fruitful

way to describe identity using the political language. Such an action inevitably leads to fixed identities for any definition inevitably eliminates differences inside the constructed category. Instead of demanding political recognition of a multitude of identities it is necessary to demand that political institutes avoid the provision of advantages on the basis of special identities. This is what liberal modernist policy did supporting the identity of white well-off men. It is necessary to move to policy of identification when these or other actors act with the purposes of solving specific political problems without fixing identities. In a strict sense of the word, women's movement supports not identity but identification. Such post-policy of identity does not impose special identity on others and does not require political actors to have special identities.[23]

We studied the criticism of policy of identity so thoroughly for absolutely practical purposes. It is quite possible that in Western realities policy of identity has already exhausted itself. However, the same can hardly be said about the post-Soviet space. At the same time we should take into consideration Western experience to understand the genealogy of the post-Soviet policy of identity which is specifically post-Soviet, i.e. practically including all imperious and other Soviet practices starting with the patriarchal understanding of relations between the sexes. As a result we do not have the gender policy of identity. We have got the same struggle for equality organized according to the rules of the modernist subject when women keep fighting to play man's roles. The same is observed in the policy of national identity. It is the desire to replace one power structure with another on the basis of essential and even primordially justified identities. It is clear that it is an aspiration to affirm fixed identities.

So, we have the situation of a paradox for the post-Soviet space cannot reject policy of identity as it is structured by it but at the same time the given policy appears to be extremely dangerous for the establishment of democracy and the independent subject. These features of authority described by M. Foucault become evident. The authority has dialogical nature (domination/submission) and presents itself as the effect of historically formed cultural practices the configuration of which (let us recollect Mouffe) entirely depends on the accidental concurrence of features of people, events, processes, and language traditions. The main problem is how to pass from the discourse to the normative analysis of relations of authority between identities as only in this case we can understand the sources and displays of inequality of discourses and tendencies of the struggle for hegemony. It means that policy of identity requires different discourse languages and the discourse analysis of resistance. The post-Soviet woman is still speaking the Soviet man's political language. This leads to the absence of a woman as a woman in the political space. This makes policy of identity inevitable even if it brings a multitude of other problems with it. Hence, it is necessary to be ready to solve them in a modern manner.

Notes

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BELARUS AS A BORDERLAND: MODELLING OF MEDIA-LANDSCAPE

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This paper is an attempt to consider the functioning of Belarusian mass media system taking into account events of the last 15 years and the status of Eastern European Borderland. The functioning of FM radio stations is discussed. This work is based on the results of a research project titled "Cultural Identity in the Context of Borderland" conducted within "*Social Transformation in the Western Eurasia Border Region (Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine)"* program administered by the Center for Advanced Studies and Education (CASE).

The choice of FM radio stations as an object of research is not incidental. Below are just some of the reasons justifying this choice and pointing out the impact of FM broadcasting have on social and cultural reforms in the former USSR in general and Belarus in particular:

- First, this area of mass media system emerged and developed after the fall of the USSR. FM broadcasting stations were exactly the medium USSR did not know as they did not exist. Its forms and models were borrowed from the West. Thus, the break with Soviet broadcasting traditions was emphasized.
- Second, radio equipment produced in the USSR was not able to get VHF waveband so the development of FM broadcasting had to follow the import of western equipment. Significantly, during the USSR period broadcasting of foreign radio stations

was carried out within wavebands available to Soviet made radio sets while with FM broadcasting one needed new radio sets which were imported and bought by people voluntarily.

- Third, radio has become a pioneer in advertising business. In the USSR there have been ad papers but those were all personal ads. Radio has taken the first step in broadcasting commercial ads for money. Thus, one can note that this way FM market is another definition for advertising market.
- Fourth, the tradition of totalitarian state and its centralized media system affected and still continue to affect policy in all media sources. Being once the voice of the Kremlin, radio has transformed into one of the most efficient types of local media. Counterpart to the radio system inherited from Belarusian SSR and implemented in state broadcasting we can also see now the development of radio techniques borrowed in the West. This is so called "format" broadcasting where mass media is a subject to business laws and it develops broadcasting not for everyone but for a specific target audience. Though after introducing 75% quota broadcasting for Belarusian musicians it is hard to talk about truly "format" broadcasting.

After the fall of the Soviet Union Belarus is trying to revive the Soviet model of mass media using the premises of its remnants (under[1] the Soviet model of mass media we take the basic scheme of interaction between Soviet media and Soviet authorities, described by Denis McQuail). As well, *"every remnant of semiotic structure or a separate text maintains reconstruction mechanisms of the whole structure. It is the destruction of its integrity that brings in the crash process of 'memory regaining' – reconstruction of semiotic integrity by its parts. This reconstruction of the long lost language in the system of which alone would the text make sense is almost always means creation of a new language, rather than a resurrection of the old one as it might seem from the point of cultural consciousness"*. In Belarus cultural remnants of Soviet past are carefully preserved to reconstruct the ideal model of the past. This way we can say for sure that the Belarusian landscape on the whole, let alone media landscape continues to be a Soviet one. In case of mass media one can see it quite clearly. Still, the changes that occurred with Soviet system in Belarus after the fall of the USSR do not allow such characteristics as it being 'sovietlike' be one of its attributive characteristics.

Media Communication in Transition: from Soviet Model to Borderland Model

It would be hard to find a place for modern Belarusian media system within the six traditional media theories (authoritarian theory, the freedom of the press theory, social responsibility theory, Soviet theory, development theory, democratic involvement theory) described by Denis McQuail in early edition of his "Mass Communication Theory. An Intriduction"[2]. To list Belarusian model in the existing coordinate system let us use the

following pairs of definitions: standard-context (axis Y) and genesis-prospective (axis X). Moreover, the following system of coordinates might be useful for the future structuring of media landscape.

Standard

West European and Soviet experience in using and structuring mass media system is quite different in understanding media functions and goals. On the one hand we can mention a well developed humanitarian knowledge sphere, for instance communication and media theories. Within them all types of mass media are classified and structured, their goals and functions are determined according to their social and political value. There is also a tradition of having liberal mass media as a working institute or the fourth power. All- successfully implemented - theories offering different ways of understanding mass media coexist at the same time.

On the other hand, there is an opposite tradition of understanding media as nothing else but a mouthpiece of authorities and a source of propaganda. Thus media professionals have always been and still are on a special account and need to realize all importance and responsibility of their job as sources of information and propaganda. Neither critical thinking on mass media functions and goals nor the theory to describe their mere existence has been offered yet. That is why defining a standard in media use in Belarus seems problematic. A lot of times mass media were created artificially as a result of the initiative from the 'bottom' though in fact it has always been from the 'top'. After the fall of the Soviet Union a natural reluctance to the former standards returned, although the new standards were never to be made. This was what caused a hyper sensitivity of a nation to emotions of the past and its reinterpreting. If there is no truth in newspaper "Pravda" (Russian for 'truth'),It should definitely be found in new media with no Soviet past in its resume. It might be that this is the reason for this faith in objective interpreting of reality. It is the very same faith that media professionals have.

Context

Postsoviet state of political and border absence in media though has not lasted for long. After that period Soviet model was taken as a foundation stone for creating new ones. The influence of Russian media on the Belarusian media landscape is still significant and in some areas it is even crucial. This is evident not only in the areas with the long-term dependence formed still under the USSR (like TV) but even in new media: Belarusian Internet traffic is mainly hosted in Russia, in the so called 'ru.net' (Russian Web). Our own media system, partly independent but mostly independent from the outer influence was formed at the time of cultural familiarization with new technologies. Today Belarus lags several decades behind the rest of the civilized world. As a result, we have to rediscover

functions and goals of some media even if those media have been known in the country for more than fifty years, like radio and television. In the USSR Belarusian media were not national (formally they were but in fact they were not doing the job of the national media).


Genesis

In the USSR Belarus was not a part of East European Borderland. Moreover, there has never been one. It has always been more like a traditional hierarchical model of a relationship between the empire and its lands: Center – Province – Faraway Districts – Borderland[3]. However, one of the results of social and political transformations was the creation of new borders and the change of those that existed in Europe.

Talking about the model itself we can start using the term **"trench model"** for the model described below. The reason for this term would become clear in a while.

Picture 1 describes a traditional scheme of relationships between a Center (Moscow) and its Provinces and faraway Districts. Obviously, there is no place for a bilateral communication.

Pic.1 (70-ies)




At that point this model represented a proper pyramid and the position of its periods and planes was not of a big interest to us. Thus the main attention was concentrated around the possibility to widen the area of the basement of the pyramid thus expanding the empire's lands. Speaking about mass media, direct communication between lower level media was limited and even then rather difficult. Both Warsaw and Minsk could barely communicate with each other without interference of the center, i.e. Moscow. The hierarchy was definite and final: central (country) media => national (of member republics) media => regional media => city media => district media. V.Kagansky points out that, *"In the Soviet Union every single member republic was a small version of the USSR, every single region was a small version of a member republic, every single district was a mini version of a region etc .There were no cells of other type. It was tough, clear and in its own way an effective system*

that reminded of a spatial constructing puzzle”[4]. All this can be related not only to the mere geography but also to mass media system. In the Belarusian SSR there were two all-soviet TV channels and one Belarusian. Part of radio stations were rebroadcast from Moscow while even the national radio still had live programs from Moscow talk radio with a traditional Kremlin chimes striking at the beginning. No feedback was provided (Belarusian radio did not broadcast to any other member republics).

Social and political events in Poland in early 80-ies have changed its role. Among those were organizing of “Solidarnasc” union, the wave of “Samizdat” (small illegal publishing houses) and a breakthrough of economic and political reforms. All this had led to a complete break between Poland and other members of “Warsaw block” and a opened new prospective for Polish media ever after. Picture 2 shows a gradual change in the relations between Poland as a developing independent state and the Soviet Union in the last decade of its existence. A split caused by social transformations resulted in irrevocable outcome.


Pic.2 (80-ies)



Information about Poland coming from Moscow was quite different from information given by Poland itself. Belarusian SSR still had to obey informational laws of Moscow while information from Poland was already banned in Belarus.

Early 90-ies were the period of independence in all former member republics of USSR that are now the new-born free states. This was also the time for reconstruction of relationships between those countries lost soon after the fall of USSR. CIS came to existence after a few of those attempts. Economic Aid Union (EAU) seized to exist and the European Union claimed its possible expansion to the East.


Pic. 3 (90-ies)



The breakup between two systems was so huge that one can speak about a 'wall' built out of total incomprehension. Belarus at that time was marked by its policy of looking up to Russia (among the examples were Belarus-Russia union media group "Soyuz" ("Union") and Interstate TV channel "Mir" (CIS)), and media independence on Russian mass media (one of the first new FM stations "Radio Roks" was once rebroadcast from Moscow and gave a start to the development of independent local stations). For a long time there were only two FM radio stations in Belarus, "Radio Roks" rebroadcast from Moscow and "Radio BA" in Minsk. Both economic and political differences with Russia appeared to be too much of a burden for Belarus and resulted in a strong need in national media as a counterbalance to the Russian one. In case of radio this was implemented by ceasing rebroadcast of Russian radios "Mayak" and "Yunost" by Belarus at the expense of its own budget (and yet it was in 1999) and in creating new national radio stations. One of the main reasons for this decision lay in political campaigns and presidential elections in Russia when it became obvious that information on Belarusian events in Russian media has become biased and Belarus could not influence the process anymore while just rebroadcasting Russian media. As few of the outcomes we can mention the all-round defense and rhetoric statements on imposing an information war on Belarus. Consequently Belarus tries to limit the influence of neighbor mass media by starting with a 50% quota for Belarusian music (2003) and raising it up to 75% later (2005). Similar processes are common for TV too, for example, Second National TV channel ("ONT") is made on the basis of Russian "1st channel" while national "STV" is broadcasting with the Russian-based Ren-TV.

Today Belarusian mass media does not have any technical and financial feasibility to grow. But it is not the only reason. It is also a problem of following the process of globalization and European integration. We get to know world news only by the reflections produced on the sides of the trench we are deep in. We can judge about current events only by the specks and shades coming outside of our trench. And the thing is that the final influence of this broadcast of shades is by far not worse than the broadcast of national media.

Pic. 4 (late 90-ies till now)



It is needed to say that all neighbor countries do care about their frequency resources. Frequency resource is a unique resource of every country including the smallest one be-

cause it offers broadcast even beyond country's territory. Though at this point frequency conflicts are quite common. For instance, one can listen to Polish radio in Brest or Grodno. So called media territory of our neighbors does not correspond to actual territory. Actually Belarus falls under their influence in this matter though we can barely say that Belarusian media has the same impact on its neighbors. In the end, the decision of Belarus to create its own media territory as exclusive and isolated as it only can be did not live up to expectations. Its media territory was not able to compete with those of its neighbors, and thus Belarus digs its own trench deeper and deeper pretending to expand its media territory that nobody needs anymore. While the specks and shades from our neighbors repeatedly reflect on the walls of the trench and alternate our perception of reality our own mass media with its system of representations and simulations does change us as well.

Thinking again about this particular model, one starts realizing that all this has been already described about 2000 years ago by Plato in his book "Cave symbol" (Plato, Cave Symbol//The State, book VII).

"People are living in an underground world that reminds of a cave with light all over it. Since they were little they wear fetters on their legs and necks so that they cannot move and the only thing they see is what they can see right in front of them for they cannot move their heads because of their chains. Their backs are on the light side and that light is coming from the fire way up there. Between the fire and the prisoners is the upper road with a small fence […] that so much reminds of the curtains in the theatre where actors put their puppets before the show begins. […] Behind this wall are the people carrying all different kind of things the way that they could be seen over the wall. They carry statues and images of living creatures made of stone and wood. As usual, some of the people are talking and some of them are quiet. But do you really think that those with the chains see anything else both their own and that of other people but the shadows on the wall of that cave?"[5].

Prospective

The following conclusions claim no universal truths. However taking into account the current state of Belarusian media we can offer four possible versions of development and transformation of the "trench" model as a model of media landscape. The walls of the trench carrying too much weight and experiencing a fierce and chaotic digging would finally fall down:

Version 1: they would fall down on the West side;

Version 2: they would fall down on the East side;

Version 3: they would fall down on both sides;

Version 4: too concentrated on building higher walls Belarusian mass media would never be able to get out of the shaft it digs.

In this paper we did not try to create a map of the surrounding media landscape. Still, we have to notice that the preliminary work for that is now done. Geography and landscaping require *"creating the most significant (system constructing) links between single nature*

elements (components) within the given territory"[6]. This is one of the principal methods of landscape construction by means of structuring. The researcher creates links between the elements. Thus, if we are not speaking about the landscape as matter of this paper we might not see it at all. We can also say, that *"the landscape exists due to our interaction with it as a landscape"*[7]. Thus, mass media should be related to as a technology that is in a certain way built in a certain cultural landscape. Media landscape becomes real only in our imagination otherwise we would never be able to see its dimensional features. In a way it is close to a landscape image which is *"defined by a geometry of a compound curve connecting points of the sky and earth in a way that reflects the force of their interaction the best"*[8]. During the semi standardized interviews conducted with program and station producers of Minsk radio stations an interesting detail was found out. One of the questions was to describe position of the radio station and other radio stations in Belarusian media landscape using geography terms. Following are the answers to this question, *"We would broadcast nationwide – this is a geographical term we use"* or *"Our hills are all around the city"*. The most metaphoric answer was *"if to speak about metaphoric comparisons it would be the edge of the forest. Imagine you walk in the forest and then - bang! - you see its edge. I'd call it an edge of a forest"*.

As a conclusion:

To describe a media landscape is only possible when such a landscape is constructed. Media landscape is a kind of a Utopian model. It is something that does not exist in reality (in the contrast to geographical landscape where a person with a practiced eye can distinguish components described above such as mountains, peaks, mountain chains, etc). Media landscape is hard to fit in the geographical landscape. It does not correspond to neither geographical nor administrative borders. It a virtual multidimension within which communication occurs.

An attempt to describe media landscape of a borderland can be compared to describing heterotopias or, if to speak about Belarus, Utopian landscapes. An attempt to construct a landscape of a borderland leads to splitting up the influence of the neighbor countries which mostly deny the mere fact of existence of such a thing as culture of borderland. This is the case when describing means naming and naming in turn means acquiring the name.

There are no reasons to stop using the "trench" model ("Cave-2") in media landscape context as if it were ineffective and having no prospective. This model is useful for rating various transformations of media landscape and in search for and constructing the landscape. Speaking about the Belarusian audience we can use this model to understand the principles of organization and structure of this virtual community. When a virtual community does not exist in a void it is then releases its potential in a social reality within the territory of media broadcast.

The above described "cave/trench" model helps to structure media landscape and allows Belarusian mass media system to enter the context of Eastern European borderland. The rate of interaction with other mass media systems of our neighbors plays an important role of consumer indicator and also of the symbolic Other in the Belarusian cultural landscape. The continuity of media landscape makes it necessary to talk about The Other as a special mirror looking in which we can look at ourselves while trying to see that Other.

The "shades" that are seen by the inhabitants of the cave might have yet another meaning in the Belarusian context. They are also visions created by The Other to be consumed in other cultures. They were not made especially for the cave inhabitants though they do help them to see their own reflection in the eyes of The Other. New media is now offering a unique opportunity to take a look at the Belarusian media landscape from a different point of view. Thus the metaphor of "shades" used above does not at all mean that there is some objective representation of reality which is not available in the cave. Different "shades" are in fact different ways to represent reality and not a single one pretends to be truthful and objective. The "shades" are the strokes that mass media use to create reality in our mind.

Notes

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Vitaly Kirichenko

IMAGES OF RUSSIA IN PUBLIC DISCOURCE OF THE PRESIDENT OF UKRAINE V. YUSCHENKO AND THE PRESIDENT OF BELARUS A. LUKASHENKO (comparative aspect)

The process of interaction and relationship building with external environment requires exploration and mastering of this environment. In their turn they are expressed in the production and maintenance or transformation of steady beliefs about the loci of the surrounding reality. Creation of such notions goes through several stages fully including the level of social communication. Interaction between social actors or groups could be represented as a process of constituting the meaning, the sense of the line of simple events united or articulated into more complex structures. The combination of such simple senses leads to the construction of the integral image of this or that object of the surrounding reality. In this case the image shall be understood as the sign of this object substituting its denotation in the representations of social actors. Processes of articulation of simple senses have similar nature and that is why they obey the methods of reflexive tracking of the construction logic. Research interest consists of the attempt to study both the mechanisms of turning into one whole of simple social "facts" used by practicing actors and the possibility to reconstruct on the level of social interaction in the form of transmitting and materializing integral images including the geographical ones.

The tradition to study images of these or those participants of political interaction on different space and political levels starting from the regional one and finishing with the vast geographic areas has a rich history and clearly developed principles and methods of analysis. We do not aim at presenting an exhaustive review of materials devoted to the given topic. However, we believe it is important to stress the novelty and peculiarities of such approaches which emphasize the mutual influence of geographic spaces and social practices,

their interdependence and complex interweaving within the framework of specific social and historic periods.

In particular, Russian researcher D. Zamyatin when explaining his approach as humanitarian geography and imageonalism actually "immerses" into the images of geographic spaces instituted in historical discursive practices. He is interested in the process of the establishment and development of natural spaces with clear or vague geographic denotations like, for instance, Eurasia with the space of the Middle Ages and of postmodern [see 4, 5].

When we consider the Western tradition we shall mention the achievements based on discourse analysis principles and approaches towards the study of the existing images and representations on the level of representatives of state power. Researchers also pay special attention to the media space.

One of the most prospective and promising directions in modern humanitarian, social and political thought is discourse analysis. The content of this term covers the theoretical construction that includes achievements and faults of many schools and traditions of scientific or philosophic thought as well as the combination of techniques and procedures of empirical analysis.

The given direction is the reaction to the conditions and criteria of scientific activity external to it as well as the reaction to immanent and internal parameters that go back to "root metaphors" and further developing dichotomies and isomorphism such as constructivism/reflexivity, quantity methods/quality instruments, determinism/freedom and some others. However, one shall not get carried away by the illusions about the omnipresence and omnipotence of the discourse analysis as some researchers see it. They quite eclectically unite absolutely different notions about the criteria of scientific "thinking" and mechanisms of social life activity.

The discourse analysis should be understood as one of the ways to develop the scientifically recognized "production" which obeys the same rules of "creation" and "existence" just like the social reality reconstructed during the discourse analysis research. Analysts themselves understand this clearly and believe that the realization offered by them of critically oriented ideas and concepts is one of the varieties of multiple social practices from which, after all, a society is made of. As its direct consequence it allows to break the present asymmetry of power relations of society and attract attention to the hidden, possibly unconscious and thus methodically produced mechanisms of creation and management of social processes with these mechanisms maintained on the same level. The goal of following the identified practice is to redistribute power positions of participants of social interaction assisting in the achievement of "fairer" and "better" relations of equality, tolerance, and humaneness.

However, the same scientific practices lead to the legitimation of their products and rationalization of the identified ideologies of common sense (as the main object of critical thought).

When studying the texts produced by actors one shall take into consideration the game of the identifiers and their structuring done according to certain principles. At the

same time one cannot underestimate the value of the context treating it as a factor that one-sidedly determines the content and form of the discourse. In such a case models of articulation of the identifiers become more important.

Post-Marx theorists E. Laclau and C. Mouffe understand discourse as a wide social sphere and even as the social itself and as something mobile that is subject to constant situations of occasional redefining.

According to these authors, all social practices are discursive and it means that they lead to the forming of identities by means of articulating of empty identifying around nodal points or such key points which possess the organizing principle of subordinating to themselves the identifiers of "the lowest order".

The essence of the articulation practice is the constructing of key points which partially fix the meaning. In its turn, this fixing is not complete due to the principal openness of the social treated as the articulation without which society is not possible. [1, p.110]

Articulation as the transformation of the existing disposition of the identifiers is based on two mechanisms or logics of difference and identity. If the logic of difference according to the name presupposes the construction of such identity that emphasizes the game and the necessity of differences between the articulated moments then the logic of identity or equivalence on the contrary unites the elements eliminating any difference between them leaving for itself only two polar meanings that constitute each other.

Equivalence creates the second meaning which destroys the first, i.e. differences cancel each other or express something identical in their base. In the chain of similarity all different and differing objective definitions of its term get lost and identity can only be set by the general reference to something external. Complete equivalence presupposes the whole elimination of differences. Identity becomes purely negative. Due to the fact that negative identity cannot be presented directly, i.e. positively it can be presented indirectly, through the similarity of differing moments. Similarity is used to express something that the object is not. [1, p. 128]

E. Laclau and C. Mouffe examine separately the role of logic of similarity in creating and carrying out such politics as populism:

"A popular subject position is the position constituted through equivalence, division of the political field into two polar, antagonistic camps. The political space of the popular arises in such situations where by means of a chain of democratic equivalences the political logic aspires to fill the gap between the political space and society as the empirical reviewer." [1, p. 133]

Having formulated briefly the theoretical bases of the research, we shall move now to the practical part. This article is devoted to the discourse-analysis of the images of Russia present at the level of speech practices of the president of Ukraine V. Yushchenko and the president of Belarus A. Lukashenko.

The aim of this article is to make explicit implicit ideologies and to reveal cultural-cognitive models defining the perception and evaluation of one's own place in the system of coordinates of international relations by analyzing public speeches and interviews of

V. Yushchenko during the period of 2005-2008 and A. Lukashenko during the period of 2001-2008.

About History of the Question

Considerable attention is paid to the problem of studying the images of geographical spaces in Ukrainian and foreign scientific traditions.

Russian historian A. Miller practices the tradition of studying the genesis of international and interethnic relations. In a series of his works he presented his vision of the problem of the Ukrainian identity forming and of the problem of the relations between Ukraine and Russia in the past and at present. In particular, the results of the research of mutual media-images of Russia and Ukraine in 1991-1995 were presented in the magazine "Polis". [8]

Ukrainian researchers V. Kulyk and M. Ryabchuk deal with such problems as the interaction conceptualization, the struggle of the two versions of national identity which are the most essential ones for Ukraine having the Russian and Ukrainian background, as well as the criticism of the position of state leaders who with a view of preservation of their authority pursue a policy of "reconciliation" reduced to inactivity, concealment, and blackmail. [7]

We shall mention the adherence of the specified authors to one of the opposing parties, in particular, that with the Ukrainian background. The given conclusion can be made on the basis of the textual analysis of the lexicon used by them for the characteristic of the Russian background discourse.

When emphasizing the importance of the specified works we shall say that the authors concentrate on wide contextual events and the analysis of literature on the given subjects but they do not actually come close to the characteristic of the speech practices of state officials and use the rhetoric only as an additional tool just to confirm available findings and conclusions like a symptom proves the diagnosis.

In the given aspect the metaphor of "the Borderzone" seems to be productive and, hence, its application in the solving of the identified task. O. Shparaga notes that it is necessary to understand the special territory that finds itself between any two spaces not only in a literal, geographical, sense as the Borderzone but also in a symbolical, semantic position as an attempt to define one's own identity invariably leads to the definition of the image identity and the context of those who are on both sides of the territory of the Borderzone, and only then to the definition of one's own identity. The Borderzone, being in such a zone, experiences challenges from both sides, is surrounded by their discourses, and when answering such calls creates its own discourse (as a narrative, as a representation, and as a style of life). [9]

In this case the interpretation of the image of the Other (another, alien) serves as a constituting factor for the definition of one's own location and purpose.

Y. Kiselyov rightly says that "the knowledge and the designing of reality occur by means of symbols and values valid for a specific cultural and historical context. Thus, the knowledge is characterized by its relativity, cultural and historical localization. Due to the cognitive process the considered fact finds reality for both states." [6] We shall expand the given citation as the knowledge can be studied only through the discursive practices of the subject carrying out the perception and evaluation of the surrounding reality while filling it with the senses received and created during social interaction.

Within the limits of the given research it is necessary to specify the validity of the uses of the term "image" in plural as "images" when we aspire to specify the presence in externally complete texts of presidents of several discourses or voices as representations submitting to somewhat differing logics of the presentation of the concept "Russia" contrary to each other, but nevertheless united by the coherent text with the help of rhetorical means into a single whole.

Analysis of the Discourse of the President of Ukraine of V. Yushchenko

Presidential elections in Ukraine at the end of 2004 became one of the main division lines (imagined only by experts or a part of the population) between the participants of the pre-election contest. One of the most significant moments of the pre-election campaign was the articulated attitude of the presidential candidates to the Russian Federation (further - the Russian Federation). V. Yanukovich who was considered to be "pro-Russian" supported the creation of the union of two states, giving Russian the status of the second state language, and the integration into the European economic space. The "Westernized" candidate V. Yushchenko in his electoral program "Ten steps towards people" allocated only one point to the relations with Russia. In particular, the emphasis in the given program was made on forming transparent and business relations at the level of two neighboring states.

Yushchenko who won the elections managed to do it mainly due to the support of the Ukrainian-speaking regions of the right bank (of the river) and Western Ukraine. The Russian-speaking Eastern Ukraine, the south of Ukraine, and the Crimea voted for the candidate V. Yanukovich.

These elections can be treated as the refusal to trust the "Westernized" candidate in the regions which mainly voted for V. Yanukovich while people did not trust the pro-Russian candidate in the areas which gave their voices to V. Yushchenko.

D.Arel rightly says that after Yushchenko's victory the key question of the agenda for Ukraine became the distribution of principles of the self-organizing of the Ukrainian nation not only in the west and in the center of Ukraine but also in the east and the south of the country. "The inclusion into the political nation can hardly happen on the basis of a unilateral idea of what national identity is. If Russians in Russia should understand that they cannot impose unilaterally on Ukrainians the vision of the Ukrainian national iden-

tity then Western Ukrainians (so we again identify the inhabitants of Western and Central Ukraine) cannot impose unilaterally on the people of Eastern Ukraine the vision of the Ukrainian national identity. It is necessary to find a way of overcoming disagreements based on the differences of identities." [3]

Following D. Arel we shall ascertain that the person who took the position of the president of Ukraine had to solve a challenging problem of designing such an image of the Russian Federation which would help to merge together the ideas about the given state of the political elite and of the population of Ukraine in order to overcome the contradictions dividing Ukraine discursively at least into two camps.

The problem of the research is to trace and reconstruct the image of Russia developed in the discursive practices of V. Yushchenko. The image of Russia is treated as an important and determining factor of the development of mutual relations and as the factor of strengthening the image of the president within the limits of the struggle for the status of the president as the main generator of senses and concepts of the Ukrainian state and nation.

From the very beginning of his becoming the president of Ukraine V. Yushchenko has been trying to formulate such vision of interaction with Russia which would correspond to his internal opinion about the mutual relations of two neighboring countries.

He articulates the elements in such a way that the conscious/created identity of the Russian Federation allows to establish certain relations with it constructing corresponding lines of similarity or distinction.

Already in the inaugural address (his first public speech) he identifies the beginning of a new epoch of the foreign political activity of Ukraine when this function of the state is ruled *exclusively by national interests.*

National interests in this case are a nodal point ordering a discursive formation that develops around it. The given concept is present in all presidential rhetoric remaining practically unchanged all four years.

Yushchenko believes national interests to be indisputable truths which cannot be subject to any transformations; they have been given initially and forever. In the sphere of foreign policy they are materialized in the form of processes of integrating into Europe, a collective structure of security on the European space and clear, transparent, strategic relations with Russia.

It is important to emphasize that "national interests" as they are national, obey the logic of the struggle of political forces for their definition and realization. This is recognized even by Yushchenko. However, the president actually aspires to close the space for public discussion, persistently and daily presenting his own interpretation of "interests".

After the initial analysis of the texts of the president and in accordance with their internal structure the image of Russia should be preliminary divided into several components.

For example, it is possible to identify the following images of the Russian Federation and to define them as:

1) Economic Russia economic is a partner;
2) Political Russia is not a partner.

Identification of such subimages will allow us to analyze more adequately the internal organization of the text corpus of Yushchenko's speeches.

His neoliberal thinking allows Yushchenko to see Russia in an economic sense as a huge market ready for the consumption of goods made in Ukraine. The market is huge though smaller in size than the European market following its own rules and principles which differ greatly from the EU standards. It is not always transparent consequently demanding its final regulation and submission to the laws of the free market:

> *Our strategic neighbor is Russia where 1/5 of the Ukrainian export is formed today, where there are considerable economic, historical, strategic, political, and other relations. This is a unique market and it is necessary to struggle for it.*

As Russia is conventionalized in the form of space, first of all, for economic affairs and the movement of capital and services, then the logic of the establishment of contacts caused by such disposition is reduced as a whole only to the transformation of the cumulative system of relations into a basic "marketization" of a symbolical field:

> *The matter is that our two countries have tried manually "to rule" our economic relations though it is a free market that should determine their direction, first of all.*
>
> *The market order has been established now for the first time in this sector of our relations and you understand that it is very important and possible as it is the core of our business relations.*

Even the declared jointness is treated through the commonness of economic interests:

> *I would begin with the fact that Ukrainian and Russian people have much in common in culture and in traditions. I am convinced that today the unique mutual cooperation between two economies brings real feedback to both peoples.*

At the same time the market-state can serve as an example to follow in some typical cases, for instance, when setting "transparent" and "democratic" tariffs for municipal services or carrying out the reform of social security (monetization privileges):

> *The price for gas - internal consumption – is lower than in Russia. What politician is responsible for this shady affair?*

Trying to transform mutual relations into a system base Yushchenko often personifies interactions with Russia saying that both countries possess their own biography and history:

We have discussed tête-a-tête the questions which, probably, Ukraine has not asked Russia for a very long time and I have understood.

When speaking with Russia we should speak a more readable language while we should be more expressive in the behavior and at the same time sincere.

In Russia they often say that we have got common history. It is almost the same when they say that we went to one school. But everyone has his own biography and everyone has his own history.

Personification is confirmed by the fact of the creation by heads of the states of the commission “Yushchenko – Putin” which is called upon to carry the mechanism of overcoming of the collected difficulties and questions over to the level of leaders of the countries bearing personal responsibility for the condition of interstate relations.

The problems which accumulated during the presidency of L. Kuchma are waiting for their evaluation and solution from Yushchenko. The key to the problems’ solution is the introduction of the rules of free market economy as the base principle of mutual relations. The programs for different directions of mutual relations are being developed starting from the questions of basing the Black Sea fleet of the Russian Federation to the support of the Russian language in the regions populated by ethnic Russians:

If we understand that near us there is a strategic partner, Russia, where we wish to ensure the realization of the Ukrainian interests we should know the Russian language. The Russian language should not develop at the expense of the Ukrainian language while the Ukrainian language should not develop at the expense of the Russian language.

Consequently, for the society which ethnic distinction and, more importantly, language distinction is great, the Russian language is excluded from the list of possible resources which could be used for the development of other variants (for example, of an intercultural dialogue). Russian is moved specifically to the area of the economic dialogue of subjects of entrepreneurship as though studying English or any other foreign language that is not a part of the representatives of the Ukrainian state and the nation will help, first of all, to realize the Ukrainian interests abroad, and then, secondly, to realize the rights of citizens registered in the constitution and other laws.

The ideology of a neoliberal demanding from the politician to introduce the principle of transparency and efficiency in all spheres of public life forces Yushchenko to declare the transfer of spheres of humanitarian practices (education, mass-media, art), especially

subject to cultural influence from the strategic partner, to the realization of the ethnonationalist policy laconically expressed in the formula:

> *There are no alternative Ukraines. There is Ukraine and only one. One Kiev. One people.*

Separately from the subimage of economic Russia stands the subimage of political Russia as the space with a special logic of the articulation of elements that differs from the mechanism of ordering of identifiers of the previous "huge market" subimage.

One of the components of the subimage of political Russia is the representation of history. Speeches of Yushchenko periodically reflect practices of social commemoration and historical imagination of Russian (including the Soviet part as inseparable from Russian) history in the form of memoirs about the tragic and unacceptable negative moments. Yushchenko actualizes the power seizure of the White house in Moscow in 1993 against the background of the parliamentary crisis in the spring of 2007. Other moments include the problems of elections, mutual relations between the authorities and the opposition, the authorities and business against the background of achievements of president Yushchenko in democratic and economic transformations. When answering the question of a journalist, "*In your opinion, will Julia Timoshenko turn into a Ukrainian version of Putin if she becomes the president of Ukraine?*" Yushchenko says, "*I do not want to offend anybody. We are a European people and we cannot go back to Asia.*"

Yushchenko's reflection on the political events of the past and modern Russia allows him to draw a conclusion that Ukraine has absolutely no points of contact with Russia:

> *It (*Ukraine. – *V.K.) should also create the political culture necessary for the system to function according to democratic principles. This is what distinguishes the countries which have avoided the Soviet inheritance from those which are still in its captivity.*

A rare reference to the joint historical tradition serves discursively for the final embodiment of the model of "amnesia" as a full negation of the events that had something in common with Russia while the events of the past which have not disappeared (inherited from the USSR, for example) are treated exclusively or primarily as the events of the Ukrainian history only.

Yushchenko's discourse contains practically no mentioning of any historical events common with Russia and the practice of national oblivion dominates. If the president of Ukraine also makes references to the valid facts of the joint past they are unequivocally interpreted according to two evaluation poles. The Great patriotic war becomes an individual business of the Ukrainian nation while the guilt for creating and carrying out the Holodomor (famine) is laid down entirely on the depersonalized communist Stalin regime. Two different systems of the world vision are introduced specifically to characterize the

Holodomor, one is nationalist and the other is ideological which means that the subject of repression was *the communist regime* and the object of influence was the Ukrainian *nation* to a great extent generated by the policy of rooting carried out by the Bolsheviks.

Yushchenko offers an ambiguous and disputed interpretation of the Holodomor in the context of the establishment of more transparent relations with the Russian Federation. During the days of reverence of the Holodomor victims as a historical episode demanding emotional nuances and not giving in to rational judgment Russia is identified with its people characterized in terms of relationship ties:

> *We call upon all and, first of all, the Russian Federation to condemn the crimes of Stalinism and the totalitarian Soviet Union together like true, fair and honest brothers with nothing to hide from each other.*

I call upon the Russian Federation to stand near us and through the state reverence of the Holodomor to be an example of human empathy corresponding to the Russian people.

However, the people of Russia being the brother is discursively identified with its leaders as the people has elected the president who *humiliates millions of people who now rest in peace but who have been innocently killed and who have done nothing to anybody.*

When characterizing the trajectory of the forming of the Russian state identity during the post-Soviet transformation, Yushchenko a posteriori rejects any distinctions between the Soviet Union and its assignee Russia:

> *Russia received the starting conditions which were present in the Soviet Union, hence, it was not so difficult for Russia to represent itself in the world and to formulate the bases of foreign policy. It is the mechanism of continuity, that's all.*

Following the specified logic, we can draw a conclusion that Yushchenko sees Russia not only theoretically but also practically as the successor of the USSR unequivocally correlating in the discourse of the president of Ukraine with the gravest crimes of the 20th century. The attempt to construct an alternative representation of Russia that could suit and neutralize the representations of Russia competing among themselves in the Ukrainian daily and official discourses, leads to certain contradictions in Yushchenko's speeches.

In 2008 we can observe the hyperactivity of the president in the form of the attempts to concretize the image of the Russian Federation that used to be indistinct and vague. It was facilitated by the events in Transcaucasia.

In connection with the military conflict in the Caucasus in August, 2008 the president of Ukraine actualizes the image of Russia as an aggressor and infringer of abstract international norms which have been broken by the West in Kosovo before as the West turned the former region of Serbia into the subject of international law without the permission of Serbia herself. Yushchenko's evaluation of the events in the Caucasus shows his firm

conviction in the infallibility of his opinion. The relationships of cause and effect are immediately established removing the regions from the process and the parties of the conflict or "war" instead of a peace-making operation are not Georgia, Southern Ossetia and Russia but only the latter. The war is caused by the aggression of the Russian Federation.

On the whole, summing up the above stated, we can draw a conclusion about the ambiguity of the image of the Russian Federation and the existence of several principles of the organization of the social toponym "Russia" in the discourse of the Ukrainian president. On the one hand, there is the consistency of a neoliberal that requires the transfer of the plural reality of interstate relations to the plane of effective economic cooperation and integration of the variety of approaches and principles into the organization of bilateral interaction and into "transparency" and a "market" conjuncture while on the other hand there is obvious uncooperative attitude to the close past of the Russian internal political reality which Ukrainians managed to get rid of only during the presidential campaign in 2004.

The historical affinity actualized by individual "injections" as a result turns into the Ukrainian national biography that differs radically from the biography of Russia and the increasing articulation of Russia as the absolute Other in accordance with the chronology.

This is proved by the observation of the moments of correlation of the modern Russian Federation with the Soviet Union. We presented the features of representation of the Holodomor by Yushchenko above. The communist regime is to be blamed for the tragedy. The president explicitly denies the role of the guilty party of Russia but the gradual annually strengthening interpretation of the Russian life experience as non-European, Asian, namely, the Other according to the definition, ontologically Other, makes Yushchenko implicitly identify modern Russia with the Soviet Russia. It is expressed, for example, in the following formulation, "*Russia received the starting conditions which were present in the Soviet Union*". There is also a latent logic connection that is frequently used and that can be presented as, "Troubles of our times are direct consequences of the Soviet experience." Accordingly, the Russian Federation as the formal (in the sphere of property) and actual successor of the USSR (in the sphere of the world outlook tradition) turns into the Other being on the other side of the border and constantly changing the identity of Ukraine. The proclaimed "ontological" Europeanness of Ukraine leads to the forming of the image of Russia as one of the partners with the predicate of being strategic. In fact, it is the image of the Other acceptable in several aspects of education on the post-Soviet space the actions of which ("Asianness") are more and more facilitating the rooting of Ukraine's belonging to the European Union foreordained by fate. Since 2005 Yushchenko has been trying to build the relationship with the Other on the basis of transparency and market rules. However, as time went by this Other began to distance itself more and more and turned into the infringer of the foundations of the sacred "European security" and thus has no right to serve as a role model in view of the European expectations of "I". This "I" is Yushchenko as the leader of Ukraine. It became that Other that earlier used to be a friend but whose life and "biography" led it away in a different direction. The common choice of Ukraine and the

Russian Federation in favor of the EU turned out to be impossible. The Borderzone finally "rejected" one of the parties (Russia), having constructed it as the opposite though not having become closer to the other party (Europe).

Analysis of the Discourse of the President of Belarus A. Lukashenko

Using the theoretical framework given above we shall try to present the discourse models of Russia found in A. Lukashenko's statements.

The problem of constructing and functioning of the Belarusian-Russian relations is widely covered both in the publicistical and scientific discourse.

During our preliminary acquaintance with the texts we managed to determine that the constructing of an externally completed uniform image of the Russian Federation in the speeches of V. Yushchenko and, especially, A. Lukashenko follows several logics which consistently develop into the general picture of the representation of this state.

Despite the wide variability and presence of a plenty of opinions about Russia, nevertheless, it is important to reduce them to several general models or forms of representation. If one is to understand the common mechanism of "the life ability" of a cumulative consistent image of Russia then it seems expedient to examine each of the identified subimages separately (let us name them so for greater correctness).

Thematically, the Belarusian leader devotes much more "time" and "space" to the problem of interaction with Russia than his Ukrainian colleague. This is justified by the elaboration of the political project "the union state" presupposing the discourse "development" and interpretation of the partner party and filling the empty denominating project with the contents and definition of the system of coordinates for the creation of an attractive alive "product" capable of reproducing its own identity through self-awareness. In fact, the subject matter of the joint state is not separated from the supposedly main notions or statements about one's own state, identity, and national construction. It actively and creatively cooperates with the topics of the internal space of Belarus using identical logics and sense constructs when structuring the identity of the Union.

The process of the creation of the union state that is original and has no analogues in the world's practice as well as its "objectification" is interesting for scientific research as the fact of the development of the surrounding reality in terms of the available cognitive matrixes as well as the fact of the constructing of articulation practices which are essentially new and which have not been interpreted before.

It does not seem to be problematic to chronologically trace the turning points in Lukashenko's discourse for one specific reason. Such turns coincide with the events of the context of the statement production but this also generates the research interest consisting of the aspiration to identify the techniques of the elements articulation, their ordering, shifts, and the repeated defining of central points.

Actually, Lukashenko interprets the geographical denotation "Russia" only from the perspective of the creation of the joint political project. There is no Russia separate from the project. The country is alive only as long as it "is building" the Union with Belarus even though unsuccessfully. The logical consequence of the given position is the emphasis on the practices structuring and legitimizing the project.

On the whole, when evaluating the essence of the supranational formation Lukashenko most often resorts to the use of the metaphorical model with the sphere-source "building" mainly to indicate the disputed denotations which cannot be fixed definitely and which serve the purpose of defining the integration problem moments:

> *The introduction of the Russian ruble is the top level of that house which we are building. The top level cannot be installed until we place the founding underlying levels.*
>
> *When we plunged into this great problem and when we started to build the relations brick by brick it turned out that each brick should be ground and that these bricks should be ground when put into the building. We shall remember that we are building this house for the people.*
>
> *I tell them that the house is built not from the roof. It is built from the foundation.*

The emerging episodes of mutual misunderstanding are presented as the inability to design the house, to actually build it, and as the absence of representations about the very frame "building". The lack of such a frame is constantly associated only with the Russian party as the leaders of the Russian Federation cannot be architects and builders, and only Lukashenko can be the "construction superintendent".

> The metaphor from the sphere-source "nature" is used with the same purpose: *If we pick the unripe fruit you know what will happen: it will be impossible to eat it.*

If one is to understand the logic of the articulation of the discourse formation "the union state" one should understand the principle of the creation of identity of Belarus in Lukashenko's discourse.

The mechanism of the constructing of identity of Belarus by her President can be identified as populist. E. Laclau defines populism as "a series of political-discourse practices which construct the popular subject the precondition of which is the construction of the internal border dividing the social space into two camps through the definition of denotation".[2] In case of Belarus the country is seen by Lukashenko as divided into two parts which are inherently antagonistic. There is a people as the supreme sovereign and a non-people or the opposition which in every possible way with the use of a different rhetorical strategy is forced outside of the borders of Belarus identity. Thus, it finds itself on the other side of the border, mainly, in the West but sometimes in Russia as well. The empty denotation, i.e., the border that divides them is "the Belarusian model of develop-

ment" formulated and realized by A. Lukashenko. The people as the supreme sovereign is seen as the only legitimate source of authority for the president himself as the individual representative of the people who realizes the unity and existence through the president. There would be no Belarus without president Lukashenko and there would be no president Lukashenko without Belarus. In order to evaluate the degree of representation of the will of the sovereign Lukashenko applies the strategy of removal of all possible "fellow travelers" or intermediaries between himself and the people who are objectively present and essential but are symbolically eliminated from the vertical the people - the president:

> *I always relied and rely on the people but not on some groups or clans. The main thing is the trust of the people.*

The people cannot have any internal differences in relation to the president; there can be only full identity.

There is no common space of interaction for two given camps. The opposition is marginalized through lexical means and metaphors of nature and organism:

> *Three and a half hundred lame-brained people; morons from the opposition; only these oppositionists fed from outside of our country, start to shout (it means we are on the right path); the lured oppositionists; because these are brainless absurd actions. And this is also brainless and absurd criticism; "they grunted near the feeding trough" of Lukashenko! They became stronger, rose on their feet, were caught stealing or simply took the treacherous position of the "lousy" oppositionist.*

At the same time the "people" appears proud, wise, hardworking, fair, free, and intellectually prepared.

Thus, there are no positive differences between two camps inside Belarus. The people and the "so-called" opposition are equivalent in terms of pure negativity while negativity and antagonism are introduced by Lukashenko for his own legitimation as "a worthy representative" of the interests of such a people.

This logic is projected actively onto Russia with two camps being the authority (frequently together with the oligarchs) and the people rather than the opposition and the people.

The people of Russia is constructed similar to the defining of the Belarusian people. "The people" as such exists not only in Belarus but also in Russia. This logic of equivalence is effectively transferred to the Russian "soil" attracting the conceptual metaphor from the sphere-source "relationship":

> *The states which have been fostered in one cradle.*

> *They are our closest brothers. We shall do everything to maintain brotherly friendship. It has been foreordained by fate for us to be together.*
>
> *If you ask if there is more calculation or feeling in the Belarusian aspiration to be together with Russians it is certainly the latter or the desire to be together.*

The intentions of our brothers-Russians are to build the Union on a fair basis.

There is a symbolical relationship. The family has had a long history, presumably, since the Kievan Rus'. However, the Great patriotic war became the key central point for the strengthening and institutionalization, and an original check. It occupies the prepotent position in Lukashenko's discourse:

> *We rotted in the trenches together with Russians on the same side of the barricades during the Great patriotic war.*
>
> *Russia it not only your Russia, it is also my Russia. We lived in one country. We protected, we had more than three million people who lost their lives fighting for Victory protecting our country.*
>
> *We were always together in history. We were always together! We always fought against the common enemy; we were always together in wars and usually we won.*

The reference to history and to the tragic past acts as the search for the foundations for the rooting of the present in the fact of the Union state. Human victims serve as a mute reproach to the actions of the present Russian authority breaking laws entrusted by ancestors. The past is periodically actualized for the projection to the modern position and for the evaluation of the current condition of international relations as a natural consequence of the events of sixty years' prescription.

The principles of peoples' consolidation on the basis of military interaction also cover interstate relations and the army and the soldier become the key images of the state sovereignty and, more widely, the rights to the existence *of the Belarusian-Russian arms brotherhood; a joint Belarusian-Russian front; if you destroy the army you will destroy Russia. One shall clearly understand that if there is no army nobody will manage to keep Russia.*

Through the transfer of properties of the subject "the Belarusian people" to the subject "the Russian people" the population of Russia acquires the qualities and features of "the Belarusian people" though not completely:

> *It is in Russia that is our rich Russia where one will not bend down to pick up a ruble but where they like to risk in a big way. A Belarusian will pick up a kopeck. He is thrifty and circumspect.*

Contextually, the difference between the Russian and the Belarusian people is the inability to influence the government one-sidedly.

The concept "market democracy" is the empty denotation dividing Russia socially into two opposite camps. The Russian state becomes the analogue of the Belarusian opposition in the situation with Russia.

Attempts to strengthen and legitimize their own imperious practices and claims for stability lead to the identification of external factors of instability of the Union state. Among the preconditions to the strengthening of Lukashenko's authority are the reference images of the Other formed as the example not to be followed and to be rejected. The format of such an example is assigned to "capitalist Russia" especially during the presidency of Putin.

Lukashenko sees the authority of the Russian Federation as the subject structured by someone's own certain corporate interests that cannot be influenced unlike in Belarus and the influence from the people-sovereign. Unlike Lukashenko in most cases the leaders of the Russian Federation do not act "on behalf of the people". If at an early stage the situation did not seem so pitiable even under the presence in Russia of the connection "authority – oligarchs" as "together *with Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin we acted as simple executors of the will of our people"* then during the presidency of Putin the abstraction from the people increases, "There is *(*in the Kremlin. – *V.K.) a small group of "the dissatisfied" which is both in the government and around the president; those who today tried to do this is not the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia which should deal with it but certain individuals in the administration of the president; unfortunately, the president of Russia is involved in all these actions"*.

The privatization in the 90s of the 20th century is articulated as the key moment indicative of the beginning of the breakaway of the authority from the people:

> *There was criminal privatization, landslide and wild privatization in Russia;*
>
> *What did the people receive, what did the 150 million Russian people receive from the privatization of the main directions of economy of Russia;*
>
> *There is a barbarous taking away of the capital and property and means and money from those people who are weaker today.*

The created chain includes the consequences of privatization. "S*uperrich oligarchs of Russia"* united with the political capital and began to determine the strategic course "further from the people". As "the Russian people" is essentially good and is a positive subject then specific group interests dominate in policy toward Belarus:

> *The Russian oligarchs will cease to put the pressure on Belarus so brutally.*

"Dishonest" journalists guilty of the slowing down of the process of the Union creation supported the pair "authority – oligarchs":

> *You, journalists, those who dominate today in mass media of Russia, cover this problem (integration – V.K.) very unfairly.*

> *Everybody, figuratively speaking, "has been disciplined" from the so-called independent NTV to the state RTR.*

However, contrary to the actions of the authority "the Russian people" does not forget its predestination:

> *Russians feel sorry for us that we shall be dissolved and we shall be lost there (*in Russia. – *V.K.), in your mess.*

The frequency of the use of the similarity logic increases in a timely sequence: in 2007 and 2008 Lukashenko uses it in each speech starting with the oil-and-gas opposition of Russia and Belarus.

If up to 2007 Russia was represented by the president of Belarus as an independent player at least of the regional scale with the objective claims for the influence in world politics then in 2007 Lukashenko's position started to move to the field of neoliberalism, rigidly differentiating economy from all other spheres of public life and recognizing its priority. The Russian Federation is more and more associated with the economically backward country (only military strong) carelessly treating not only Belarus but also other states on the post-Soviet space:

> *Russian economy is very dependent on European and American economies becoming more and more dependent on Chinese economy. Because these are solvent markets and it is very profitable for Russia to sell raw materials there. Raw material is life for Russia.*
>
> *Russia is visible. Why? It is visible because the West needs energy resources. They will accept, will embrace, kiss, they will do everything.*
>
> *Russia has turned into a raw appendage of the technological West and the United States of America.*
>
> *Everything depends on Russia. Right now the situation is not clear. But it is necessary to make a choice. I once again emphasize that otherwise let us not take offence on Ukrainians, Georgians who search for happiness in a different place*.

Against the background of such Russian one-vector economic policy determining the role of the Russian Federation as "an inadequate person" possessing emotions Belarus clearly acquires advantages as Belarus is the leader in world mechanical engineering (*Our supersize cars Belaz take 30 % of the world market*; *MTZ produces 90 % of tractors of the whole Soviet Union*) and modernizes the enterprises (*Today the level of processing reaches approximately 85 %. It is the world level. Russia had and still has 50% because the factories were not modernized and it was easier and better to sell crude oil to the West*), develops technologies (*we made a decision to create our own so-called "Silicon valley" - Park of high*

technologies). There are specific examples of emergency intervention in the general tendency of lagging behind and stagnating of Belarusian economy. As a result of Lukashenko's discourse "interventions" the factor of the international influence of the Russian Federation turns into nothing:

> *Without any reasons the Russian Federation has already declared itself to be among the leading centers of force in the world.*

It is necessary to modify "family relations" to overcome the complex:

> *Russia should reject its superpowerness and attempts to look down on us if we were a younger brother.*

When characterizing the image of Russia created by the president of Belarus, it is necessary to point out the duality or even polarity of Russia's presentation in Lukashenko's discourse. On the one hand, it is a way of "tuning out from the competitor" when the competitor is a direct partner in negotiations and a participant of direct communication with Lukashenko and it is the leadership of the Russian Federation. It gets accused of the inability to become "an architect" and to be "a builder" and is aggregated with a large criminal capital, i.e., it acquires such attributes that are explicitly negatively perceived by the population of both countries closely familiar with the processes of privatization and development of liberal market economy. On the other hand, there is a people-sovereign and a member of a big "family" of people, a comrade of Lukashenko and a discourse opponent of its own representatives in the authorities. On the one part, there is identification of the Belarusian people with the Russian people through the spheres-sources of relationship, while on the other part there is marginalization and forcing out of the opposition from the former and of groups "authority – oligarchs" together with media professionals from the latter. The tactics based on the logic of structurization of chains of equivalence and articulation of a populist discourse is rarely applied initially but in due course it becomes a comprehensive strategy aimed at creating an image of Russia as the party responsible not only for the inner-union problems (if one recognizes the real existence of the Union) but also for many disputed situations on the post-Soviet space. Such transformation coincides in time with the general reduction of the frequency of the use of the denotation "Russia" in 2007 and 2008.

Conclusion

The presented description of images of Russia used in the communication space of presidents of Belarus and Ukraine A. Lukashenko and V. Yushchenko allows to identify similarities and differences of practices carried out by the given actors.

For both of them Russia is a large market inside which unknown processes frequently take place being criminal or simply not understandable by the rational thinking of neoliberals. It is the country which, first of all, has great supplies of energy resources but is hardly more remarkable than the West, for example, or China. This geographical region does not look "attractive" from the political point of view. For Yushchenko it is "Asia" with the non-European management style while for Lukashenko it is the country the central administration of which professes principles similar to the principles of the Belarusian opposition so it is actually non-European space.

The basic logic used by Lukashenko is the logic of the articulation of elements through the creation of chains of identity and populist discourse; it becomes especially noticeable in the situations with the legitimation of powers and confrontation with Russian authorities.

Unlike Lukashenko Yushchenko uses a softer combination of logics of identities and differences. He does not have such a sharp division of contrary subjects such as people – authority and opposition - oligarchs.

Growing negativism towards Russia in public speeches in 2008 coincides in time with the significant event in the interstate relations between Belarus and Ukraine in February, 2009 when Lukashenko and Yushchenko met personally for the first time since the time of the election of Yushchenko the head of Ukraine.

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CHERNOBYL, ECOLOGY AND POLITICS: SOCIAL MOBILIZATION IN BELARUS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 1990s

Research

The period of the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s for Belarus, as well as for all new independent states is ambiguous and inconsistent. The Soviet heritage of Belarus among all other things presupposed a set of unresolved problems which had to be dealt with simultaneously with the construction of "the state-nation" and the country's own political system. It acquired more or less completed outlines only in the middle of the 1990s with the introduction and final registration of the presidency institute in its present form. It determined political processes in the country for a decade (-s). Meanwhile behind the facade of important political events in the first half of the 1990s a number of socially significant problems seemed to have faded into the background. The problems included the deterioration of social conditions, consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station (CNPS) and the ecological situation. The conditions of the increase of social intensity, on the one hand, and pluralization of the political space on the other hand, made possible the formation of some elements of civil society, in particular, the first institutes of social and civil mobilization. In this case we mean not so much political or parapolitical structures. The issue here is those public organizations which during the given period tried to resolve "socially significant" problems and get set in the still unset political system.

Emergence of public organizations as new actors, participants of the political process, was, first of all, connected with the hopes for the process of democratic transformations at the beginning of the 1990s that began practically in all the former Soviet republics. This period for Belarus was characterized by a number of significant political transformations such as the forming of political parties, public

associations, and development of national and independent press. In those conditions numerous public organizations and movements started to lay claims for their participation in the political process. In 1994 according to **the register of the republican Ministry of Justice** there were about 630 registered public organizations in Belarus. Public organizations accepted various forms: funds, associations, communities, clubs, unions, charitable organizations, centers, federations, societies, committees, companies, associations, and movements. Their activity affected various aspects of social life and categories of the population: nurseries, organizations of the disabled, organizations of veterans, youth, human rights, ecological[1], Chernobyl and foreign organizations.

However, the emergence and development of public organizations in Belarus were preceded with the process of their consolidating not only in the daily social system, but also in the not yet transformed political system. The research aimed at revealing the source of the emergence of public organizations in the former Soviet republics concentrates on various aspects but comes to the uniform denominator. The Soviet period saw the formation of certain "public" practices which led to the fast development of the public sector after acquiring independence.[2] In this case it is a question of the role of "amateur organizations" as well as the role of "environmental activism".

It is necessary to note that the emergence of predecessors of modern public organizations in Belarus took place during the Soviet period when they were defined as "amateur organizations".[3] In fact, such organizations represented a challenge to the centralized state system and became the first attributes of the increase of social action and civil resistance. Therefore, the authorities perceived them ambiguously as on the one hand, they were believed to be "alien elements" which could lead to the growth of national movements[4] while on the other hand, they were considered to be elements of the process to reform the Soviet system.[5] Thus, "amateur organizations" appear as intermediate and transitive forms, which are, on the one part, not entered into the political structure, but, on the other, meet certain social changes and ideas of the "perestroika" process. Below is their officially recognized purpose of that time, "Public amateur associations are created under the control of the state in accordance with the purposes of communism construction to realize socialist pluralism of opinions at the account of the avant-garde role of the CPSU. They function as organizational forms of activity of the Soviet citizens expressing diverse interests, needs and requirements, participate in procedures of making administrative decisions within the frameworks defined by current legislation, and in coordination with the bodies of the government and management, independently carry out or participate in organized event".[6] In Belarus such "amateur organizations" focused mainly on the young audience, may include the following associations and clubs "Talaka", "Tutejshyja", "Pahodnya", "Sovremennik", "Uzgorje", "Maladzik".[7] According to different estimations, they had 3,5 thousand members in 1994.

During the Soviet period the practice of social mobilization of the population in Belarus was not so widespread like in some other Soviet republics. This also concerns the ecological movement. O.L. Denisjuk notes, for example, that in the USSR at the end of 1988

there was observed a certain crisis of the organized forms of the movement characterized by the search and transition to new forms, in view of the role and importance of an organization's structure. It is precisely during this period that the development of the social movement was completed and amateur organizations of the party type and popular fronts began to emerge. O.L. Denisjuk also identifies the continuity of forms of civil resistance as the factor of the public sector forming. During different periods these forms found their expression in the display of the political will and social interest. The author claims that members of informal social groups ("neformaly") in the 1980s are the followers of "men and women of the sixties" ("shestidesyatniki") and dissidents. "It is possible to define a uniform string of cultural-historical and political continuity from "enemies of people" of the Stalin period (except for innocently slandered citizens) to "men and women of the sixties" and to dissidents of the 70s and the beginning of the 1980s and further to the "members of informal social groups» of the second half of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, and, at last, to the democrats of the 1990s".[8]

Chernobyl and Ecological Organizations: Groups and Movement?

When speaking about the development of the ecological movement in the USSR, it is necessary to cite its periodization offered by Shubin, one of the authors of the collection "Ecological organizations on the territory of the former USSR" (up to 1992) which, while defining historical parameters of the emergence and development of the ecological movement, points out the following periods: the institutionalized period of the ecological movement (approximately 1958-1982); the petition (approximately 1982-1989); the populist (1989-1991), and the alternative periods. Using the example of the ecological organizations to outline the way of the social movements' development during the Soviet period, Shubin uses different periodization criteria which more likely deal with various characteristics of the ecological movement during different historical periods. The characteristic feature of the ecological organizations during the period from 1958 till 1982 is their being embedded in the structures of official public organizations while during the following period from 1982 to 1989 the main characteristic of the ecological organizations becomes their independence and addressing the authorities. The petition period is identified by the change of the ecological movement character, namely, the politization of ecological organizations and use of ecological ideas in the struggle for political authority. The alternativist period can be characterized as the period of changes which led to the ecological movement identifying its place in new political systems.

The emergence of the ecological movement and its organization in almost all countries of the former USSR can be explained by the existence of the Soviet practices of "environmental activism", close to antinuclear practices in Western countries. Thus, the formation of the ecological civil sector occurs between the influence of forms of individual or group activism and forms of social movement. According to some research,[9] conducted

in the second half of the 1980s there appear the so-called "groups of public interest" expressing some common interest and capable of taking part in the forming and making of political decisions. So, researchers in the USSR understood the new role of environmental groups which, having arisen during the Soviet period, at the beginning of political transformations, since 1988, have applied for a certain place in defining power policy, "In the past environmental discussions were a priority problem of the scientific and intellectual elite; now ordinary people could join the movement for the protection of environment. The collective action in which they were all involved, was absolutely unprecedented for the Soviet system just like its equal intervention into the process of making political decisions".[10] Babcock connects the development of environmental groups, first of all, with the political transformations of the late Soviet regime. At the same time the form of "ecological protest", "social movements" or "public groups of interests" depend on the degree of the transformation of the political system. So, for example, the ecological protest developed in Brezhnev's epoch "in the form of social movements"[11] consisting of the leaders having opportunities to establish communications with each other through the academic and media environment". During the reorganization, the beginning of the reforming of the political system, one shall speak not about social or public movement but about the phenomenon of "environmental activism" where public groups of interest move to the foreground. For example, on the basis of the carried out research[12] Babcock has shown that "the Soviet environmental groups" played a significant role at the beginning of democratization, however, they did not manage to occupy a fixed place in the political process of a new political system. Babcock believes that it is possible to identify two phases of the political activity of environmental groups: the first phase is characterized by deep beliefs of participants of "environmental groups" that they can really participate in the political process and carry out the function of an intermediary between the local authorities and the public opinion, "between the correct information and the correct decision". However, the power sector represented a difficult and complex sphere of politics and the area of political decision making. During the second phase it led to certain reconsideration by groups of what political institutes and political process represent, and, as a consequence, it led to the disappointment in Gorbachev's reforms.

On the other hand, it is necessary to say that neither the catastrophe at the CNPS, nor the announcement of its real consequences served as the factor that determined the development of the antinuclear movement in the post-Soviet countries. After the accident at the CNPS, more specifically, when the majority of Western countries presented more or less objective information there was a rise of the antinuclear movement though in the mentioned countries this type of movement had already existed. In the countries of the former USSR at the beginning of the 1990s the antinuclear subject became a component of anticommunist movement: "deceit", "crimes" and "responsibility" replaced the question of danger of the nuclear power engineering. The subject became a priority task of scientists rather than the activity of public movements.[13] This is due to the fact that during the Soviet period certain antinuclear protest experts did not manage to be united in the social

movement, "the antinuclear movement could not create the precondition for the formation in the USSR of the uniform movement, either in the struggle against the nuclear power engineering, or in the struggle for the preservation of the environment".[14] Not having had time to be formed the antinuclear movement gave up its place in the forming public space to the ecological movement and Chernobyl organizations.

The necessity of overcoming the consequences of the CNPS accident led to the emergence and creation of organizations of a new type such as organizations of assistance, welfare funds, organizations of psychological support, etc. However, the question remains of whence and how these organizations appeared and were created, what social practices were used as the base and whether it is possible to consider them to be social movements or isolated actions of the public sector actors?

We shall say that during the Soviet period there were no such organizations; therefore, there was no experience of their functioning. Since 1991 in Belarus there have been public organizations somehow involved in the overcoming of the consequences of the CNPS accident. The number increased to about 40 by 1994. This period was the most favorable for the emergence of public organizations. It was characterized by the disclosure of the truth about Chernobyl, a weak political and economic system, the development of external relations, the heightened interest of Western countries and the weakened state control. Some authors tend to believe that the development of these organizations (the forming of the sector of Chernobyl public organizations) was to a greater degree connected with the roles of external actors (foreign funds and organizations) which did not wish to cooperate with authorities and supported the development of the activity of non-governmental organizations (NGO), "The aspiration of the Soviet authorities to belittle the scale of consequences of the Chernobyl accident has led to numerous foreign initiatives showing a desire to cooperate exclusively with NGOs to provide assistance directly to those people who have suffered".[15]

Meanwhile, new public organizations possessing the essential financial resources[16] managed to solve a certain number of problems which state institutions could not cope with. All this led to a specific division of tasks for the overcoming of the consequences of the Chernobyl accident between the government and public organizations. "The state took upon itself the evacuation of the population from the contaminated areas, the provision of people with new housing, the payment of social benefits to the victims and the financing of campaigns to attract the attention of the world community to this problem. 12 % of the state budget is spent on these purposes through the State fund of Chernobyl receiving the 12 % tax paid by individuals and legal entities. However, the problem of rehabilitation of victims has been laid down on the shoulders of public organizations."[17] Chernobyl organizations mainly concentrated on organizing health restoring trips abroad and assisting in the deliveries of clothes and food and medical aid.

However, the experience of the ecological and Chernobyl organizations at the beginning of the 1990s allows to divide and distinguish the issues of "ecology" and "Chernobyl". At the beginning of the 1990s the subject of "ecology" in many public organizations was

separated from "Chernobyl" which became a strictly specific sphere of the protest opinion display (against the state and anticommunism) and the rendering of various kinds of assistance to certain groups of the population though this concept is understood differently by various organizations. It could be the improvement of the ecological situation or ecologically clean Belarus, etc. As a rule, the organizations which position themselves as Chernobyl ones use different variants of the word in their names, including not only single-root and similar sense words but also words which are associated with the consequences of the CNPS accident such as "April 26th", "Chernobyl", "The echo of Chernobyl", "131st iodine of Chernobyl", "Children of Chernobyl", "Otklik" ("Response"), "Prypyats", "Znich" ("Star"), "Shchit Chernobylya" ("Shield of Chernobyl"), "Zhizn pereselentsev" ("Life of out migrants"). Many organizations formed prior to the beginning of the Chernobyl mobilization, were later transformed into the Chernobyl ones having reoriented their activities. When speaking about the ecological movement it shall be mentioned that during the 1990s one could see only weak and underdeveloped ecological movement in Belarus; more likely it represented "a non-formalized network of active workers".[18]

About Sociology of Social Movements: Some Characteristics of Chernobyl Organizations

When defining the role and place of Chernobyl organizations in the formed social and political system of Belarus the core question is whether Chernobyl organizations could become a social movement, an institute of social mobilization of Belarusian civil society. In social and political sciences the analysis of social movements and organizations occupies a special place as it is connected with the studying of the fundamental component of modern society. Theories explaining the reasons of emergence and development of social movements can be conveniently divided into two groups.[19] The first group consists of theories of collective behavior while the second one includes theories of mobilization of resources. These theories help to identify the reasons and explain the emergence of social and social movements against the background of certain social and economic conditions. The first group of theories emphasizes the fact that social movements arise there where the realization of individual interests becomes practically impossible without the attraction of other members of a community or a group. We are speaking now about the studies of researchers describing the rational behavior of individuals and recognizing the factor of "relative frustration"[20] as the main factor defining their behavior. The second group of theories is aimed at explaining social mobilization through factors of structure and organization, namely the interrelation of social mobilization and opportunities directly through agents. The given theories find the resource factors to be very significant.[21]

Theoretical sources provide different definitions of social movements. If we speak about the general definition then it is important to say that social movements are a set of practices of collective action. When speaking about "social movements" in a more narrow sense of the term one shall specify the characteristics of the given collective action. Firstly,

social movements are purposeful actions with the participants of the social movement being unable to reach a certain goal individually. Secondly, the social movement assumes some readiness of its participants to produce a collective action together and in cooperation. Thirdly, if we are speaking about the purpose of the social movement then we shall take into account its protest character; in other words, we shall identify against whom it is directed, whether it is against the factory manager polluting the environment or against some official or political institute preventing the execution of this or that political decision. The given characteristic makes it possible to speak about the practices of identification of this or that social movement, basically, about the way of identification of that against which the action of the given movement is directed. The following significant characteristic of the social movement is its politicized character. No matter what the purpose of the social movement is its actions will always concern the political sphere (be it observance of this or that law, action of public people, legal registering, etc.).

Another characteristic of the social movement is the type of its actions. The repertoire of actions represents a certain set of forms and ways of expressing the will and achieving the purpose including the means of influence and the means of protest. According to Charles Tilly, the creator of this term, it is a question of forms of institutionalization of actions of social and social movements, "Specific people do not get together for some collective action. They get together to send a petition to parliament, to organize a campaign of phone calls, to protest in front of the city hall or to organize a strike."[22] In other words, the action of social movements is determined by a set of forms of protest, participation and influence defined historically and legislatively. The basis of the given conceptual tool is a simple logic scheme where the actors of social mobilization define the character of the protest actions not so much in relation to the purpose but more in relation to the means which are or can be at their disposal.[23] The logic of actions of the social movement is expressed not so much by the idea of "what we should do" but rather "what we can do". Therefore, trade-union movements, for example, when realizing the interests (protection of the rights of workers) possess a certain set of means from the negotiations with employers to the carrying out of a strike. In this case we are dealing with the institutionalized and organized protest action where the structure or the organization in many respects determines the character of actions. Mass protest actions in the suburbs of Paris and other cities of France can serve as a clearly opposite example based on the same logic that to a greater extent unorganized actions lead to the use of a certain set of protest actions. The absence of the organization and structure also determines the choice of protest forms from "parties" in living quarters up to car burning.

When trying to apply some theories of social movements to the example of Chernobyl organizations with the purpose of defining their place and importance in the formation of the political and social system at the beginning of the 1990s it becomes possible to identify the following qualitative characteristics including the strategy of the Chernobyl organizations, social and political resources, politization of "Chernobyl", and the influence on the political process.

If we speak about the strategy of Chernobyl public organizations it is necessary to mention that by the middle of the 1990s Chernobyl organizations had moved to the tactics of "competent economic agents", i.e., from the strategy of collaboration and cooperation (the attempts to create the co-coordinating committee of Chernobyl funds and the organizations in October 1991) to the strategy of rivalry and competition. As a result the public sector of Chernobyl initiatives was transformed into a truly competitive environment where numerous agents competed for the attraction of resources, preferably foreign ones. The attempts to unite, on the contrary, led to the split of the sector, "There were attempts to create the co-coordinating committee. On the contrary, many unions and organizations are splitting up into independent organizations as they cannot divide the authority and, consequently, the money".[24] The Chernobyl public sector had a certain social network of various organizations and associations working in the same sphere, practically with the same social groups that knew each other.[25] One of the peculiar features of Chernobyl organizations is that the success of this or that organization in many respects depended on the involved social resources, namely, social contacts of its leaders and participants. In other words, social and professional experience of participants greatly determined the success of the organization. Access of one organization to certain resources distinguished it from other organizations and determined its place in the public sector.

In its meaning and importance "Chernobyl" from a sharp social problem has gradually started to be transformed into a "brand" or commercial project. A very limited number of public organizations continued to use it as a real means of solving certain social problems. For this reason organizations were divided into Chernobyl organizations and "purely" ecological ones which did not use the Chernobyl subject and tried to move the emphasis to the forming of ecological consciousness of the population of Belarus.

We shall mention the role of political parties which led to the politicizing and division of "the ecological idea" and "the Chernobyl subject". Ecological parties of Belarus, such as the Belarusian ecological party and the Party of the green, do not use the word "Chernobyl" in the program documents. Thus, we can draw a conclusion that the issue of "Chernobyl" has started to be used exclusively by large political parties applying for authority and a certain place in the political system. The influence of those political parties[26] which did not mention either "Chernobyl" or ecology was insignificant in the political life of Belarus in the middle of the 1990s. Therefore, political parties try to use most favorably both Chernobyl and ecological subjects even if we do not specify that "Chernobyl" is to a great degree the subject of the BNF. Even the communist party in its program mentions "Chernobyl" though the problem of "the responsibility of communist officials for the concealment of the truth about "Chernobyl" should have forced Belarusian communists to refrain from the use of this subject. It is even more so as the Chernobyl political movement and Chernobyl organizations appeared against the background of the anticommunist movement in the post-Soviet countries.

While speaking about Chernobyl organizations it is necessary to specify that their practices are also significantly determined by social ideas about the environment. We shall

agree that "the vision of the environment is based not on the regular analysis of its condition but rather on the idea about it created by numerous movements and mass media".[27] The stronger the influence of an individual on the environment, the bigger is the attention drawn to it, the greater is the number of ecological movements and their supporters, the greater is the number of accidents and the attention of mass media. The role of numerous social movements becomes extremely important. They do not only express any social interest and solve certain problems but also form the idea about the existing social reality and about the social structure of society. In this case social movements acquire certain functions of social institutes. Chernobyl public organizations formed and solved a number of problems connected with the overcoming of consequences of the disaster. At the same time they also formed the population's idea about what "West", "humanitarian aid", "liquidators" and "out migrants" are.

The CNPS disaster strongly influenced the public opinion of the new independent states. It awoke some civil activity, namely, the desire to help and participate in the liquidation of consequences[28] which means personal involvement in the social and political process. Thus, "Chernobyl" became the space for the expression of civil ambitions which had been collected over the Soviet period, the space for the expression of not only anxiety for one's own safety but also the discontent and mistrust with the state and political institutions of authority. The "Chernobyl concept" became a powerful catalyst factor for the expression of social and political reactions".[29]

Chernobyl organizations represent organizations of a new type identified by theoretical sources as "new social movements". The combination of Chernobyl organizations is a parameter of new social movements in the post-Soviet states. Chernobyl organizations differ from simple public associations by their activity being directed not only towards the solving of certain social problems, but also towards the expressing of common values from civil up to Christian ones.

Chernobyl and ecological organizations covered quite a big part of the population and the biggest part of civil activity. To some extent they "drew" social resources from political parties or distracted a part of the population from political actions until the latter started to use actively the symbolical value of "Chernobyl" understanding that it deals with a significant part of the population. "To care for Chernobyl" means to be a politically active and conscious citizen. To know and think of "Chernobyl" and to participate in the activity of a Chernobyl organization was equated practically to the acts of "civil disobedience".[30]

We shall also say that during the identified period (the beginning of the 1990s) the activity of some Chernobyl organizations was aimed at working with authorities. Many active workers noted that during that period it was much easier to work with authorities than at the beginning of the 2000s. During the Soviet period there were also opportunities of cooperation with party structures. When analyzing the attitude of social movements to the political system S. Tarrow suggests to avoid application of the concept "state" and to apply instead the concept "the structure of political opportunities",[31] namely, the level of

openness and perception of the political system in relation to social mobilization, and to analyze collective actions in relation to specific political processes.

Actions of social movements and the internal organization determine their place in political and social space. Kriesi[32] offers a model defining the place of a public organization with the help of two variables: direct participation of its members in the activity of the organization and the direction of activity of the organization (the help of the organization's members or influence on the institutes of authority). According to Kriese, there is a trajectory of development of a public organization from the organizations of self help (an association of citizens to help each other; there were no such Chernobyl organizations for the address groups were oriented only towards the receipt of the external aid[33]), the organizations of the type "service" (serving certain categories of the population or address groups[34]), the organizations of "social movements" to political parties and groups of pressure. The transition from one type of the organization to another determines its trajectory of moving in the given sociopolitical space. We can speak about the institutionalization of a public organization into a pressure group (influence on the authority) or about the commercialization of the social movement upon the transformation of the organization to the "service" one or about concentrating the social movement on itself (the creation of a certain specific field of activity).[35]

Social and civil mobilization in Belarus at the beginning of the 1990s testified to the emergence of the new social practices which made up the basis of civil society. The civil sector was so active that it was possible to speak about the transformation of social mobilization into the political force capable of influencing the social and political order.[36] However, civil mobilization did not manage to turn from a set of isolated and numerous social practices into a steady social institute of mobilization. In other words, the social movement in Belarus did not manage to institutionalize and to become a part of the political system to answer new challenges of social reality.

Notes

1 According to the directory "Ecological organizations on the territory of the former USSR" there were about 26 ecological organizations of various types, from political parties to groups and musical clubs in Belarus in 1992.

2 Denisjuk, O.L. Neformalnye objedinenija, obshchestvenno-politicheskie dvizhenija, partii v SSSR: predposylki, stanovlenie, razvitie (1985-1991.) Mn.: BGU, 2003; Tereshkovich, L.V. Obshchestvennye dvizhenija v sovremennoj Belorussii: kratkij kommentarij к dokumentam/ Grazhdanskie dvizhenija v Belorussii. Dokumenty i materialy: TSIMO, 1991; ekologicheskie organizatsii na territorii byvshego SSSR. Spravochnik. M., 1992; Babcock, G. A. 1997. The role of public interest groups in democratization. Soviet environmental groups and energy policy-making, 1985-1991. Dissertation.

3 Babosov, Matusevich. Samodejatelnye organizatsii. Minsk, 1989.

4 The activity of national movements in the Baltics can serve as an example.

5 The XIXth national conference of the CPSU identified as positive the fact of the increase of amateur organizations.

6 Babosov, Matusevich. Samodejatelnye organizatsii. S. 10-11.

7 Ibid. P. 5.

8 Denisjuk, O.L. Neformalnye objedinenija, obshchestvenno-politicheskie dvizhenija, partii v SSSR: predposylki, stanovlenie, razvitie (1985-1991.) Mn.: BGU, 2003; S. 57.

9 Sonja D. Schmid Transformation Discourse: Nuclear Risk as a Strategic Tool in Late Soviet Politics of Expertise Science Technology Human Values, 2004; 29; Babcock G. A. 1997. The role of public interest groups in democratization. Soviet environmental groups and energy policy-making, 1985-1991. Dissertation.

10 Babcock, G.A. 1997. The role of public interest groups in democratization. Soviet environmental groups and energy policy-making, 1985-1991. Dissertation, P. 10-11.

11 In this case we are speaking about the social movement rather than about a group of interests and about the division between general values of "environment protection" and engineering and industrial intervention.

12 Babcock, G.A. 1997. The role of public interest groups in democratization. Soviet environmental groups and energy policy-making, 1985-1991. Dissertation.

13 Despite some successful civil initiatives, such as, for example, the collection of signatures against the construction of a nuclear power station in Vitebsk area in Belarus. Navumchyk, S. Sem' gadou Adradzhennya, albo fragment nainoushaj belaruskaj gistoryi (1988-1995). Varshava: Belaruskija Vedamastsi. Prague: Clovek v tisni, 2006. S. 25-26.

14 Dawson, Jane Irons. Social Mobilization in the post-Leninist societies: the rise and the Fall of the anti-nuclear power movement in the USSR, doctoral dissertation, University of California, Berkley, 1993. P. 4. To learn more about the development of national, ecological and anti-nuclear movement in the USSR and in the countries of the former USSR see also: Dawson J. I. Eco-Nationalism: Anti-Nuclear Activism and National Identity in Russia, Lithuania, and Ukraine. Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1996. The interrelation of ecological and national ideas are described also in some publications of Y. Shevtsov, A. Hvezhenko: Chernobylskij sotsium. Pervaja postindustrialnaja natsija? Chast' tretja: Chernobylskaja ideologija. Sbornik statej. Izdatelstvo "Belyj svet" i Almanah Geopolitika. Minsk, 2002.

15 Zam, A. Na puti v transnatsionalnoe obshchestvo? Belarus i Chernobylskaja pomoshch. Osteuropa. # 4. 2006. S. 105-116.

16 "From the reports of Belarusan government from 1993 according to which 82 % of all help received by then had been provided by non-governmental organizations" (Zam, A. Germanskie initsiativy po Chernobylu cherez 20 let. Motivy, dejstvija, perspektivy. Internationale Politik, March-April 2006, S. 40).

17 Messing, M. Obshchestvennye organizatsii Belarusi. Obzor, 1995. S. 8.

18 Ibid. S. 11.

19 In literature in the Russian language main works on sociology of social movements include a number of books. It shall be taken into account that the last direction has never been widely widespread in Russian-speaking scientific circles: Sotsiologija obshchestvennyh dvizhenij: empiricheskie nabludenija i issledovanija / Otv. red. V.V. Kostjushev. V 2 t.; SPb.: SPbF iS RAN, 1993. Zdravomyslova, E.A. Sotsiologicheskie podhody k analizu obshchestvennyh dvizhenij // Sotsiologicheskie issledovanija. 1990. # 7. S. 88-94; Paradigmy zapadnoj sotsiologii obshchestvennyh dvizhenij. SPb.: Nauka, 1993.172 s.

20 Ted Gurr. Why men rebel? Princeton, 1970.

21 The following authors are considered to be the founders of the theory of mobilization of resources: Oberschall. Social conflict and social movements. Prentice Hall, 1973; Gamson. The strategy of Social Protest. Wadsworth Pub., Belmont, 1990 (1st edition 1975); Tilly. From mobilization to Revolution. Addison - Wesley, Reading, Mass, 1976; McCarthy and Zald. Resource mobilization and Social movements: a Partial Theory American Journal of Sociology. Vol. 82.1977. P. 1212-1241.

22 Tilly, C. From mobilization to Revolution. Addison - Wesley, Reading, Mass, 1976. P. 143; Tilly, C. La France conteste de 1600 a nos jours. Fayard, Paris, 1986.

23 When we speak about the range of actions as a set of forms of expression of protest or disagreement, it is necessary to remind that the range of actions represents historically fixed forms of protest, namely, those which correspond to a certain type of social, economic and political relations. Charles Tilly has been carrying out research on the change of the range of protest actions in France from 1600 till 1980 comparing two historical periods identified with the help of the social and political modernization of the industrial revolution epoch. Tilly establishes the interrelation between the form of all protest actions and the type of the public system. Tilly, C. La France conteste de 1600 a nos jours. Fayard, Paris, 1986.

24 From the interview of G. Grushevoj "Italy" has been taken away, Chernobyl remains... (Delovoj vestnik, 1992, # 3-4).

25 "They do not want to unite because they know each other too well" (from S. Evlash's interview, society "Deti v bede", Delovoj vestnik, 1992, # 3-4).

26 Out of 19 parties registered in 1994 8 political parties do not mention either "Chernobyl" or ecology in their program documents.

27 Gavin Walker. Sociological theory and the natural environment // History of the Human Sciences. Vol. 18.1. P. 80.

28 Numerous letters from readers published in the press prove this.

29 Sonja D. Schmid Transformation Discourse: Nuclear Risk as a Strategic Tool Late Soviet Politics of Expertise Science Technology Human Values. 2004. 29, 353.

30 Numerous attempts to return to the deserted villages in 1989 showed that people disobeyed the Soviet authority.

31 "Political opportunity structure": Tarrow, S. National Politics and Collective Action: Recent Theory and Research in Western Europe and the United States // Annual Review Sociology. 1988.

32 Kriesi, H. Sviluppo organizzativo dei nuovi movimenti sociali e contesto politico // Revista italiana di scienza politica. Vol. 23.1.1993. P. 67-117.

33 In this case we could speak about public organizations engaged in psychological rehabilitation of the suffering population where the direct participation of the victims was a necessary condition.

34 This type of the organization could include the biggest part of "Chernobyl organizations" dealing with humanitarian aid, improvement of children's health abroad, supply of medicines and medical equipment.

35 Neveu, E. Sociologie des mouvements sociaux (Sociology of social movements). 4 edition. La Decouverte, 2005.

36 This can correspond to the rise of "new social movements" at the end of the 1970s – the beginning of the 1980s in Germany, Italy and Holland: new feminist movements, development of civil initiatives, antinuclear movement, alternative movements, and movement for piece, human rights and in support of the countries of the third world.

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